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Abstract
Smartphones have become ubiquitous and provide considerable benefits for users. Personal
data considered both sensitive and non-sensitive is commonly stored on smartphones. It has
been established that the use of smartphones can lead to users enjoying less privacy when
a data leak occurs. In this thesis, we aim to determine if smartphone stored non-sensitive
data can be analyzed to derive sensitive information. We also aim to develop methods for
protecting smartphone users from privacy attacks. While privacy research is an active area,
more work is needed to determine the types of inferences that can be made about a person
and how accurate a profile is derivable from smartphone data.
We demonstrate how straightforward it is for third party app developers to embed code
in inconspicuous apps to capture and mine data. Our studies show that there are a large
number of apps found in popular app stores commonly requesting special app permissions in
order to gain access to sensitive data. In most cases, we could not find any functional benefits
in exchange for accessing the sensitive data. Additional data not local to the device but rather
stored on a social networking service can also be extracted and unnoticed via mobile apps
provided the user has social networking apps installed. Current research shows that users
do not easily comprehend the implications of granting apps access to sensitive permissions.
Apps can transfer captured data to cloud services easily via high-speed wireless networks.
This is difficult for users to detect since mobile platforms do not provide alerts for when this
occurs. With access to sensitive mobile data, we developed and performed a number of case
studies to learn details about an individual. Modern smartphones are capable of sending
continuous location updates to services providing a near real-time proxy of where a user is
located. We were able to determine where a user was traveling simply by analyzing the point
of interest results from continuous location queries sent to a location-based service without
referencing user location data. With continuous location data, we were able to determine
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the personal encounters between individuals and relationships in realtime. We also found
that even diagnostic data commonly used to debug apps that appears to be anonymous is
useful in identifying an individual. Mobile devices disclose the indoor location information
of the user indirectly via the wireless signals emitted by the device. We were able to locate
users indoors by analyzing Bluetooth beacons within a 1m accuracy by using a localization
scheme we developed. With the understanding that mobile data is sometimes needed by apps
to provide functionality, we developed a system called PrivacyPalisade designed to protect
users from revealing sensitive information. The system detects when apps are requesting
uncharacteristic app permissions based on the app’s category.
Overall we found that mobile smartphones store seemingly non-sensitive data that can
reveal sensitive information upon further inspection and that this information is easily ac-
cessible. In turn, an analyst can use this data to build a detailed individual profile of private
and sensitive information. With the growing number of users expressing privacy concerns,
techniques to better protect privacy are needed to allow manufacturers to meet their users’
privacy requirements. Our proposed protection methods demonstrated in PrivacyPalisade
can be adopted to make smartphone platforms more privacy aware.
Thesis Contributions: In this thesis, we show how sensitive information can be in-
ferred from seemingly innocuous data and propose a protection system by performing the
following:
• Provide a comprehensive literature review of the current state of privacy research and
how it relates to the use of smartphones.
• Demonstrate an inference attack on trajectory privacy by reconstructing a route using
only query results.
• Develop an algorithm that combines range-based and range-free localization schemes
to perform indoor localization using Bluetooth with accuracies of up to 1m.
• Analyze diagnostic data commonly sent by smartphones and used it to identify users
in a dataset with accuracies of up to 97%.
• Develop an algorithm to infer potential encounters of smartphone users in realtime
by proposing the use of a constraint nearest neighbor (c-NN) spatial query.
• Develop and demonstrate PrivacyPalisade, a system developed for Android with the
aim of protecting against privacy attacks.
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Smartphones are used frequently in everyday life and provide great convenience for users.
The capabilities of smartphones have extended far beyond communications with users per-
forming activities ranging from work related tasks including sending emails and writing
documents to entertainment such as playing games and watching movies. Smartphone oper-
ating systems provide a powerful alternative to performing functions traditionally performed
on a PC. Although smartphones provide great benefits, researchers have expressed privacy
concerns due to the storage of sensitive data stored, such as location, on smartphones [1].
The smartphone is likely the most personal device users own and likely contains more
sensitive information than any other device that users possess. This has led to privacy con-
cerns in the event an adversary gains access to an individual’s smartphone data. Smartphone
related privacy threats are also becoming a conscience concern amongst the general public.
On an individual’s smartphone, it is common to find personal emails, banking information,
browsing history, meeting schedules, location tracks, call logs, personal text messages and
numerous other types of sensitive information. Furthermore, a smartphone is likely to pro-
vide a complete digital profile of a user because it synchronizes with other devices such as
desktop PCs and cloud services. The scale of personal information captured daily has long
been a concern of pervasive computing research community [2].
The success of smartphones combined with advancements in mobile network infrastruc-
ture has created a strong market for third party apps, cloud storage providers and location-
based services (LBS) [3]. These apps and services are used frequently by smartphone users.
For example, a user looking up a map would reveal their location to an LBS and a third party
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app used to send text messages would have access to user contacts. Mobile apps and services
greatly enhance the functionality provided by the smartphone but have the consequence of
causing data to be sent to these third party providers.
Mobile data privacy has become a well-researched topic in pervasive computing [4].
However, more research is needed to determine the possibility of learning personal infor-
mation about a user from mobile data. For example, it may be possible to determine user
encounters with other users from location data or determine the identity of a person by sim-
ply looking at the mobile sensors. We demonstrate techniques and algorithms that reveal
sensitive information about a user and personal interactions based on data stored on a mo-
bile device. It is often speculated that an analyst can infer personal information from mobile
data, although literature to highlight tools and techniques utilized to invade user privacy is
scarce. We aim to use raw data from a variety of sensors on a mobile device to determine
user behavior.
1.1 Smartphones as a Data Sensor
Modern smartphones have advanced hardware capabilities embedded directly into the de-
vice that apps can leverage to provide functionality. The combination of multiple hardware
features allows apps to provide advanced functionality for the user. For example, song de-
tection apps use the microphone to detect audible songs and provide the user with the name
and artist of the song. Sophisticated sensors including the accelerometer, gyroscope and
temperature instruments allow a mobile phone to sense the surrounding environment. The
radio capabilities allow for connecting to high-speed cellular networks, WI-FI networks and
Bluetooth devices. The high quality front facing and back facing cameras allow a device to
capture images and video of the environment. Location sensing with accuracies of up to
five meters is possible through the combined use of inbuilt GPS and localization schemes
providing known cell tower locations.
Smartphone software provides sophisticated functionality for the user via a highly ac-
cessible user interface. It has been found that users find it easier to perform certain tasks
such as online browsing on smartphones than on a traditional PC [5]. The software capa-
bilities of smartphones is now competitive to traditional PCs. For example, there is a host
of office suite apps available for smartphones and tablets that provide similar functionality
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Figure 1.1: Smartphone Data Sent to Remote Servers to be Analyzed to Infer Sensitive
Information
to Microsoft Office commonly used in the workplace. Currently the Android and iOS mo-
bile and tablet operating systems are dominating the market [6]. Mobile operating systems
provide a development kit and third party APIs that allow programmers to create their own
applications and make use of the advanced capabilities of the device. This has led to the
creation of millions of apps across a diverse range of categories including communications,
games, navigation, social networks, dating, fitness and office apps.
While smartphone platforms are sold with base functionality, much of the additional
functionality is provided by third-party apps. It is estimated that users spend as much as
85% of smartphone usage time interacting with apps [7]. These interactions can lead to
apps storing and retaining personal information. Current platforms have made it accessible
to make use of device functionality and access the data stored on a device. Early smartphone
operating systems such as Symbian took a very strict approach to granting third party apps
access to core functionality. For example, each time a third-party app required a location
update, the user would be promoted to allow the app or disallow the app to access the GPS.
The latest platforms including Android and iOS relaxed these requirements to make the
platforms more developer friendly to access key data and user-friendly to not be constantly
warned that certain personal information is going to be accessed. This architectural deci-
sion was a contributing factor as to why these platforms experienced great market success,
however came at the expense of sacrificing user privacy.
Modern smartphones have the capability to access high-speed cellular networks and
WI-FI networks that allows apps to easily download data. For example, a music app can
stream directly from a cloud server. This same capability can be used to send data captured
on the device itself to remote cloud servers at high speeds. Dropbox, for example provides
the ability for users to backup a smartphone’s photo album on to cloud storage. While this
is a legitimate application, apps that do not require access to photos could easily perform
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the same function in the background. It is difficult for the user to detect when data transfer
is occurring as no indication is given as to what data is being sent.
Software capabilities being made available to third-party developers has led to the cre-
ation of millions of apps enjoyed by users. This in turn has the side effect of the capturing
and storing of user data. Captured sensitive and data considered non-sensitive can be sent to
remote servers and be mined to infer personal information. In the next section, we describe
how mobile data can be captured.
1.2 Capturing Smartphone Data
Modern smartphone platforms provide developers access to data stored locally on a device.
The smartphone OS provides function or method calls that allow apps to access function-
ality on the device or sensitive information stored. These API calls are well documented
and easily accessible by developers. Furthermore, there is also a range of undocumented
calls that could be used to obtain additional information. Undocumented API calls are not
intended to be used by third party apps and are often found through a process of reverse
engineering. Although apps that make use of undocumented calls tend to be removed from
repositories, not all apps are detected.
Third-party apps can also provide hooks for other apps to make use of the functionality
they provide. This is common with social networking apps where they provide calls that
can access user data stored on remote services not local to the device. This provides an
additional mechanism for apps to access sensitive data. Thus, even data that is not local
to the device can be accessed provided a user has social networking apps installed. An
additional privacy issue with apps providing their own internal APIs is that it circumvents
the smartphone’s privacy protection mechanisms and relies on the developer to provide one
which, may not have the same privacy guarantees.
Early smartphone platforms such as Symbian required the developer obtain a special
certificate to access sensitive calls. This requirement has been relaxed by modern platforms
to make it easier for developers to create apps. There are a large number of API calls that
allow for easy collection of user information via public APIs. We demonstrate how to send
data to a remote server without the user being aware. Furthermore, we detail a process
for storing the data in a relational manner making it easy for an analyst to derive insights
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through methods such as joining certain data points with additional data sources. Appendix
1 describes the details of how to capture smartphone data and demonstrates how to build a
data warehouse of the user data.
The ability to easily collect mobile data via third party apps can put a smartphone user’s
privacy in jeopardy. When combining many different types of data together and then further
applying inference techniques, a more complete picture starts to emerge about an individual.
Many users will not be comfortable with these profiles being created about them. Further-
more, derived profiles can affect a user’s ability to access financial or insurance services
given they are shared among parties if they can be accessed by the service providers.
1.3 Smartphone Privacy Protection
The main challenge users are experiencing in regard to securing their mobile privacy is mod-
ern platforms do not provide sufficient capabilities to safeguard privacy. Data leakage can
occur through the use of third-party apps. The most popular smartphone operating system,
Android, relies on a permissions system that warns users before installing an app of what
types of data the app can access. However, studies show that many users do not comprehend
or simply ignore warning dialogs at installation time. Dialogs have also shown to be ignored
in other settings such as accepting a EULA agreement [8]. Other systems including iOS rely
on app review process to determine if the types of data the app is accessing is appropriate,
however the review process conducted by Apple is manual and is not made fully transparent
to iOS users, thus users have to place their faith on the review process.
Once an app is installed and being frequently used by a smartphone user, there is no
indication of when certain data is being accessed and if it is being sent to remote servers.
Modern smartphones are secure but do not guarantee user privacy due to issues of data
leakage. It is possible to access data through third party apps such as games that are popular
being developed with an intention of mining for user data. Thus, app stores or repositories
are commonly being used as a launching pad to collect data. Even the use of services such
as a LBS or fitness tracking apps can reveal sensitive habits.
Early methods of privacy protection were restrictive, blocking any call to features that
may pose a risk. For example, the device would prompt the user for permission to grant
an app access to capture a location sample at each update. Modern platforms relaxed these
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restrictions to lower the barrier of entry for developers to create innovative apps. Features of-
ten require access to sensitive data, for example communications apps require access to the
contacts. Protection apps that allow the user to block certain permissions from all installed
apps have been made available. A notable example includes Stowaway [9]. In practice, this
caused many apps to crash as developers do not usually guard against not being able to
access sensitive calls once the user grants permission at installation time. The relaxing of
these requirements has exacerbated issues pertaining to data leakage.
It is extremely difficult to access mobile data stored internally when a device is locked
as the data will be wiped if the lock screen is bypassed [10, 11]. Smartphones usually make
a user wait a number of minutes if too many attempts are made at entering the passcode
without success. Thus, successfully attacking a passcode via brute force is not viable. In a
recent case, the FBI attempted to gain access to a suspect’s device to help solve an inves-
tigation. Apple refused to engineer an exploit to their device and the case received a lot of
media coverage and ignited debate on whether or not Apple should unlock the phone [12],
eventually a firm in Israel had an exploit that unlocked the device. Thus, it is difficult to
invade user privacy via bypassing device security.
A major hurdle for smartphone users in safeguarding their privacy is there are not many
configurable privacy options. Steps users can typically take to help secure privacy are to
use complicated passcodes, encrypt any device storage, install a VPN and install anti-virus
apps. Unfortunately, these methods do not protect the user from third-party apps that need
to access private data required to provide functionality. Once the data is accessed, it can be
sent to remote servers. A user may not be made aware when private information is sent to a
remote service.
1.4 Famous Privacy Breaches
Privacy researchers have long established the risks of data being shared with third parties
or made public. The problem of publishing data in a privacy-preserving manner has been
found to be a hard problem to solve since enforcing really strong privacy controls can reduce
the utility of the dataset to the point where it is not usable for analysis [13]. While solutions
exist, there is no general solution that works well in all circumstances. Even though privacy
risks exist, the benefits gained by sharing data is considered in many cases to outweigh
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the risks. However, in the event of a data breach, there are often serious reputational and
possible legal repercussions. There are a few famous cases that have received considerable
mainstream media attention involving large multinational companies.
Carrier IQ was a company that provided diagnostic information of smartphone usage
to mobile service providers. The software provided was found to be capable of capturing
sensitive information including text messages, retrieving call logs, recording phone calls,
logging keystrokes and overriding user location settings to force capture location samples
[14]. Many users were unaware that this software came preloaded with their smartphone and
in many instances, it was not a straightforward process to disable or remove the software.
The discovery of this software created a lot of controversy that in part eventually led to the
company no longer being active.
Shanghai Adups Technology Company was recently found to have preinstalled software
designed for Android smartphones. The software collects a wide array of sensitive user
information similar to Carrier IQ and sends it to a remote server every 72 hours [15]. In this
case, service providers were not aware of the software and it is unclear how many devices
have been affected.
AOL intentionally released search data in 2006 publicly for research purposes for a
large percentage of their user base. While the release was intended for academics, it was
accessible to everyone. Only the user ID and the search terms were made available, search
queries are sensitive and user IDs were consistent for each user. Thus, once a user ID was
de-anonymized, all their search history was viewable. The New York Times successfully
identified a user and even found a photo of them online [16]. Another user referred to as
“User 927” had an unusual search history which was the subject of an online analysis [17].
The search history was even made into a play and the user was eventually identified. There
is now debate as to whether or not it is ethical to use the data given it has been mirrored by
many websites.
Netflix crowdsourced their recommendation system and offered a million dollar prize
to whom created the best model. To facilitate this, a training and a testing dataset were
released to participants. Netflix took a simple approach to securing user privacy by replacing
customer IDs with random IDs. Researchers from the University of Texas were able to
perform a background knowledge attack by using data from alternative movie databases
including IMDB [18]. Users were de-anonymized which compromised their privacy. The
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privacy model employed did not take into account publicly available datasets that provide
auxiliary information to perform linkage attacks that have shown to be theoretically possible
in the literature.
With the advent of big data and recent commercial interest into data mining, we will
likely see more privacy breaches in the future as data is more likely to be freely exchanged
amongst parties or made publicly available online. There are recently available crowdsourc-
ing services such as Kaggle [19] that allows organizations to make datasets available online
to individuals from various disciplines that compete to produce the best performing model
with top performers receiving a prize.
In Chapter 2, we provide details on how these breaches can be performed and possible
protection mechanisms that can be employed to make it more difficult for an adversary to
derive sensitive information. The interest into crowdsourcing data mining is driving the need
to provide a privacy aware way of exchanging datasets. In order to make datasets privacy
aware, a knowledge of what can be inferred is required which is a primary focus of this
thesis. This directly affects smartphone users as it will be likely that information sourced
from a device will be considered valuable for research purposes.
1.5 Sensitive Inferences Made from Smartphone Data
In this thesis, we present a series of algorithms and techniques to derive sensitive data from
data accessible to smartphones. Our focus is on data that is considered seemingly innocuous
and may be distributed freely amongst parties. We consider data to be seemingly innocuous
when upon manual inspection, it appears it does not reveal much information but can reveal
sensitive insights when applying additional analysis. Our approaches have advantages over
existing protection models such as differential privacy [20], which only tend to work well
for static datasets and are difficult to apply to dynamic datasets such as a user’s mobile data
that is changing constantly through continued interactions with the smartphone.
Mobile apps capture diagnostic data for the purposes of debugging and improving the
quality of an app or service. In our work, we found that users can be uniquely classified
using diagnostic data in isolation. Diagnostic data is considered to be less sensitive and
is freely shared amongst developers. The diagnostic data of open source apps may even
be available for anyone to view online. Types of diagnostic data includes the hardware
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information of the device, user settings and the amount of storage space remaining. Mobile
apps and services often send diagnostic data to a server at regular intervals. This allows
for a profile of how the users’ device changes over time to be captured. We demonstrate
that ensembling a number of diagnostic data points together can lead to the identification of
identifying a user. We identify users with accuracies as high as 90% in a dataset containing
diagnostic data. By showing that users can be identified, app developers should carefully
consider the types of diagnostic data they capture.
The service providers of apps commonly store location query data inputted by the user
on remote servers. An example of a location query could be “what are the closest Italian
restaurants?”. Legislation may not permit a service provider to provide raw personal data
to third parties, but may permit the service provider to exchange the query results with third
parties. We were able to establish an individual’s trajectory to a high degree of precision
given that the individual sends continuous queries requesting the closest point of interest
(e.g. restaurant) from a location service provider. The algorithm to infer the user’s trajectory
is based on the query result locations instead of the actual user locations.
We show that a user’s personal information can be obtained via an indirect approach,
i.e., the storage and exchange of query results. Experimental evaluation indicates in some
cases that a user’s trajectory can be determined to a high level of accuracy given a small
set of points in real scenarios. We found that by simply analyzing the POI locations in the
results of continuous location queries, we were able to recreate the route of the smartphone
user.
The features provided by the Bluetooth wireless communications stack that come with
smartphones as standard can also be used as a sensor to infer sensitive information. We ran
an experiment to determine what information is inferable based on one audible Bluetooth
beacon. Using our data collection app, we placed a smartphone in one location and captured
RSSI data for two weeks. We were able to detect patterns of behavior of individuals when
they walk past a certain room. Interestingly, we were also able to see the common times
they worked during the day since some desktops seem to turn on the Bluetooth transmitter
when the machine is no longer in sleep mode.
We also were able to locate indoor users and learn about their activities by capturing
signal strengths of their smartphones. Bluetooth is a mature technology that facilitates com-
munications between devices such as headsets, speakers, wearables and other smartphones.
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Bluetooth capable devices in discoverable mode allow for other devices to scan and pair
with it. Paired devices automatically connect to one another when they are within range. A
majority of Bluetooth devices can communicate within a range of 10m. Bluetooth devices
can sense the signal strength of surrounding devices by determining the Relative Strength
Signal Indicator (RSSI).
By simply analyzing the signals emitted with smartphones with no other information,
we found it was possible to infer location of users and possible times of when they will be at
certain locations. Individuals carry their smartphone on their person in most circumstances.
When smartphone users are near each other, the Bluetooth RSSI signal strength informa-
tion of devices in range is available. The RSSI values between devices allows for locating
users. There has been much research in proposing indoor localization schemes using Blue-
tooth. Outdoor localization is considered a solved problem with the use of GPS. The use
of GPS indoors does not work well promoting research into indoor positioning. Localiza-
tion schemes are either range-based or range-free. We propose an approach that combines
both range-based and range-free methods and demonstrate how it can locate indoor users
with an accuracy better than 1m. A smartphone user may not want their location inside a
building such as an office complex to be exposed to others but our research shows that their
smartphones can expose the information indirectly.
Smartphone users revealing their location information can also indirectly reveal poten-
tial social encounters with other individuals. Location information can be used to reveal
interactions between individuals by detecting people within close proximity. An individual
may not intend to reveal their personnel encounters for a variety of reasons, an example be-
ing an individual who is an employee of an organization who wishes to seek other possible
opportunities may not want to let their current employer know.
We developed techniques that use location data to detect encounters between smart-
phone users. Encounters occur between people when they are within proximity to one an-
other. Modern smartphones send location data continuously to services. This provides a
snapshot of the location of users in near real-time. We found that this high level of granu-
larity makes it possible to detect encounters between individuals as they occur.
Mining for encounters at scale is challenging because a distance calculation between
each pair combination of individuals is required to determine the proximity between users.
Nearest neighbor algorithms can be applied to this problem, however they are not efficient.
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We propose the use of a constraint nearest neighbor query (c-NN) which only considers
neighbors that are close. We developed an algorithm that exploits spatial properties to calcu-
late who is within proximity efficiently. The first property we propose considers that people
within proximity to one another must be within the same grid cell or surrounding grid cells.
Grid cells are set to a size where people are considered to be within proximity. The second
property we consider is there is a minimum time people need to be within proximity for
an encounter to occur. We found that we were able to mine for the encounter patterns for
millions of people in real-time.
Overall we demonstrated examples of data, which appears to not reveal much informa-
tion about a user, could in fact reveal sensitive insights. We considered diagnostic data, lo-
cation query results without the actual query, radio signal strength information and location
traces. With these insights in mind, we aimed to develop a system called PrivacyPalisade to
protect users from these insights being drawn by data miners. The system detects apps that
request access permissions to data metrics that are not common for a certain type of app and
alerts users before sensitive data is accessed.
1.6 Proposed Smartphone Privacy Protection
A secondary aim of this thesis is to provide techniques to protect smartphone users from the
aforementioned inference attacks we described. At present, there are few options available
to privacy conscience users that want to realize the full benefit of using smartphones while
preserving their privacy. A privacy conscience user may choose not to use certain apps or
perform certain functions such as using a map for navigation, however they also lose the
benefit of having access to the map. We aim to balance privacy requirements with user
functionality.
A key problem is measuring that if accessing certain data points is justified to provide
certain functionality to the user. We developed an algorithm to detect apps that are suspi-
ciously requesting excessive permissions. The premise is apps with similar functionalities
normally share similar permissions from the user. For example, weather apps normally re-
quire access to location services but do not require access to the microphone. Our algorithm
can identify outliers across each app category when viewing the permissions required by
each respective app. We propose the use of Isolation Forests [21] that have demonstrated
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high performance in detecting outliers even when only limited training data is available.
Our detection algorithm trains an Isolation Forest for each respective category. If an app in
a category is requesting irregular permissions then the Isolation Forest will detect it as an
outlier.
To protect user privacy, we developed a system called PrivacyPalisade. It aims to in-
fer which apps are simply requesting certain permissions for data mining purposes and
what apps actually need the data to provide functionality. The system protects users from
the demonstrated privacy inferences that take seemingly innocent data and derive sensitive
information. PrivacyPalisade balances privacy requirements with the functionality require-
ments of apps. PrivacyPalisade embeds directly into the operating system and assists the
user to make more privacy focused decisions. It attempts to balance the functionality re-
quirements of an app with the types of data an app can access.
PrivacyPalisade classifies apps as either safe, neutral or invasive. An app is safe if it does
not require any sensitive permissions, neutral if the Isolation Forest does not detect it as an
outlier and invasive if the app is detected as an outlier. The app launcher icons are color-
coded based on the level of invasiveness determined. PrivacyPalisade displays a dialog to
warn the user in the event a user opens an invasive app. Data leakage occurring from sus-
picious apps can also be detected by keeping a log of data points that are captured by each
installed app. A smartphone user can make more privacy conscience decisions with Privay-
Palisade. The user can choose whether they want to grant access to data for certain apps.
We found many apps were requesting excessive permissions and conducted case studies of
certain apps. Our system also suggests that smartphone users can also consider alternative
apps that provide the same functionality but require less excessive permissions.
1.7 Research Significance
Smartphones are continuing to advance with more processing power, more sensors, faster
network connections and more advanced software. There are now also additional devices
that can be connected to smartphones that provide even further functionality, e.g. FM radio
receiver. It is not unrealistic to consider that smartphones in the future will become the
primary computing device for many users. Foreseeable development in this area increases
the possibility that even more data needs to be collected by smartphones. Privacy needs to
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be built into device as a part of the design and not considered an add-on in order to provide
effective privacy protection. Achieving this requires a strong understanding into the dangers
of certain data types and what they can reveal.
Demand for data mining smartphone data is growing as smartphones reveal many in-
sights that are useful for research. For example, the use of smartphone data to learn insights
is already being performed by Apple. Users are assured their privacy will be maintained via
using differential privacy mechanisms, which we explain in detail in Chapter 2. More re-
search is needed to understand the privacy implications of exchanging mobile data and how
to protect users. In this thesis, we demonstrate how data considered to be non-sensitive can
infer sensitive information. The insights we provide can also help data providers carefully
consider how to exchange data in a safe anonymous manner.
Smartphones that protect user privacy will be in high demand as the public becomes
aware of the potential privacy implications. The early Internet faced a major barrier of users
trusting it enough to perform tasks such as online shopping and banking. Eventually this was
overcome with advancements in web security. Smartphones may face a similar problem in
the future. A major reason as to why users appear to not be concerned about privacy is they
do not comprehend the implications or are willing to sacrifice privacy for convenience.
Different users will naturally have different privacy preferences depending on a number
of factors. Personality, occupation, lifestyle factors and a host of other reasons could drive
user privacy decisions. For example, some users may feel comfortable with releasing user
specific information such as location tracks while this may be of great concern for other
users. The reasons as to what level of privacy a user expects and the types of data they
wish to secure will depend on a wide range of factors. As smartphones are ubiquitous,
there is a large cross section of many different types of users. Smartphone developers need
to aim to satisfy a large customer base so an understanding of how to satisfy a variety of
privacy preferences is needed. It would be ideal if smartphones allow users to specify what
inferences they do not want to be made and then the device will ensure that relevant data
cannot be leaked. Part of solving this problem is to be able to understand the inferences that
can be made which this thesis contributes to this understanding.
PrivacyPalisade tackles the problem of protecting user privacy as a prototype system.
Our proposals to further secure privacy can easily be adopted by smartphone manufactur-
ers to help safeguard user privacy. Without access to research into preserving smartphone
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privacy, manufacturers may struggle to provide the privacy requirements a subset of their
users will demand. We believe our proposed method contributes to the argument that privacy
should be built in by design into the system itself.
Smartphones have become an important device for users and many users have come to
heavily rely on them. While the functionality smartphones provide are important, so too is
user privacy. Many privacy advocates consider the privacy concerns associated to be severe
and this has put pressure on legislators to propose laws to help protect users. There is already
proposed legislation that will come into effect in the EU in 2018 that will directly impact on
how smartphones need to interact with users. Thus, it is important that these privacy issues
are addressed to allow the smartphone technology to continue to proliferate.
1.8 Contributions
This thesis makes the following contributions:
1. We provide a comprehensive literature review of the current state of privacy research
including dataset privacy, location privacy, trajectory privacy and smartphone privacy
research. There exists a gap in the literature between more general privacy research
and how it relates to smartphones. We discuss the latest privacy research and put it
into context of how it relates to the use of smartphones.
2. We demonstrate an inference attack on trajectory privacy by reconstructing a route a
user potentially traveled along by using query results without knowledge of the GPS
tracks. The properties of a Voronoi diagram with the knowledge of when timestamped
queries are used to incrementally expand out candidate paths. Weighting functions
are proposed to select a potential candidate path. An accuracy level of up to 80% is
achieved using the Microsoft Geolife dataset.
3. We show how Bluetooth can be used to locate users indoors with accuracies of up to
1m by combining the use of range-based and range-free localization methods. Tradi-
tionally, range-based methods use audible beacons and methods such as triangulation
while range-free methods use the information provided by neighboring nodes. We
demonstrate an algorithm that combines the benefits of both to yield more accurate
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results. It is also demonstrated that signal data captured and stored by a Bluetooth
beacon in a static location reveals sensitive information about an individual.
4. We analyzed diagnostic data commonly sent by smartphones and used it to identify
users in a dataset with accuracies of up to 97%. Diagnostic data is often considered to
be anonymous and even public data. While some diagnostic metrics like manufacturer
remain unchanged, dynamic metrics such as the amount of space remaining on flash
storage and user settings change overtime. We trained a naive bayes classifier and we
were able to reliably identify a user with just three consecutive days of training data.
This leads to the assumption of freely exchanging diagnostic data as not invasive to
privacy to be challenged.
5. We developed an algorithm to infer potential encounters of an individual using a
smartphone and continuous location updates to a LBS. The algorithm makes use of
spatial properties that are unique to encounters. We formalize the encounter problem
and propose the use of a constraint nearest neighbor query (c-NN). Unlike traditional
Nearest Neighbor (NN) search that can be too slow for practical user, our algorithm
is capable of mining encounters in real time.
6. We present PrivacyPalisade, a system developed for Android with the aim of protect-
ing against privacy attacks. PrivacyPalisade integrates directly into Android at the OS
level allowing it to monitor user activities and present or warn a user about certain
actions. We developed an algorithm that considers app similarity when measuring
for whether an app is justified to access certain device functionality. The algorithm
makes use of Isolation Forests. PrivacyPalisade uses the algorithm to determine when
to warn users when accessing certain apps.
1.9 Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2. We provide a literature review of the current state of mobile privacy research.
We also present a general background on data mining techniques and how smartphones
currently provide privacy protection.
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Chapter 3. We present an algorithm that can infer the route of users based on the query
result data sent to an LBS.
Chapter 4. We analyze Bluetooth signals emitted by smartphones and present a localization
scheme that can locate users indoors.
Chapter 5. We show how access to continuous location updates can be used to determine
encounters patterns of individuals. We present an algorithm to mine for encounters in real-
time.
Chapter 6. We demonstrate how smartphone users can be identified from diagnostic data.
Chapter 7. We present techniques on how to identify apps that are similar to one another.
We also present PrivacyPalisade, a system designed to protect user privacy.
Chapter 8. We conclude the thesis and present the direction of future work.
Appendix A. We demonstrate how a smartphone developer can construct a data warehouse
of user mobile data.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Smartphones have proliferated in recent years providing considerable benefit to its users.
The benefits have often come at the expense of user privacy either by the user directly or
indirectly revealing information about themselves via interacting with the device. Research
into smartphone privacy is a broad area that overlaps with other research disciplines includ-
ing dataset privacy, location privacy, trajectory privacy, wireless networks and issues related
to the design decisions of smartphones.
Privacy researchers are concerned with technology being used by an adversary to invade
user privacy. The exposure of personal information that leads to privacy concerns fall under
various types of categories including communications, financial, medical, location, politi-
cal and educational. These information types can be captured and stored on a smartphone.
Techniques to protect privacy draw ideas from research areas including the security, legal
and database fields.
The Right to Privacy was published in 1890 and was inspired by issues of general cov-
erage of individuals’ personal lives in newspapers [22]. Laws at the time did not protect
people from published privacy inferences made by the press. Journalists and photographers
were free to take photos or use any other modern recording devices. The article is considered
to be the foundation of modern privacy laws.
Privacy advocates argue that regulations are still not sufficient to protect user privacy
and current laws are outdated relative to current technology [23]. Researchers recommend
privacy be engineered directly into technology by design to protect users [24]. The foun-
dations of information privacy research dates back to the advent of the widespread use of
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modern computers that enable the processing of large quantities of information and com-
pleting complex queries in mere seconds. It is now accepted that users reveal information
directly by storing it on a computer and indirectly through performing tasks such as check-
ing email or browsing the web. Smartphones are capable of performing almost all traditional
computing tasks and specific tasks to mobiles such as phone calls. Potential privacy threats
have been amplified by the use of smartphones.
While privacy is widely considered to be a right, other scholars argue that it is a com-
modity that can be transacted. Online privacy protection, for example, is currently being
treated as a commodity with many online services adopting the freemium model. This is
mainly as a result of relaxed regulations and will be subject to change in the future.
Privacy research is gaining more attention with revelations of government and corporate
data mining programs of users’ personal information. The problem of preserving privacy has
been further exacerbated by the use of smartphones. Concerns expressed by early privacy
researchers have come to fruition with claims of government mass surveillance programs
[25]. Furthermore, agreements have been made between corporations to exchange data to
drive revenue. Individuals have concern for their digital privacy but will act in ways counter-
intuitive to this notion for the convenience of the services offered [26].
Analyzing datasets can reveal sensitive information about a user even when stored in just
aggregate form [27]. It is common for analysts to exchange anonymous datasets for research
purposes when an analysis can be of great benefit to society. Ensuring an adversary cannot
infer sensitive information is a difficult problem to solve. Proposed solutions come from a
variety of fields including cryptography, statistics and theoretical computer science.
Early research into privacy related to smartphones targeted location privacy as it was
considered to be the number one concern preventing users from adopting smartphones [28].
The spatial nature of mobile devices coupled with advanced GPS capabilities allows for
capturing accurate location samples and sending them to remote services in near real-time.
Thus, individual smartphone users can be tracked and inferences from these location tracks
allow for sensitive inferences to be derived. Location samples reveal sensitive insights about
an individual, however an individual’s trajectory has been found to be able to reveal even
further insights prompting the recent research field of trajectory privacy.
Advancements in data mining techniques in combination with streamlined access to user
data via smartphones allow for the discovery of intrusive insights. The adoption of privacy-
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preserving data mining could potentially lead to further insights being discovered in data as
organizations will be better positioned to allow their data to be used without revealing it.
We explore how to perform common data mining functions while considering user privacy.
Smartphone design itself impacts on the level of privacy it affords its users. Modern
smartphone technology cryptographically protects data stored but does not consider pri-
vacy related issues. The success of smartphones has led to the development of millions of
third party apps. The app ecosystem engineered for smartphones can lead to issues of data
leakage. Every modern smartphone has Bluetooth capabilities to facilitate communications
between devices, however Bluetooth has a history of being vulnerable to security and pri-
vacy threats. Malware has also been detected on modern smartphones with characteristics
similar to what can be found on desktops.
Research into smartphone privacy is mainly aimed at technological solutions, however
legislators have also explored enforcing protections legally. Proposed regulatory policies
will influence how smartphones, mobile apps, mobile services and user interactions with
smartphones as they come into effect. We describe how new regulatory policies will directly
affect current platforms and how platforms will need to adapt in order to be compliant.
In this thesis, our primary focus is to determine if sensitive inferences are derivable from
smartphone data that may appear to be anonymous but upon analysis can reveal sensitive
insights. To the best of our knowledge, this is not covered in the literature. The work in this
thesis will help fill this gap contributing to the area of understanding possible inferences
and protection mechanisms.
The foundations of information privacy research highlighted many concerns related to
the technological advancements in storage, retrieval and sharing of information. Smart-
phones with these capabilities present privacy challenges that are relevant to database tech-
nology and desktop PCs. In Section 2.1, we describe identified privacy threats and how they
apply to the use of modern smartphones.
The manner in which organizations store data has shifted from internally managed
databases to making use of cloud storage. Smartphones also make use of cloud storage
in the form of backups or saving personal information. Statistical databases derived for
lower-level records also are commonly managed by organizations. Section 2.2 describes the
progression of data storage in relation to smartphones.
Smartphones contain a wealth of personal information making it an attractive option for
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researchers to access and collect certain types of required information. While there may be
considerable benefit to the research conducted, the manner in how to collect and store this
information has been the subject of much research. Section 2.3 describes potential attacks
and protection models that are commonly used.
The spatial nature of smartphones presents unique privacy challenges due localization
capabilities offered by the device. It is possible to learn the location history of users that in
turn can reveal a wealth of sensitive information about an individual. Location privacy was
once considered a key concern in preventing smartphones from proliferating. We provide an
overview of the wealth of research conducted by the location privacy research community
in Section 2.4.
Localization capabilities of smartphones has progressed from taking just location sam-
ples at various points in time to being able to provide continuous location updates. Con-
tinuous location updates presents further privacy challenges as additional information can
be learned such as frequently used routes. This led to a new line of research in the area of
trajectory privacy which is described in Section 2.5.
Advancements in data mining allow for sensitive and in many cases not obvious in-
sights to be learned about individuals. Many of these techniques employ machine learning
and artificial intelligence techniques. Smartphone data can be utilized by these data mining
approaches to train models. In Section 2.5, we provide a brief overview of common data
mining methods and how to apply them in a privacy preserving manner.
The architectural decisions made by smartphone manufacturers has a direct impact on
how effective they are at securing user privacy. There are also a number of potential attack
vectors an adversary can exploit to gain unauthorized access to a user’s sensitive informa-
tion. Malware is becoming increasingly more common in smartphone platforms while third
party apps that provide legitimate functionality are also increasingly being used as a means
of gathering data. We explore these issues in Section 2.7.
Regulatory approaches are also required to work in conjunction with technological so-
lutions to effectively safeguard user privacy. Privacy is considered to be a UN human right
and new laws coming into effect across many states. In Section 2.8, we explore various reg-
ulatory protections currently being considered and the impact they will have on the design
of smartphones.
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This chapter is organized as follows:
Section 2.1 draws parallels with privacy concerns identified by early privacy research and
how similar problems are arising with the use of smartphones.
Section 2.2 details the progression of how organizations store data from internally main-
tained databases to cloud storage solutions. A discussion of statistical database systems is
also presented which can be populated with smartphone data.
Section 2.3 details privacy concerns related to the storage and exchanging of sensitive data.
Smartphone apps are capable of sending data to databases on the cloud that can be used for
research purposes.
Section 2.4 explores location privacy in detail. Smartphones are capable of producing ac-
curate positioning estimates and location privacy was once considered the biggest barrier
facing smartphone adoption by the masses.
Section 2.5 explores trajectory privacy which is a research discipline extending from lo-
cation privacy that considers a collection of location points to reveal insights that single
positioning points may not reveal.
Section 2.6 details proposals on how to perform data mining while preserving privacy.
Section 2.7 describes how apps can access sensitive information on the device and the pri-
vacy implications. We also explore privacy issues associated by smartphone malware and
from Bluetooth capabilities.
Section 2.8 presents regulatory proposals that will affect how smartphones are designed
in the future in order for them to remain compliant.
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Figure 2.1: Living in a Digital World that Captures Data via Daily Interactions
2.1 Foundations of Information Privacy
Smartphones are the latest iteration of a long line of technological breakthroughs that had
the unintended consequence of reducing privacy. Information technology is becoming more
ingrained in our everyday life. We have come to not only use it ourselves but live in it
through daily interactions [29]. Larry Hunter was the first to express privacy concerns from
the use of desktop PCs in 1985 [30]. Nissenbaum described how information drawn from
public spheres could potentially lead to privacy invasions [31].
In the 1970s, early mainframe systems with database capabilities were deployed in
many organizations. Databases made it easier to store and retrieve information quickly and
have replaced many paper-based methods. In the 1980s, personal computers soon followed,
individuals started creating and storing their own information in digital format. The ad-
vent of the Internet in the 1990s led to the creation and sharing of information making the
exchange of personal information easier than ever before.
Hunter noted that computers can join information together from multiple data sources
to build an accurate profile about a person [30]. With the mainstream adoption of personal
computers, users typically store sensitive information including their contacts, calendar and
documents. An individual can potentially reveal personal and sensitive information that is
not only captured by their computer but also systems they interact with such as mobile
networks, CCTV cameras and bank cards used for transactions.
The creation of the Internet and the World Wide Web (WWW) led to the development
of many web apps. Users directly or indirectly share information that is commonly captured
by these services. For example, online shopping reveals purchasing behavior while instant
messaging reveals personal conversations. User privacy concerns acted as a serious barrier
to commercialization during the advent of the web with a study finding that users did not




Figure 2.2: Mobile Data Stored in a Relational Dataset
enter valid information when signing up for services [32]. To make an online purchase,
a user is required to reveal correct information to complete the transaction. Users were
concerned with the information they need to reveal to make an online purchase.
Just as concerns were expressed with early generations of computing technology, re-
searchers have expressed similar concerns with smartphones as they provide all the capabil-
ities of earlier generation technology with the flexibility of being with a user at all times. A
similar trend that occurred with web apps is now prevalent with smartphones as developers
create mobile apps that replicate many of the web app functions. The amount of sensitive
information users store digitally has increased with the advent of smartphones.
2.2 Datasets and Smartphones
Datasets privacy overlaps with smartphone privacy since sensitive datasets can be derived
from internal smartphone data. It is likely that organizations will provide users enticing of-
fers for access to their data. Smartphones lend themselves to be useful in capturing user data
and creating a structured dataset containing a user’s digital profile. Data stored internally on
the device can be processed into a structured dataset for the purposes of exchange and
analysis. Relational databases such as SQLite are available to install directly on a smart-
phone thereby simplifying the creation of internal datasets. Information rich datasets are
commonly exchanged amongst organizations.
Furthermore, there are now services available that provide user backups of their smart-
phone data such as iCloud. While backups are convenient for a user, they also expose their
personal data to the service. At present, backups are highly encrypted and cannot be ac-
cessed by the service but the user needs to trust the service does not have the decryption
key.
There has been a steady progression from organizations handling their own data man-
agement to outsourcing the function to alternative providers. This has led to a great con-
2. Literature Review 24
Internet
Figure 2.3: Devices Interacting with Cloud Storage Services
centration of data from a variety of sources that when combined are valuable. Datasets are
made up of microdata that can be aggregated to higher orders. Statistical databases store
aggregated data and are widely used to aid organizational decision-making.
In this section we discuss the progression of how organizations store data in Section
2.2.1, microdata in Section 2.2.2 and statistical databases in Section 2.2.3.
2.2.1 Organizational Data Storage
The manner in that organizations have handled the storage and retrieval of data has steadily
changed over the last decade as a result of the development of cloud storage advance-
ments. These advancements have led to a great concentration of data stored on cloud storage
provider data centers from varied organizational sources.
Traditionally, organizational data was commonly stored locally on relational databases
using servers managed by technical staff with any data the organization had collected about
an individual was captured mostly via internal processes. For example, a data entry operator
creating a customer entity in a CRM system. There was great cost associated in managing
internal systems as hardware and software is required to be constantly updated and main-
tained. This led to hosting companies forming that specialize in this function.
Many companies opted to outsource their server management to benefit from opera-
tional efficiency and cost savings. This process involves a private dedicated connection be-
ing established between the host’s data center and a client site. The hosting company itself
had visibility of all their clients’ data, although there are now ways to guard against this
with encrypted file systems.
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ID First Name Last Name DOB
1 David Avery 01/03/1966
2 Claire Scott 15/06/1962
3 Faith Sharp 07/02/1972
4 Adrian Reid 23/07/1990









Figure 2.4: Aggregation of Microdata to a Statistical Dataset
.
Cloud services also became available to outsource hosting to remote Internet servers
such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure. This progressed further to
emerging services specializing in dedicated functions such as CRM or accounting. Sales-
force is a recent example of a tremendously successful online CRM system. While each
client that uses Salesforce is required to enter their own data, Salesforce themselves have
access to all their clients’ data including from multiple direct competitors. These services
have access to a rich dataset that can be exchanged or sold.
There is a legal question of who owns the data. Nevertheless, data mining is being
performed on these data sets. While it is less common for detailed datasets to be exchanged,
microdata and statistical datasets are frequently shared amongst organizations.
2.2.2 Microdata
Microdata often refers to data collected at the individual level. Some examples include age,
address and occupation. Microdata being exchanged is usually protected through mecha-
nisms of data perturbation when being exchanged. The advantage of exchanging microdata
is it allows an analyst to explore the relationship between variables.
Organizations typically remove personal data on the assumption that individuals will
remain anonymous. However, it is often possible to perform re-identification with linking
methods [33] when access to multiple datasets is available. Attacks on datasets make use
of re-linking methods that join a group of datasets together to establish a detailed profile.
Proposed protection models to guard against re-linking methods have been to be effective
in certain scenarios.
2.2.3 Statistical Databases
The widespread use of smartphones lends it to be an attractive option to collect statistical
data of users for research or commercial purposes. The purpose of a statistical database is to
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provide aggregated information to a researcher for a set or subset of records. Consider the
example in Figure 2.4, a table containing individual date of births is aggregated to provide
counts of year of births. Computed statistics range from simple functions including SUM,
MEAN, COUNT, MIN, MAX to more complicated measures such as probabilities [34].
There are major challenges in preserving privacy in statistical databases. Statistical
databases are frequently used in the development of data warehouses that facilitate the gen-
eration of reports used to aid the decision-making. Data is often aggregated before being
exchanged to a higher order such as a zip or postal codes with personal identifiers removed.
It is commonly assumed that detailed individual data is most sensitive. The opposite can
also be true as aggregated data can actually reveal further insights about an individual. In-
specting detailed data manually is laborious and it is easy to miss key details that automated
processes can find. With advances in data mining technology, interactions a person makes
in the public eye is far more accessible.
Turn and Shapiro described the following classifications for statistical databases: offline-
online, static-dynamic, centralized-decentralized and dedicated-shared systems [35]. Statis-
tical databases that provide realtime interaction with the user are considered to be online.
In the offline scenario, the user does not know when a query is going to be processed or
when it will be completed. Statistics are either static and never change or dynamic and are
being constantly updated. Datasets can reside on a centralized server in one database or
be split over multiple databases residing on multiple servers. Statistical database systems
can be classified as a dedicated system that provides data or a shared system in which a
client application will run alongside other applications. Shared systems are more prevalent
in modern databases while early mainframe systems were often dedicated.
Early approaches to protect statistical database systems from users drawing sensitive
inferences focused on conceptual approach, query restriction, data perturbation and output
perturbation. These approaches were subject to much initial research and presented in the
survey [34]. The main focus is to balance quality of output versus individual privacy for
data stored in relational databases. Certain factors need to be taken into account such as
the confidential requirement of certain fields and the types of queries users need to initi-
ate. These solutions normally need to be used in conjunction with one another to provide
adequate protection as not one model is sufficient for all scenarios.
The conceptual model [36] approaches the security problem by providing a framework
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that is implemented throughout the entire development cycle of the statistical database sys-
tem. In this model, there is no query language available, limiting the user to only access
statistics of certain attributes. A distinction is made between the conceptual level data and
the internal data. A kernel controls access to the physical data and ensures access to con-
fidential data is limited. This is achieved using A-populations that ensures at least zero or
two entities are returned, preventing information about a single individual being disclosed.
Noise may also be added to ensure more than one record is disclosed.
Query restriction approaches limit the type of queries users can send to a statistical
database. A straight forward solution is to apply the query-set-size control method that only
allows for a statistic to be released if the number of respondents that make up the aggregate
satisfy a condition [37]. A query-set-overlap control can also be employed restricting the
number of overlapping samples that make up successive queries [38]. While this can protect
from inferences made by one user, it is not effective when multiple users collaborate to
make inferences. A similar approach is to maintain an audit trail of all queries issued and
look for potential compromises [39]. Populations used in statistics can be partitioned to be
mutually exclusive and form what is referred to as atomic populations [40]. A user can only
run statistical queries on each group in its entirety and cannot select a subset. If queries
are combined then both the queries must have complete overlap. Cell suppression can be
applied on static statistical databases [41]. The main idea is to suppress confidential cells
that might lead to sensitive inferences being made.
Data perturbation involves transforming some of the underlying data with values that
conform to an assumed probability distribution or generating statistics based on an assumed
underlying probability distribution and replacing the statistical database. The most common
method is to employ data swapping [42] of the original data with randomly generated data
that still produces the same statistical quantities. This is only practical for static databases
due to the computational requirements. Instead of swapping the data, confidential attributes
can be protected by estimating a probability distribution that describes the field [43]. Care
has to be taken to ensure the probability distribution does not match to closely to the original
attribute otherwise exact disclosure can occur.
Output perturbation changes the output of computed statistics rather than changing the
underlying data as described by data perturbation. One method is to derive a random sample
set each time a query is initiated to compute the required statistics [44]. Another approach is
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to change the actual output of the computed statistics using an independent random variable
[45]. This approach also ensures that a response will eventually be repeated. Rounding
techniques can also be used to ensure that a response to a query conforms to the closest
multiple of a base. Various methods that make use of rounding have been proposed [46, 47,
48, 49, 50].
Modern research in this area now tends to focus on generic dataset privacy models as
opposed to securing statistical database systems. Potential dataset attacks and protection
methods are presented in the next section.
2.3 Dataset Attacks and Protection
In this section, we provide an overview of how data is commonly stored and explore success-
fully performed attacks that violate user privacy. We also detail common protection methods
employed including k-Anonymity, l-Diversity, t-Closeness and differential privacy.
2.3.1 Inferring Sensitive Information in Datasets
Data found on smartphones can be supplemented with publicly available databases to derive
further insights that may be intrusive. Dalenius was one of the first to consider privacy in
statistical databases stating that “anything that can be learned about a respondent from a
statistical database can be learned without accessing to the database” [51]. This goal has
formally been proven to be unachievable.
Even though it is well understood that exchanging statistical databases could lead to pri-
vacy invasions, there are researchers that consider the benefits of what is learned to outweigh
the risk. Special care needs to be taken to ensure the probability of sensitive inferences oc-
curring is low. There have been a number of famous cases where researchers de-anonymized
datasets that were made public. Notable cases include The Netflix prize data, Massachusetts
medical records, AOL search logs, Genome Wide Association studies (GWAS) datasets and
mobility databases. There will likely be more cases as data mining continues to gain trac-
tion. While we detail famous cases that received public attention, there could be more many
cases where inferences are being made in organizations for potential gains with general
public unaware.
A major concern in all the listed attacks is that many of the datasets used were pub-
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licly available. Given an analyst performs a successful attack, if this attack becomes widely
known then the users sensitive data is exposed forever due to the nature of the web. Even
if data is removed online from a host, mirror sites typically cache and collect online data
making it really difficult to remove from every possible source. This was especially true in
the AOL and Netflix cases where search history is still available to download online from
various mirrors. As more of these cases come to light, so too will the exception for organi-
zations to take every possible step to safeguard data.
Terry Gross’s Height: Consider the following example to demonstrate how Dalenius’ goal
is unachievable presented by Dwork in [20]. An adversary wishes to determine the height
of Terry Gross. Assume that there exists a national database of average heights of women
of different nationalities. The adversary has access to the statistical database on average
heights. Auxiliary information is known that “Terry Gross is two inches shorter than the
average Lithuanian woman.”.
An adversary can learn Terry Gross’s height only if he has access to both pieces of
information. Having only the statistical database or the auxiliary information in isolation
yields little information. Even if Terry Gross is not in the database, her height can still be
determined. This is the motivating example for differential privacy, which we will explain
in detail in this chapter.
Netflix Prize: Netflix decided to crowd source a solution for a recommendation system
and offered a prize of a $1,000,000USD to the best predictive model. A training dataset was
released for competing analysts. Netflix removed the data of all sensitive fields and replaced
them with randomly assigned IDs.
Since Netflix is not the only online movie database, researchers joined the Netflix data to
the well-established IMDB movie database to partially de-anonymize the training set [18].
This was accomplished by identifying public reviews for popular movies on IMDB and
capturing all the review information. This dataset was then joined with the Netflix dataset
looking for matches across the same movie and similar reviews approximately around the
same time. The inference attack worked well identifying a subset of the individuals and
revealing their identities. This attack was effective because people who leave reviews for
movies tend to be passionate about movies and leave reviews across multiple sources.
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Figure 2.5: Venn Diagram Showing Linkable Fields Between Two Datasets
Massachusetts Hospital: A privacy attack with potentially more damaging consequences
was performed on medical records. Medical data is often released under the assumption that
if you remove unique identifiers such as name, address, telephone number and government
IDs that patient confidentiality is maintained. Sweeney described a technique to relink data
anonymized by systems including Scrub, Datafly and u-Argus [52].
In this work, the demographic data released from the 1997 Cambridge Massachusetts
voting database that contained demographic data was joined to the Massachusetts hospital’s
anonymized database. Individuals that appeared in both databases were open to having cer-
tain medical attributes identified. The governor of Massachusetts was identified using this
approach. The approach is illustrated in Figure 2.5. Attacks such as this are particularly
worrying because this type of information exposed could effect a person’s ability to receive
health insurance or even effect career prospects.
AOL Search: There is numerous studies supporting the assumption that search history is
personal and can reveal a user’s identity and private information. Search history can easily
be found on a user’s smartphone by opening up their web browser. AOL Search ignored
these risks and released search logs for over 650,000 users covering a three month period
containing every search query. The search queries had a unique ID for each user, thus if
a user was identified then their entire search history could be discovered. The release was
only intended for academics but was publicly placed online with no controls.
Even though the mistake was acknowledged and removed in a few days, the dataset was
mirrored on many websites. A user was identified and exposed in an article with permission
by the New York Times, there have also be claims of other users being identified.
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Scenario Datasets Technique Inferred
Finding Height [20] National Heights Auxiliary Height
Netflix Prize [18] Netflix/IMDB Linkage Identity
Hospital Records [52] Medical Records/Voter List Linkage Identity
AOL Search [16] AOL Search History Linkage Identity
GENOME [53, 54] Genotype Statistics Auxiliary Identity
Table 2.1: Summary of Demonstrated Dataset Inference Attacks
GENOME Projects: Medical research into potential links between human genomes and
common diseases is prevalent and receives a significant amount of attention. Research into
this area could yield important information into improving treatments so there is consider-
able benefits to society into finding potential associations.
The National Institute of Health (NIH) publishes allele counts based on certain geno-
types of individuals that have an ailment and a control group of those that do not. It was
found in [53, 54] that individuals participating in a case group can be identified as having
an ailment when all participants in the case group had the ailment. Due to privacy con-
cerns, the NIH had to discontinue public access to these datasets. DNA just like fingerprints
change very little over time so once it is leaked, it can cause significant breaches in privacy.
Smartphones already collect fingerprint information and will likely collect additional
biometric data such as an IRIS scan as they continue to advance.
2.3.2 k-Anonymity Protection
The principal of k-Anonymity states that “the information for each person contained in
the release cannot be distinguished from at least k − 1 individuals whose information also
appears in the release” [33]. There are properties that exist in a dataset that that make
it more difficult to perform linkage attacks, k-Anonymity being one such property. The
property of k-Anonymity is frequently used when protecting datasets and ensuring user
privacy when accessing systems such as an LBS.
k-Anonymity defines protections for quasi-identifier attributes. The term quasi-identifier
was defined in [55] to represent potentially sensitive attributes. Attributes in a dataset are
considered quasi-identifiers if they are not unique identifiers but can be combined with
other attributes to identify an individual. In order to make a dataset k-Anonymous, quasi-
identifiers need to be generalized or suppressed. Suppression involves removing quasi-
identifiers, curators commonly place a ‘*’ character in its place. Generalization methods
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Zip Code Age Gender Condition
3025 34 Male Heart Disease
3020 39 Male Heart Disease
3021 33 Female Heart Disease
3020 31 Female Heart Disease
3065 54 Male Viral Infection
3065 46 Male Heart Disease
3087 22 Male Heart Disease
3088 25 Male Viral Infection
(a) Medical Data
Zip Code Age Gender Condition
302* 3* Male Heart Disease
302* 3* Male Heart Disease
302* 3* Female Heart Disease
302* 3* Female Heart Disease
306* ≥ 40 Male Heart Disease
306* ≥ 40 Male Viral Infection
308* 2* Male Heart Disease
308* 2* Male Viral Infection
(b) 2-Anonymous Table
Figure 2.6: Medical Data Anonymized
bucket the data range. For example, individuals with an age under 30 can be listed as ≤ 30
as opposed to stating the actual age.
To prevent re-linking of data, k-Anonymity offers scientific guarantees. Various systems
that make use of k-Anonymity have recently been patented. Consider a curator releasing
a dataset where typical identifiers are removed such as name and government issued ID
numbers. However, there exists other types of attributes such as age, sex, zip code that
can be obtained from public records and be joined to an anonymized dataset to identify
individuals. Sweeney proposed a formal framework to evaluate algorithms used to generate
a release of information designed to anonymize data. The following definitions proposed by
Sweeney:
Definition 2.3.1. Attributes Let B(A1, , An) be a table with a finite number of tuples. The
finite set of attributes of B are {A1, , An}.
Definition 2.3.2. Quasi-identifier Given a population of entities U , an entity-specific table
T (A1, , An), fc : U → T and fg : T → U ′, where U ⊆ U ′. A quasi-identifier of T , written
QT , is a set of attributesAi, , Aj ⊆ A1, , An where: ∃pi ∈ U such that fg(fc(pi)[QT ]) = pi.
Definition 2.3.3. k-Anonymity Let RT (A1, ..., An) be a table and QIRT be the quasi-
identifier associated with it. RT is said to satisfy k-Anonymity if and only if each sequence
of values in RT [QIRT ] appears with at least k occurrences in RT [QIRT ].
With these definitions, we can ensure tables are k-anonymous before that are exchanged.
The higher value of k, the greater the privacy. Consider Figure 2.6a that contains medical
information for patients and the 2-anonymous version in Figure 2.6b. Suppression is applied
to the zip code and age fields. Generalization is also applied to ages over 40 by simply
marking them as ≥ 40.
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Algorithms have been proposed to ensure datasets are k-anonymous [56, 57, 58, 59, 60,
61, 62]. Further research into k-Anonymity found drawbacks of using the model for privacy.
Models using k-Anonymity are susceptible to inference attacks as they attempt to retain
partial information about certain dimensions. It was demonstrated in [63] that anonymity
is hard to achieve using k-Anonymity when there are a large number of quasi-identifiers.
Information loss increases steadily as dimensionality increases. The experiments showed
that for Gaussian clusters and k = 2, anonymity was not maintained for over 20 attributes
and information loss was unacceptable for data mining purposes.
It was also demonstrated in [64, 65] that solving for k-Anonymity even for simple cases
of k = 2 is an NP hard problem. An algorithm was proposed using a heuristic that produced
good results in a reasonable running time. In addition to issues in optimally achieving k-
Anonymity, datasets are susceptible to linking attacks that l-Diversity attempted to address.
2.3.3 l-Diversity Protection
l-Diversity has been proposed to overcome some of the shortcomings discovered with k-
Anonymity. l-Diversity proposes that k-Anonymity is maintained as well as ensuring there
is diversity amongst the sensitive values [66]. Algorithms used in k-Anonymity can be con-
veniently adapted to enforce l-Diversity with little effort.
Definition 2.3.4. l-Diversity A q∗-block isL-Diverse if contains at least l “well-represented”
values for the sensitive attributes S. A table is L-Diverse if every q∗-block is L-Diverse
The authors also expanded on the l-Diversity definition to provide variants that can be
more suitable depending on the dataset. These proposals include entropy l-Diversity and
recursive (c, l)-Diversity. Entropy l-Diversity ensures that sensitive values are distributed to
satisfy log(l) in each equivalence class.








is the fraction of tuples in the q∗-block with sensitive attribute
value equal to s
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Zip Code Age Gender Condition
302* 3* Male Heart Disease
302* 3* Male Heart Disease
(a) Homogeneity Attack
Zip Code Age Gender Condition
308* 2* Male Heart Disease
308* 2* Male Viral Infection
(b) Background Attack
Figure 2.7: Attacks on k-Anonymity
Recursive (c, l)-Diversity ensures that the most frequent value can not be determined to
appear frequently.
Definition 2.3.6. Recursive (c, l)-Diversity In a given q∗-block, let Ti denote the number
of times the ith most frequent sensitive value appears in that q∗-block. Given a constant
c, the q∗-block satisfies recursive (c, l)-Diversity if r1 < c(rl + rl+1 + ... + rm). A table
T ∗ satisfies recursive (c, l)-Diversity if every q∗-block satisfies recursive l-Diversity. We say
that 1-Diversity is always satisfied.
The use of k-Anonymity quickly gained popularity and many algorithms were proposed
to process datasets to be k-Anonymous. Even though k-Anonymity provides better protec-
tion by reducing the granularity of quasi-identifiers, it does not protect sensitive attributes
that are the focus of the dataset opening an avenue for inference attacks. The homogeneity
attack and background knowledge attack were presented in [66].
The homogeneity attack can be performed when a dataset contains a group where the
sensitive value is the same for k records. An adversary may know each quasi-identifier of
a particular individual allowing them to learn the sensitive value. Consider the example in
Figure 2.7a, a health insurance company may have auxiliary knowledge of what customers
are in a research dataset. They can link their customer database using a fuzzy match with
quasi identifiers with health research datasets and determine with certainty that individuals
that fall within a certain group have a condition.
Background knowledge of quasi-identifiers can be used by an adversary to deduce be-
tween two or more possible options in a group. The example used in [66] and shown in
Figure 2.7b demonstrated a Japanese patient was identified to be in a group that listed two
possible conditions being “Heart Disease” or “Viral Infection”. The knowledge that heart
disease is not prevalent amongst Japanese patients allows an adversary to learn the condi-
tion is a “Viral Infection” with a high probability of being correct. Figure 2.8 demonstrated
a table that ensures the sensitive attribute being Disease is l-diverse.














Figure 2.8: Quasi-Identifier Equivalence Class Must Have Diverse Sensitive Attributes(s)
Zip Code Age Salary Disease
47677 29 3K Gastric Ulcer
47602 22 4K Gastritis
47678 27 5K Stomach Cancer
47905 43 6K Gastritis
47909 52 11K Flu
47906 47 8K Bronchitis
47605 30 7K Bronchitis
47673 36 9K Pneumonia
47607 32 10K Stomach Cancer
(a) Original Salary/Disease Table
Zip Code Age Salary Disease
47677 2* 3K Gastric Ulcer
47602 2* 4K Gastritis
47678 2* 5K Stomach Cancer
47905 ≥ 40 6K Gastritis
47909 ≥ 40 11K Flu
47906 ≥ 40 8K Bronchitis
47605 3* 7K Bronchitis
47673 3* 9K Pneumonia
47607 3* 10K Stomach Cancer
(b) A 3-diverse Version
Figure 2.9: Dataset Transformed to be 3-diverse
2.3.4 t-Closeness Protection
In t-Closeness, distributions between sensitive values are required to be within a threshold t.
The l-Diversity principle was further refined using an additional principle called t-Closeness
[67]. Researchers noted that the distribution of sensitive values also needs to be taken into
account. A trade off with using l-Diversity is it treats all values in a sensitive field the same,
which could reduce effectiveness of data mining algorithms.
Definition 2.3.7. t-Closeness An equivalence class is said to have t-Closeness if the dis-
tance between the distribution of a sensitive attribute in this class and the distribution of the
attribute in the whole table is no more than a threshold t. A table is said to have t-Closeness
if all equivalence classes have t-Closeness.
t is set to the value enforced on each equivalence class using the Earth-Mover met-
ric. The distance between distributions can be calculated via Earth-Mover metric [68], fre-
quently used within the image-retrieval community to perform image similarity analysis.
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The Earth-Mover metric takes a feature space and quantifies the minimum amount of work
to transform one feature space to another. Consider the space P andQ, the ground distances
between P and Q is defined in the matrix D = dij. F = [fij] is defined as the matrix that
minimizes the overall cost between the flow of P to Q.







fi,j ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n
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While l-Diversity overcomes limitations of k-Anonymity, it suffers from its own limita-
tions being that l-Diversity could be hard to achieve for some datasets, may be insufficient
to prevent attribute disclosure. Consider the case where a dataset only has one attribute in-
dicating the test result for a particular virus with 99% of the samples being negative and 1%
being positive. A test such as this has very different sensitivity within the attribute depend-
ing on the result. A patient may not mind disclosing a negative result but would not want to
disclose a positive result. Ensuring a 2-diverse table would result in heavy information loss.
Attacks can also be performed on l-Diverse tables. The skewness attack and similarity
attack were demonstrated in [67]. When an attribute is heavily skewed, l-Diversity cannot
prevent attribute disclosure effectively. In an actual dataset containing the test results of a
disease, only 1% suffered from the ailment. However, enforcing 2-Diversity implies that
anyone in the resulting dataset has a 50% chance of testing positive. Thus, using l-Diversity
under this scenario leads to a greater chance of a privacy breach occurring on the released
dataset.
A similarity attack can be performed when the attributes are distinct but semantically
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Zip Code Age Salary Disease
4767* ≤ 40 3K Gastric Ulcer
4767* ≤ 40 5K Stomach Cancer
4767* ≤ 40 9K Pneumonia
4790* ≥ 40 6K Gastritis
4790* ≥ 40 11K Flu
4790* ≥ 40 8K Bronchitis
4760* ≤ 40 4K Gastritis
4760* ≤ 40 7K Bromchitis
4760* ≤ 40 10K Stomach Cancer
Figure 2.10: Table that has 0.167-Closeness w.r.t Salary and 0.278-Closeness w.r.t Disease
imply something similar, consider Figure 2.9. If an individual belongs to one class where all
values of another class are the same then a sensitive value could be implied. For example,
an individual may be in a dataset where the sensitive attributes are “Salary” and “Disease”.
All rows where “Salary” is below 3k only have stomach related diseases. Thus, if you knew
an individual was in the dataset and they earn below 3k, it is implied they have a stomach
related disease. This type of attack is similar to the homogeneity attack described earlier.
Using t-Closeness provides an upper bound between the distributions of sensitive values
between the real and anonymized dataset and is considered to be more effective than many
other privacy preserving techniques for numeric attributes [69]. Figure 2.10 demonstrated
how t-closeness is enforced for the dataset we discussed in Figure 2.9a.
2.3.5 Differential Privacy Protection
The aim of differential privacy is to maximize individual privacy in a statistical database
while still allowing the dataset to provide accurate information. Apple have recently an-
nounced that they will be adopting differential privacy and building it into iOS. Differential
privacy allows researchers to exchange statistical databases with high utility while maintain-
ing the privacy of participants. The definition used in differential privacy can be applied in
both interactive and non-interactive settings. This is achieved through very rigorous mathe-
matical definitions inspired from work in the cryptography community.
A curator using differential privacy can provide a guarantee that the ability to infer any
individual in the set is the same regardless if they opt in or out of the dataset. Furthermore,
an answer provided by an individual in the dataset has no significant impact on the released
results relative to other participants. Differential privacy aims to ensure that the insertion or
removal of any element in a database has a low chance of influencing the outcome of any
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Figure 2.11: Adding Noise via the Laplace Distribution to Satisfy Differential Privacy
analysis. When joining a database onto other databases, no risk is incurred of additional
information being inferred. It is assumed that information that is distributed could be used
to reveal other types of information about an individual.
To ensure the probability of learning about each individual dataset is the same, we can
check the output of each privacy function that exports data and see how the probability
can change with the insertion or removal of individual rows. Consider the pair of databases
(D,D′) where they differ by only one row, thus one database is the subset of the other
database that is larger.
Assume databases D1 and D2 contain a set of rows that differ by at most one element.
Consider an algorithm a curator applies to share a dataset using the randomized function K.
The function is applied to so that the data can be released with privacy protections in place.
The input is the data set while the output is the released information. Differential Privacy is
achieved if the following definition can be satisfied:
Definition 2.3.9. Differential Privacy Requirement A randomized function K gives ε-
differential privacy if for all data sets D1 and D2 differing on at most one element, and
all S ⊆ Range(K),
Pr[D1 ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)× Pr[D2 ∈ S]
where the probability space in each case is over the coin flips of K.
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Various algorithms K have been proposed to satisfy the differential privacy require-
ments though techniques such as adding noise [70, 71]. While Differential privacy does not
provide an absolute guarantee, it does provide a very strong guarantee as the probability of
information being inferred is a function of a pre-determined probability.
The Laplace mechanism [70] demonstrated in Figure 2.11 was the first method proposed
by the same authors that formally defined differential privacy. The main idea is to add noise
as per the Laplace distribution in areas of a dataset that is not differentially private. Approx-
imatively 1/ε multiplied by the effect of any individual in the set can have on an outcome
leads to eε ≈ (1 + e).
The exponential mechanism was later proposed and allows for more general properties
of the dataset such as categorical values to be maintained [71]. For example, a curator may
wish to a dataset of eye colors of the group of people in a way that allows queries such as
what is the most common eye color without revealing the eye color of any participant. The
exponential mechanism ensures that the probability of queries such as the one aforemen-
tioned being answered correctly increases exponentially.
2.4 Location Privacy
Smartphones are used frequently to capture location samples of a user. Thus, the study of
location privacy is crucial in understanding of smartphone privacy issues. Location privacy
has developed in recent years into a well-researched area with protection techniques avail-
able to keep user location data private as well as providing an understanding of the types of
location attacks that are possible. Smartphones with GPS capabilities can capture location
samples with accuracies as high as 5m and can also determine location from coarse location
data such as cell tower and WI-FI point locations. Location tracks are a quasi-identifier [72]
due to the possibility of being able to identify a user and therefore are considered to be
sensitive information.
The initial motivation for location privacy research was users exposing their location
was considered a barrier for location technologies such as smartphones to proliferate. Duck-
ham and Kulik defined location privacy as “a special type of information privacy which
concerns the claim of individuals to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extra
location information about them is communicated to others” [73]. Current smartphones do
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not satisfy location privacy by this definition. The authors also formally defined obfuscation
[74, 75] that aims to protect user location privacy by degrading the quality of location in-
formation. The idea of obfuscation refers to degrading the quality of positioning estimates.
Inaccuracy was defined by the authors as providing a positioning estimate that is differ-
ent from the actual estimate and imprecision was referred to as meaning multiple possible
locations.
An individual revealing their location can put them in serious danger if they are being
maliciously targeted. They may be exposed to unsolicited advertising or denied insurance.
For example, a health insurance provider may deny cover if it is known that a user visits the
doctor frequently under the assumption they will make a claim. More serious consequences
include the possibility of an individual falling victim to physical abuse or having their rep-
utation damaged from the exposition of socially compromising areas they may visit.
There has been a number of location inference attacks demonstrated that can violate an
individual’s location privacy, which we will explore in Section 2.4.1. Protection methods
including anonymity, obfuscation and the use specialized query processing. Obfuscation is
explored in Sections 2.4.2 and Section 2.4.3. Spatial cloaking is detailed in 2.4.4. Location
based service architectures are covered in Section 2.4.5. Application specific queries are
discussed in Section 2.4.6. Users often want to exchange utility for privacy with approaches
with suggestions on how to achieve this explored in Section 2.4.7. Measuring location pri-
vacy is a difficult problem explored in Section 2.4.8. Numerous studies have also been
performed on attitudes towards location privacy discussed in Section 2.4.9.
2.4.1 Inference Attacks using Location
Sensitive inferences about an individual can be made from analyzing their location data.
There may be places a person visits that they consider private and do not want to share.
For example, an employee may not want to let their employer know they are being inter-
viewed for a job at a competitor during their lunch break. Manually analyzing individual
location samples can lead to intrusive assumptions being made. We focus on algorithmic
methods that analyze location data to revealing inferences that are not obvious from simple
inspection. These are referred to as inference attacks in the literature.
Modern production LBSs offer little privacy protection despite there being a wealth
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of location privacy research demonstrating privacy preserving methods. Location inference
attacks are developed by the community to promote the understanding that stronger protec-
tions should be adopted by LBS providers. There are multiple attack vectors an adversary
can explore to draw sensitive inferences. Most inference attacks take advantage of move-
ment patterns to draw inferences. Attacks demonstrated in the literature assume some level
of protection such as pseudonymity being enforced. Pseudonymity is the most common
method to preserve anonymity for location tracks [76] and requires identifiers to be replaced
with an unidentifiable value.
It was demonstrated in [77] that even when a pseudonym was not present, location tracks
could still be correlated to specific users. The authors applied a modified version of Reid’s
algorithm that is used for multi target tracking [78]. The algorithm makes assumptions and
re-evaluates them when new information becomes available. The authors also successfully
applied the attack on real would GPS data [79]. An alternative approach demonstrated in
[80] made use of side information such as social media checkins. It was found that only
10 pieces of information were required to identity 30%-50% of an individual’s path. An-
other attack that assumed the use of a location based social network used relative distances.
The strategy used was to fake positioning estimates at different locations in order to ob-
tain relative distances between an adversary and a user at multiple locations allowing for a
triangulation attack to be performed [81].
Interestingly in [82], the authors assumed that location data would be available for a
short amount of time to train a predictive model for data mining purposes. This process is
typical in the data mining community. By using a Markov chain model, it was found even
when the data underwent sanitation via adding spatial and temporal noise. Social media
check-in data containing time and location was used in [83] to train a model that could infer
detailed demographic information to a high accuracy. The authors showed how their model
could successfully predict age, gender and education.
A study published in Nature analyzed the movement data for one and a half million
individuals collected over fifteen months [84]. It was discovered that human mobility traces
are highly unique and just four spatio-temporal points are needed to uniquely identify 95%
of individuals. Even coarser datasets offer individuals little anonymity. The cell tower infor-
mation and location were recorded each time a user made a phone call or sent a text mes-
sage. Cell tower locations are coarse approximations while the latest location positioning
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technology can send constant location updates at a much higher granularity and frequency.
Significant places can be learned from GPS track data. Potential attacks on location
tracks were being considered as early as the year 2000 when the technology was being
adopted for commercial use. The limitation of GPS only working outdoors was exploited
to determine buildings users visited in [85]. Location samples were considered significant
where GPS signal was lost three or more times in a given radius. This work was extended to
consider additional variables factoring in time e.g. the duration of the GPS reporting at low
accuracy [86]. It has been shown that obfuscation techniques can protect home locations
[87], however the authors in [88] found also knowing work location can be used to identify
a user. External census data was used in to demonstrate that individuals that live and work
in different census blocks are much less anonymous than those that do. Another study [89]
used call logs and cell tower locations to infer that the top two to three locations calls are
made can be used to uniquely identify an individual. This finding held true even when data
was made more coarse than zip code regions.
A varied approach proposed the use of k-means clustering [90] by specifying a radii
and considering the centroids of the clusters as important places. A more advanced method
using time based clustering was shown in [91] considering how clusters can change over
time to further refine significant places. A rigorous model formally defining stay locations
and destination locations and associated algorithms was presented in [92]. Experiments
demonstrated the approach was effective in extracting the locations of a user’s home, work,
gym and frequented shopping malls.
Location traces collected by a LBS can reveal the home address of a user. The authors
in [93] captured 239 GPS tracks collected over a week from drivers from Detroit. They
examined a subset of 65 drivers and were able to determine the participants’ home to an
accuracy of 85%. The algorithm worked by filtering out all locations samples that were
high speed, select a target region of interest and drop samples outside the region, apply k-
means clustering and use the resultant centroids as potential home candidates. A candidate
was selected based on heuristics including arrival time and zoning information.
Krumm presented a similar approach to determine home locations in [87]. The study
included 172 volunteers that agreed to provide two week’s worth of GPS data using freely
available tools. Three criteria were considered including the trip must have at least ten mea-
sured points, length of trip be at least one kilometer long and one pair of points was traveling
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at least at 25 miles per hour, thus removing noisy trips from the GPS tracks. A heuristic is
then applied that considers the last destination, weighted median, largest cluster and best
time. The identity of several volunteers was successfully identified by using an online white
pages lookup that provides a reverse geocoder service.
High-level behaviors and user context can be determined by analyzing location tracks.
The mode of transportation can be determined by training a model using Bayesian filtering
[94]. High-level information that is inferable includes the prediction of trips [95, 96]. These
studies demonstrated the viability of determining context and has led to a new line of re-
search. Even the mental health of individuals can be determined, the authors in [97] trained
a model to predict when a user is depressed to a high accuracy. Features such as the number
of different places and the number of significant places were used.
Background knowledge of the maximum velocity of a given road network has been
used in maximum movement bound attacks. It has been demonstrated that user locations
and trajectories can be inferred. With speed bounds it was shown that a user’s location must
be inside the overlapping regions of the bounds [98]. Trajectories were reconstructed in [99]
by exploiting known distances of the trip shared for data mining purposes to find candidate
paths that satisfy the distance length. Spatial nearest neighbor queries have suggested to
cloak a user’s location from LBSs [100]. However, privacy concerns with spatial cloaking
have been demonstrated using maximum possible bound attacks using GPS tracks [101,
102].
In a recent attack performed by our lab, GPS turn instructions were demonstrated to be
useful in reconstructing a user’s original trajectory [103]. The approach derived every pos-
sible route in a road network given a set of turn instructions and distances. An incremental
approach was used by first traversing each connected edge of every possible source. If a
match was found, then the path would continue to be expanded, otherwise pruned. Each
time the traversal led to a complete match, it was stored. In the event only one path was
found then the user’s route was disclosed. In the event a few routes were found, it was still
possible to infer the correct path with using additional background knowledge.
In Chapter 3, we present our maximum movement attack. The location of the query
results are utilized without knowledge of the location of the query. We highlight the dangers
of assuming data is anonymous even if the location information of the query is removed.
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Study Dataset Technique Inferred Information
Marmasse, 2000 [85] GPS tracks Clustering Significant Places
Ashbrook, 2003 [90] GPS tracks Predictive Modeling Significant Places
Patterson, 2003 [94] GPS tracks Predictive Modeling Transportation Mode
Marmasse, 2004 [86] GPS tracks Clustering Home Location
Kang, 2004 [91] GPS tracks Clustering Significant Places
Hariharan, 2004 [92] GPS tracks Predictive Modeling Home Location
Gruteser, 2005 [77] GPS tracks Linear modeling Pseudonym Correlation
Hoh, 2005 [79] GPS tracks Multi Target Tracking Pseudonym Correlation
Hoh, 2006 [93] GPS tracks Clustering Home Location
Cheng, 2006 [98] GPS tracks Trajectory Tracing User Location
Mokbel, 2006 [101] GPS tracks Maximum Bounds User Location
Krumm, 2007 [87] GPS tracks Clustering Home Location
Froehlich, 2008 [95] GPS tracks Predictive Modeling Trip Prediction
Krumm, 2008 [96] GPS tracks Markov Model Trip Prediction
Ghinita, 2009 [102] GPS tracks Maximum Bounds User Location
Golle, 2009 [88] US census data Background Knowledge User Location
Kaplan, 2010 [99] Path distances Multilateration User Location
Zang, 2011 [89] Call meta-data Background Knowledge User Location
Ma, 2013 [80] GPS tracks Background Knowledge User Location
Gambs, 2014 [82] GPS tracks Predictive Modeling User Location
LiZhu, 2014 [81] Proximity measures Triangulation User Location
Canzian, 2015 [97] GPS tracks Predictive Modeling User Location
Zhong, 2015 [83] Location check-ins Tensor Model User Location
Hossain, Quattrone, et al., 2016 [103] GPS tracks Road Network Traversal Trip Prediction
Table 2.2: Summary of Location Inference Attacks
2.4.2 Obfuscation via Pseudonyms to Achieve Anonymity
Anonymity based techniques aim to prevent linkages between location samples and user
identities. Pseudonyms [76] are a value used to replace sensitive key identifiers such as
a name or address. Often identifiers are omitted and replaced with asymmetric hashes to
produce a unique ID. This approach is easy to implement and most commonly employed as
a protection mechanism when exchanging location data.
Simply applying consistent pseudonyms does not safeguard against an adversary col-
lecting a history of user data. It is often possible to identify a user and their patterns of
behavior given enough location samples are available. For example, consider a user with
a fixed pseudonym ID constantly visiting the same residential and office locations. Indi-
viduals are often unique when viewing home/work location pairs [88] implying this back-
ground knowledge can identify individuals. One approach to remedy this is to replace the
pseudonym of a user often. However, pseudonym linkage is still possible when user pref-
erences are stored by the LBS [104]. It is also possible to link pseudonyms by analyzing
locations that a user occupies for long periods of time, particularly in residential locations.
Beresford and Stajano introduced “mix zones” [105] as a means of securing pseudonyms.
Instead of assigning a pseudonym to a user identity, pseudonyms are assigned based on re-
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Figure 2.12: Mix Zones for Protecting Location Privacy [104]
gions such as a shopping center or an airport. This makes it difficult to identify a user be-
cause a pseudonym can be assigned to anyone within the “mix zone”. Consider the example
in Figure 2.12, it may be possible to infer when a user travels from the coffee shop to the
bank. Therefore, any pseudonyms of users within that general region are mixed to preserve
privacy. The effectiveness of protection via mix zones is dependent on their placement. Op-
timal placing of mix zones was studied in [106] and a placement optimization algorithm
was proposed.
2.4.3 Obfuscation via False Locations
The addition of false locations can make it difficult for an adversary to find the exact location
of a user. These approaches do not aim to hide users’ identities instead relying on confusion
as the main strategy. Reporting false locations does not require modifications to the LBS or
the use of a trusted server although there is an added cost in communications. The advantage
of these approaches is that they can be applied using real LBSs.
This was first explored in [107] where the authors attempt to make realistic false loca-
tions by ensuring false locations are in the same region as the original and cannot be further
from the possible travel distance of a user. The authors also suggest a method to reduce
extra communications by splitting positional data into two separate buckets that the server
can recognize. This reduces the cost of communication from O(n) to O(log(n)) where n is
the number of reports sent in communications to the LBS.
The authors in [108, 109] present an alternative strategy, false locations are incremen-
tally increased and sent to the LBS until the query based on the actual location can be
satisfied with the aid of local processing. The authors introduce the concepts of an anchor,
supply space and demand space. An anchor is a fake location centered in the supply space
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and the demand space is the minimum space required to guarantee the query is satisfied.
Queries are sent requesting POIs with increasing distance until the result is returned. How-
ever, this approach incurs high communications and processing overhead.
Krumm aimed to find a solution to an inference attack he presented in [87]. The identity
of several pseudonymous were revealed in the Microsoft Geolife dataset. Two dimensional
Gaussian noise was added with a standard deviation between 50m to 5km to each geospatial
coordinate [87]. Interestingly, the amount of noise needed to prevent an attack from being
successful was high with the standard deviation needing to be set to 5km in order to prevent
the attack. This level of noise would likely render the dataset not usable for data mining
purposes.
Controlled regions are used in [110] with the authors proposing a circle algorithm and
grid algorithm. The circle algorithm centers the user position in the center and determines
random positions within the circle while the grid algorithm overlays a uniform grid of k
points where one of those positions is the actual user location.
Extensions to random noise approaches was presented in [111] with the authors propos-
ing three variations including N-Rand, N-Mix and N-Dispersion. The technique of adding
Gaussian noise [87] was improved by introducing an n parameter that does not select the
first randomly generated point but rather the farthest point after n trials. The idea of preserv-
ing k-Anonymity by using an overlay network to select a random node to initiate a query
was improved by taking the average position of the 4 closest points to be the location of
the initiator. This resolves the issue of being able to infer a location accurately when a large
number of nodes are available. Dispersion involves selecting a random point at the edge of
a circular region of radius r then performing the operation again with a smaller circle to
de-center the original location. This was improved by generating a random point within the
entire area of the smaller circle.
A more recent approach presented a framework for achieving differential privacy guar-
antees by adding Laplace noise to geospatial coordinates in [112]. The authors formalize
geo-indistinguishable, the main idea is that noise is added within a radius of each user to
ensure each user is differentially private.
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Figure 2.13: Quadtree Preserving 3-Anonymity
2.4.4 Obfuscation via Spatial Cloaking
Spatial cloaking techniques aim to use a region to blur the exact location of individuals. The
size and shape of the region dependent on the privacy requirements of a user. As opposed to
using a pseudonym and reporting the exact location, a user would send a region that contains
k people so they cannot be distinguished from k − 1 other people. This works well in areas
that contain a high density of people.
Most techniques make use of either k-Anonymity or l-Diversity. The principle of k-
Anonymity is referenced often in papers proposing cloaking techniques and was discussed
in Section 2.3.2. Spatial k-Anonymity protection models ensure each user location is con-
sidered to be k-Anonymous [113] within a region. Modified queries are sent to the LBS to
ensure that the LBSs cannot join data to a great accuracy. Spatial cloaking has been demon-
strated to be effective in both centralized and decentralized architectures. An extensive study
of the performance of common spatial cloaking algorithms are available in [114].
Adaptive interval cloaking was proposed in [115] by Gruteser. The aim is to ensure the
region a user is located in overlaps with other individuals in the same region. The space
is recursively divided using a QuadTree until each region satisfies the minimal value of k.
It is assumed that each user would be satisfied with the same k-Anonymity requirement.
Unfortunately this approach is not scalable as the tree handles the movements of each user
individually requiring the tree to be constantly regenerated. Figure 2.13 shows how each
shaded region is 3-anonymous, the region size is increased to enclose at least 3 points. This
approach was later extended by Bettini [72] to take into account historical data. The authors
noted that linkage attacks could be performed if patterns could be identified in data such as
frequently visiting a restaurant or catching public transportation.
Gruteser also proposed an approach that considers k to be the number of indistinguish-
able sensitive areas [116]. Sensitive areas are POIs such as restaurants and gas stations. The
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space is divided up so that each zone contains at least k sensitive places. Users traverse from
one zone to another when location is reported. Another approach considering sensitive areas
was demonstrated in [98] that considers both an uncertainty region and a sensitive region
such as a hospital. An uncertainty region is of a specified size and hides the user within a
region. However, if the user is in a sensitive area then stricter privacy controls are enforced.
Users may want to be k-Anonymous but also specify a minimum area where they want
to hide. CliqueClock [117] aims to allow users to set their desired level of privacy prefer-
ences. Each user specifies the level of k-Anonymity they desire and the maximum size of
a cloaking region. Constraints of each user are captured by the graph data structure. Nodes
are considered neighbors if and only if each of them is inside the others’ constraint area.
Cliques are considered to be a set of users forming the graph that are indistinguishable from
one another. These regions are sent to the LBS when a query is initiated by a user.
Hilbert space filling curves were applied in [118] demonstrating significant savings in
processing costs. The Hilbert order is determined for each user location and used as a means
of bucketing users and calculating the minimum bounding rectangle for users within a range.
Another approach also presented in [118] made use of nearest neighbors. First the set S was
found containing the user u and k − 1 of u’s nearest neighbors. Secondly a neighbor v was
selected from S. This process was repeated for v to find the set S′ containing v’s k − 1
nearest neighbors. The cloaked spatial region is the minimum bounding rectangle between
users in S′ and u.
Casper proposed a novel query processor that can efficiently support users changing k-
Anonymity and the minimal spatial area required instantly [101]. The use of a pyramid data
structure as shown in Figure 2.14 is proposed that divides the space into grids at different
levels of granularity. Grid cells dynamically maintain how many users are in that cell. It
is important to note that only pyramid cells that could contain potentially cloaked regions
are maintained. The spatial cloaking algorithm makes use of the pyramid structure. Starting
from the bottom of a pyramid, the grid cell a user is located in is found. The cell is returned
if it is large enough to satisfy the user’s requirements, otherwise the algorithm traverses up
the period until it finds a satisfactory region.
Mobile specific approaches have also been proposed focusing on masking the raw loca-
tion by adding a distance error to a point and using rectangles [110, 119]. Ad-hoc mobile
networks such as GSM lend themselves well to delegating certain nodes to act as a query
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Figure 2.14: Casper’s Pyramid Data Structure [101]
initiator on behalf of other nodes. This idea was proposed in [120] with the authors demon-
strating how k-Anonymity can be achieved by having k nodes use a particular node as a
query initiator so users are distinguishable by k − 1 other users.
2.4.5 Location Based Service Architectures
The design decisions on the architecture for location privacy systems are impacted from
protection strategies required to be implemented. Early research focused on centralized
protection methods that involved the use of a trusted server [120]. Later methods shifted
to decentralized paradigms removing the need of a trusted server due to the possibility of it
being compromised by unauthorized access.
Centralized Models
Centralized approaches tend to be more practical for organizations to implement as they
have more control over the system. A trusted anonymity server is accessed on behalf of
the users [117, 105]. Typically algorithm functions using principles such as k-Anonymity
are preserved before passing on the data to a LBSs. All identifying information including
usernames or IP addresses are replaced with a pseudonym. Location points are spatially
cloaked to ensure some level of privacy is preserved.
Centralized systems can also be detrimental to protecting user privacy if the trusted
anonymity server is in some way compromised. For example if an adversary successfully
installs malware on the anonymity server then protected queries can be sent directly to the
adversary before nullifying any protection mechanisms. Therefore, an anonymity server can
potentially become a valued source of location information for an adversary.
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Decentralized Models
Decentralized methods anonymize locations without the need of a centralized server. Com-
putations to preserve privacy distributed using a peer-to-peer approach. Each node in the
computation does not have knowledge of each user’s movements. Users can feel more con-
fident that they do not need to place their trust in an anonymity server.
The drawback is the lack of centralized control makes these systems difficult and costly
to implement. Maintaining these types of systems can also be problematic. For example, if
software needs requires updating, then every client also requires updating. In addition, there
are overheads in bandwidth and computational power amongst peers that are participating
which can lead to additional costs for both the users and owners of the system.
SpaceTwist is a simple example of a system that does not require a trusted anonymity
server [108]. Multiple queries are incrementally sent at various locations to a query process-
ing server until the query is satisfied. This makes it difficult for the server to identify which
query is the actual query.
PRIVE relies on a decentralized architecture where any peer can act as a query initiator
on behalf of another peer. The authors demonstrated in a simulation how mobile devices can
organize themselves into a hierarchical overlay network [121]. Smartphones establish ad-
hoc connections with each other using common wireless protocols such as WI-FI, GPRS or
GSM. A server is still required to verify certificates used for encryption which is avoidable
by having participants agree on an encryption scheme ahead of time. The user can set the
degree of anonymity by specifying a minimum k value. This value determines the number
of clients required to perform a query the initiator is requesting. An adversary will have
difficulty identifying the device in the overlay network that actually sent the query.
2.4.6 Query Protection for Specific Applications
Location privacy can also be achieved at query time depending on the type of application.
A common function LBSs perform are nearest neighbor queries in a geographic space to
find points of interest within proximity of the user.
For finding points of interest, an algorithm has been proposed that negotiates the level
of accuracy in exchange for precision required when answering the query [75]. The authors
propose an agent sends a pre-query that the server will reply with a number of POIs. If the
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agent agrees then the result is returned otherwise a smaller obfuscation set is requested. This
allows for the agent to calibrate the privacy on the fly. Instead of sending a query to an LBS,
the authors in [122] recommend a query contain code that is executed directly on the LBS
server.
Generally most protected queries make use of cryptographic approaches. We also dis-
cuss Private Meetup [119] that is an application to organize optimal meeting locations with-
out exposing user positions.
Cryptographic Methods for Location Query Protection
Location privacy can be protected via cryptographic approaches such as [123, 124, 125,
126] that only reveal location when certain conditions are met. These approaches do not
require a complex architecture, however they incur additional processing and communica-
tions overheads. In addition, techniques used to improve efficiency of spatial processing
such as indexes cannot be easily utilized.
A recommendation application of places a user may like to visit was demonstrated to
provide quality results while privacy preserving in [123]. Recommendations can include
suggestions for good restaurants or coffee shops. The system performs aggregate calcula-
tions of recommendations by spreading the load over multiple nodes in the network where
they only expose information that is needed to assist in the calculation. In this manner, no
nodes in the network have all the required information to locate users.
Nearest neighbor queries have been demonstrated to be performed using cryptographic
methods in [124]. The one-way function of Hilbert curve transformations are used to encrypt
two dimensional space to one dimensional space. An encryption key is supplied by a trusted
entity that is then used by the user to encrypt their query, this query is then sent to the LBS.
The LBS will evaluate the encrypted query and send the result back to the user in encrypted
form in which the user can decrypt the result with key provided by the trusted entity.
A common application of LBSs is to provide a user with friends nearby. Using tech-
niques from cryptography, guarantees were created to only reveal a location if a friend is
nearby [125]. Three protocols are introduced: Louis, Lester and Pierre that achieve this goal
in different ways.
Private information retrieval protocols (PIRs) were adapted in [126] to solve NN queries.
The space is divided up into a grid with all objects stored in a format compatible with PIR.
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The user only needs to provide the encrypted cell and the server will respond with nearest
object. This process requires higher computational overhead because of added processing
and communications.
Private Meetup
PrivateMeetup uses crowdsourcing to organize meetings amongst users in a privacy pre-
serving manner [119]. The use of crowdsourcing has gained popularity and is employed to
solve a variety of problems by enlisting the assistance of a wide community. This approach
has been particularly successful in the modeling community.
The algorithm used by PrivateMeetup uses crowdsourcing to protect user privacy by
removing the role of a LBS and relies on shared data. A group nearest neighbor (GNN)
query is introduced that allows a group to meet at their nearest point of interest (POI) such
as a restaurant. The resulting meeting point minimizes the total or maximum distance of the
group.
Users of PrivateMeetup are connected via the Internet using standard cellular networks
or WI-FI. An initiator amongst a group of users initiates a MeetUp request and proposes a
set of POIs Users can then choose to accept or deny the request from the initiator. Those
participating then also propose a set of candidate POIs. A GNN query is then performed
using the set of candidate POIs to find a suitable meeting location. The focus of the private
meeting algorithm is to perform a k-GNN query where all users hide their exact locations.
In decentralized models like PrivateMeetup, users that process the k-GNN query could
be considered as potential adversaries. For this reason the algorithm is designed so each user
has the same amount of knowledge as a potential eavesdropper. Wireless ad-hoc networks
should not be used for this approach to prevent a range based attack. It is assumed that each
of the group members do not know each other and no adversary has background knowledge
about any of the users. The location of surrounding POIs are also not revealed to prevent a
distance based intersection attack.
Location points are commonly represented using 2D space. Points can be converted to
a 1-dimensional imprecise distance space with distances ranging from 0 to the maximum
possible distance between any two locations in the entire Euclidean space. Buckets are
derived by iteratively dividing the range of distances. Users only are required to reveal the
bucket in which the actual distance to a POI is within. Smaller buckets represents higher
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imprecision and thus greater privacy. The algorithm initially starts using a high level of
imprecision and iteratively reduces the imprecision until a meeting place is decided upon.
An initiator creates a MeetUp request and selects a group of users they want to meet.
The users that accept select POIs as potential meeting places. The initiator receives all
POIs and computes imprecise distance space. Each member including the initiator computes
their distances and update the imprecise aggregate distance for each POI provided the user
privacy levels are respected. When the initiator receives the returned data set, POIs that
cannot be GNNs are discarded. Given that the data set size equals k then locations are
announced to the group otherwise another round of refinement is performed.
2.4.7 Location Privacy vs. Utility Trade-off
It has been well-established in location privacy literature that utility is lost in exchange for
privacy. A user that wishes to enjoy a high degree of privacy loses the benefit of receiv-
ing high quality query results. Ideally, the user would have the desire to set the privacy
preference to balance they are comfortable with.
Every user has different privacy preferences and requirements, studies have been per-
formed aiming to work out how to best present privacy settings. In a user study conducted
in [127] to evaluate the location privacy preferences of 19 people, it was found that users
set really complicated privacy profiles. Through the use of extensive surveys, it was found
in [128] that a few categorizations could capture all user preferences. A similar study also
found this in [129].
Depending on the protection mechanism used, changes how the privacy and utility can
be balanced. Additional false locations can be added when using the false reporting strategy
to confuse potential adversaries. The time frequency of how often to switch pseudonyms
can be set when using mix zones. Obviously with spatial cloaking, user specific values for
k and the minimum size of the cloaked region can be set.
While many studies evaluate how private the proposed approaches are, few actually
consider in detail the utility of the results. It has been suggested in [130] that the dataset of
actual results if no protection methods were used versus privacy preserved results should be
measured in terms of distance. This allows a score to be assigned to evaluate the utility of an
approach. A good approach would yield a balance between privacy and quality of results.
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2.4.8 Measuring Location Privacy
Location privacy as a concept has been well defined with formal definitions available that
share common and consistent themes. However, how to measure it yet to be standardized
making it difficult to compare location privacy protection methods. One general trend ob-
served across different measures is the quality of the LBS responses decreases as location
privacy increases [74, 120, 131].
Authors have suggested the amount of false locations as a discrete measure. The level of
privacy measure has been defined as the number of location coordinates sent to a LBS in a
single query in [74]. The authors achieve ambiguity by sending more points to a system, thus
making it harder for an LBS to determine the actual user location. This allows the system
to still supply the correct answer to the user. The issue with this method is that if points are
sent from a remote area, there may be only one location that makes sense when viewing on
a map. Using a similar principle, approaches that use k-Anonymity such as [115] defined
higher values of k to represent greater levels of privacy. This measure does not consider an
adversary may have access to background information that can effectively reduce k to few
levels that make it trivial to infer the actual location.
The distance between a user’s actual location and the expected distance between the best
possible estimate an attack can infer has also been proposed [79]. This measure requires
that possible attacks are well defined which is hard to achieve in practice as all possible
attacks are not known. The primary author in a follow up study in [131] evaluated their
method by defining location piracy as the duration that an adversary can track a trajectory.
Probabilities have also been suggested in [104] where behavioral probabilities are attached
to certain events. For example, a user is less likely to perform a U-turn. This allows for an
adversary to narrow down a user’s path.
The common trend in evaluating these suggestions is that it is difficult to find multiple
studies that measure location privacy in the same manner. The ability to compare and eval-
uate the effectiveness of techniques is important for the progression of the field, in addition
to making it easier for location services providers to adopt and test protection methods.
Measures have been either discrete or continuous and each have their drawbacks.
Location privacy is difficult to measure, there is no single measure that covers all pos-
sible scenarios. As the field matures and more measures emerge, there will be eventually
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a standardized set that would be expected to be evaluated when presenting novel protec-
tion techniques. This has already started to occur with a framework presented in [132]. The
framework presents formal definitions for many inference attacks presented in the literature
and how to apply the framework to evaluate privacy preserving methods.
2.4.9 User Concern for Location Privacy
Privacy researchers consider the preservation of location privacy as an important area. It was
argued in early research that techniques are important in order for the public to feel com-
fortable in adopting new location technologies. Surveys into user attitudes seem to indicate
that there is not much concern. However, it is suspected, this lack of concern can possibly
be attributed to users not fully comprehending the consequences.
We note that most research into user attitudes into location privacy were conducted be-
fore smartphones proliferated and the general public was not as aware of location tracking.
There is no definitive study on user attitudes but there is evidence to suggest that being
aware of the negative consequences can lead to user concern.
Barkhuus et al. studied privacy attitudes to LBS services [28]. Four functions were made
available to participants including a ringing profile automatically set for private settings, a
ringing profile automatically set in public settings, a service to suggest lunch when the user
is within range of a restaurant and an alert for when friends are within proximity. The study
included 16 participants aged between 19 and 35. Interviews conducted found that position-
aware services are less intrusive then location-tracking services. Participants ranked privacy
concern from a scale of 1 to 5 with 5 being “highly concerned”. The average score was low
being 2.75, however the study did not distinguish about awareness of consequences.
User attitudes towards location aware services was explored in [133] in 2003. Future
possibilities of personal navigation products was presented to 55 participants of diverse de-
mographics during a trade fair in Finland. Participants indicated that they are happy with
information sent to them provided it was relevant to the situation. In the group interviews,
some people were worried about privacy indicating that it is like “big brother”. The partic-
ipants that did understand tracking was possible were not too concerned about the privacy
issues in regard to the network operators indicating that they already trust them with sus-
tainable personal information. The users put a great deal of faith in the operators and also
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suggested regulations prevent abuse. The authors suggested that any abuse of personal data
can lead to the public loosing trust in services that is hard to win back.
Subsequent case studies performed by Barkhuus found that users are initially concerned
with location privacy but discontinue to have concerns once using location based services
[134]. The initial case study had 23 participants and they had to imagine using an “imag-
inary” LBS with additional services added throughout the week. A later case study made
available a real LBS to staff and students on a campus environment at the University of
California. Data was gathered via a questionnaire with 35 students’ participants and a quan-
titative study of 12 students. Users expressed concern and were surprised by the amount
of data transmitted to services. One female participant felt her privacy was invaded when
a peer commented how was her gym session when tagging herself at the gym in the study
when another participant saw it. Users that did not feel they benefited from the features in-
dicated more concern than those that found them useful. The authors suggested that privacy
expectations and functionality provided are required to be balanced.
Iachello tested user attitudes towards location aware apps back in 2005 before they
gained mainstream adoption [135]. Reno is a peer-to-peer location based messaging service
deployed in a two-week study to better understand how people would use these types of ser-
vices [135]. Participants in the study were two families with teenage children in Seattle. In
total there were 11 participants. Reno requires users to define place names such as “Home”
or “School” and then define where they are located by sending a location sample. The study
found that privacy concerns were balanced with broader requirements including control and
application utility. All participants said they would not share their location to anyone who
asked but did not mind sharing with acquaintances.
The price individuals attributed to their location privacy has been investigated [136,
137]. University students surveyed were relaxed about sharing location privacy [136] and
are even more likely for payment [137]. A study employed experimental techniques to de-
termine the amount required to persuade individuals to reveal precise location information
[137]. A fictitious auction was setup asking students how much they are willing to bid to
be compensated for supplying location data given there is only a limited number of partici-
pants. For just 10 pounds, 74 undergraduate students form UCL were willing to give away
their location tracks and 20 pounds if being used for commercial purposes. Although the
results did indicate that whether the student travels outside campus or not is a consideration
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as well as the number of personal responsibilities.
A similar follow up study to [137] about the value of location privacy data was con-
ducted in [138] that considered a more diverse demographic. In the study, 1200 people from
five countries in Europe were being surveyed. It was found that different countries place
attribute different values for privacy with Greece showing the most caution and placing the
highest bid values. Gender differences were not apparent for sharing one month of data but
women expressed more caution when asked to share a year’s worth of data. The frequency
of samples made a substantial different to bids. Participants placed a higher value when
samples were captured more frequently. Overall, the findings in the initial study [137] that
users are willing to give away 1 month of location data for 20 pounds for commercial use.
2.5 Trajectory Privacy
Navigation tasks traditionally performed by in-car navigation systems are being commonly
replaced by smartphones leading to smartphones not only capturing locations, but travelled
routes as well. Trajectory privacy is a relatively new research discipline that extends from
location privacy taking into account the spatial temporal nature of individual location points.
While location privacy focuses on keeping individual locations private, trajectory privacy
aims to protect from information being inferred across an entire trip.
Mining trajectories makes it possible to identify places important to a user, provide
personalized recommendations and determine relations between users [139, 140]. These
functions usually provide some kind of benefit for users of LBS services such as turn-by-
turn navigation and finding routes with least traffic congestion. Researchers aim to perform
these functions while maintaining user trajectory privacy.
Proposed protection techniques are based on either trajectory confusion, generalization
and suppression-based methods or trajectory k-Anonymity. These methods for trajectory
protection are covered in this section.
2.5.1 Trajectory Confusion
Trajectories have specific characteristics that make them unique in comparison to others.
For example, trajectories that contain a main road or highway are more likely to be similar
to trajectories that only contain residential streets. Perturbing these unique characteristics
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from paths can be used as a method or protection. The added benefit is that trajectory mining
algorithms will still produce comparable results without violating user trajectory privacy.
An issue was noted in evaluating a tracking algorithm finding that it was difficult to infer
the identity of anonymous location tracks of multiple users where there paths cross [77].
This weakness was exploited in [79] as a protection mechanism where location tracks were
perturbed to make it difficult to tell if the tracks touched or not. This idea was extended to
include false locations around where the tracks intersect [141]. The temporal dimension can
be degraded as well instead of just obfuscating over space by removing location samples.
Reducing location samples reduces the success of attacks [93, 131].
Inserting dummy trajectories has been proposed as a method to protect against adver-
saries inferring information from trajectories in [141]. The authors propose two schemes
being random pattern scheme and rotation pattern scheme to achieve this. Parameters spec-
ified in a user profile include short-term disclosure, long-term disclosure and distance devi-
ation thresholds. The motivation for using dummies is that a trusted server or infrastructure
does not need to be relied upon. Movement patterns have been demonstrated to be unique,
so a key challenge is to generate realistic dummy paths.
The space into a grid to simplify the approach and assumed that users were free to move
in the space. The random pattern scheme takes the starting point and requires the destination
point be known ahead of time. A dummy can move vertically, horizontally or both based
on the speed. The dummy path moves randomly from the starting point to the destination.
Provided that dummy paths also produce consistent movement patterns, it would be hard
for an adversary to identify the truth path. Including more dummy paths strengthens privacy
but adds computational overhead.
The rotation pattern scheme is more sophisticated than the random scheme and ensures
dummy paths significantly deviate. The key aim of the scheme is to ensure there are in-
tersections present within the actual user and dummy trajectories. Dummy trajectories are
generated by rotating the actual user trajectory. The intersection point between the actual
trajectory and the dummy is the rotation point. The scheme is required to satisfy the user
privacy profile. The solution space is first generated to ensure distance derivation is satis-
fied. Then the short-term and long-term disclosures are obtained within the solution space.
All trajectories found with disclosures less than what is specified are selected as dummy
trajectories.
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Results in [141] indicated that generating random paths with consistent movements was
shown to improve privacy for long term disclosure of data. The rotational scheme required
a similar amount of dummies to protect short term disclosure but significantly less paths to
protect long term disclosure.
2.5.2 Generalization and Suppression-Based Method
These methods work under the assumption that adversaries may have different and incom-
plete trajectory information of users’. The aim is to reduce the probability of reconstructing
the entire trajectory with the partial information. Quasi-identifiers are considered projec-
tions of trajectories that an adversary can access.
An anonymization algorithm that takes inspiration from the concept of generalization
can be applied to preserve trajectory privacy [142]. The key idea behind the proposed ap-
proach is to take long trajectories and break it up smaller and simplified trajectories. This
allows for increased projections and diversifies locations making it difficult to infer with
high certainty what points comprise a trajectory. This is achieved by suppressing the exis-
tence of certain points within a trajectory by considering how omitting the point will alter
the main direction and what is the benefit in terms of privacy.
Determining the optimal set of points to remove is considered an NP-hard problem
[58]. Therefore, the authors propose a greedy algorithm continues to suppress locations
until privacy is met. An attack is performed at each iteration of suppression until a privacy
constraint is met.
C-Safety takes a different approach aiming to constrain the probability of an adversary
inferring a user is at a sensitive place [143]. The authors formalize privacy-violating infer-
ences and provide an upper bound c to determining if a user is at a sensitive location. An
algorithm is proposed that transforms a set of trajectories to a c-safe counterpart which can
be published safely.
2.5.3 Trajectory k-Anonymity
The main concept underpinning trajectory k-Anonymity is to guarantee that trajectories
are indistinguishable from k − 1 trajectories in a dataset. This is a deviation from location
k-Anonymity as an entire trip is considered and not just a single location point.
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Figure 2.15: Never Walk Alone [144]
A clustering based approach was presented in [144] and illustrated in Figure 2.15 makes
use of uncertainty in GPS measurements and uncertainty in multiple trajectories being co-
localized within the same period to aggregate a k-animized trajectory. The authors define
(k, δ) anonymity to ensure that a trajectory cannot be distinguished from at least k − 1
other trajectories bounded by the volume of the cylinder (δ). The set of k co-localized
trajectories is referred to as the anonymity set of k trajectory. A clustering based approach is
proposed to derive the anonymity set of k. A clustering approach is proposed to achieve this
type of privacy that includes consists of three main phases being the pre-processing phase,
clustering phase and space transformation phase. In the pre-processing phase, all trajectories
with a similar start and end time are grouped in the same equivalence class. In the clustering
phase, a greedy scheme is used to determine pivot points for trajectory. Finally, the space
transformation phase aggregates each trajectory by moving samples within a cluster to the
cluster center point.
Conversely, it was argued by the authors of [145] that enforcing classical k-Anonymity
is not sufficient. The reasoning is because a fixed set of quasi-identifier attributes does not
exist for all trajectories. Instead, they propose approaches referred to as extreme-union and
symmetric anonymization. Alternatively, instead of representing a trajectory in a relational
database, graph based approaches have also been demonstrated that partition trajectories
based on similarity [146]. The authors of [147] demonstrate how trajectory privacy can be
preserved by extracting the significant stay points and protecting them.
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2.6 Privacy Preserving Data Mining
The personal information contained in smartphones is of value to researchers and analysts in
testing a hypothesis or finding useful insights. This data can be mined via smartphone apps
and processed using data mining algorithms. In this section, we present techniques that can
be used without exposing user data. These approaches are current attempts to perform data
mining while taking user privacy into consideration. Thus, they can be implemented on user
smartphones to train models without the user exposing their sensitive information.
The most common supervised learning techniques used are linear regression, neural net-
works, support-vector machines (SVM), decision tree and random forest. Self-organizing
maps is another unsupervised method useful to find patterns in data that are hard to detect
with other methods. These techniques have practical applications across a range of dis-
ciplines. Literature on how to apply these methods while preserving privacy is available
although limited. Despite there being much research into the techniques themselves, actual
tools for production use to perform these methods privately are not widely available.
Linear regression is a modeling technique that attempts to find the relationship between
two variables by fitting a linear equation to the observed data. There are a variety of methods
available to fitting a linear line, including least-squares regression, maximum likelihood
estimation and Bayesian linear regression. Multiple variables can also be predicted via a
modified version of linear regression known as multivariate linear regression. Once a linear
model has been fit, residual testing can be performed to test the variance between the actual
data and the models results. An assumption made using linear regression is the data has a
linear relationship. As it is one of the most commonly used modeling techniques and has
been studied extensively.
The authors in [148] demonstrate how to use S2C for linear regression. Consider two
parties Alice and Bob that each have a private dataset that they want to share certain at-
tributes to fit a linear model. Two protocols are proposed, one that uses a semi-trusted com-
modity server and another that communicates between the peers directly. The line is fitted
using matrix calculations. Each party calculates their part of the matrix before sending it to
the other party. Once the matrix calculation is complete, a line is fitted.
Neural networks are a supervised machine learning technique inspired from how the
central nervous system and the brain works in biology. A neural network is made up of a
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Figure 2.16: Common Data Mining Approaches Used for Training and Classification
series of weighted and hidden neurons, a common training algorithm for neural networks
is the back-propagation algorithm [149]. The back-propagation algorithm lends itself to
be distributed and can be performed privately [150]. Neural networks can be trained across
multiple machines containing different datasets without each machine knowing the contents
of the data.
Support Vector Machines (SVM) is a machine learning technique based on the principal
that you can define an optimal linear decision boundary in data [151]. The boundary the
SVM produces makes a best attempt to define where one classification starts and another
one ends, in order for SVM’s to achieve high accuracy, the data set needs to be linearly
separable. Given very complex training data, in practice it is highly unlikely classes would
be linearly separable, slack variables were introduced to relax constraints.
SVM’s combine three different ideas, finding the optimal hyperplanes, using soft mar-
gins to relax finding the solution to the optimal hyperplane problem and using convolution
to map the feature space to vectors. The optimal hyperplane is a theorem defining the maxi-
mum margin between two vectors that can be perfectly separable. Privacy preserving SVM
has been proposed in [152, 153]. The class labels for each variable are shared between each
party that is holding data and jointly training the model.
Decision tree learning is an extensively used data mining technique to predict a tar-
get variable given a complex series of inputs [154]. Decision trees build of the concept of
decision trees by creating a predictive model that traverses the tree. Many algorithms to
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build decision trees from data have been derived, the most common are ID3, C4.5, CART,
CHAID, MARS and Conditional Inference Trees. Each algorithm builds a series of deci-
sions used to segment the data into different subgroups. To illustrate a basic decision tree,
below demonstrates how the XOR function could be captured.
It has been proposed to build decision trees privately in [155] by applying Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme. The sum of secret values from multiple parties without revealing the
secret values to each party. At the end of the computation, parties only knew its own value
and the same of all the secret values but nothing else.
Machine learning technique extending of decision trees is the random forest [156]. It
can predict the values of discrete or continuous variables and discover relationships between
variables. It works by constructing a model consisting of decision trees based on the input
training data and the classification variable. In comparison to unsupervised methods, it is
more suited for targeting specific variables rather than data exploration.
Random forest has demonstrated good predictive power when the correct parameters
are selected and sufficient trees are constructed. It can also provide good estimates of what
variables are important for classification. Expanding of the concept of training a single basic
decision trees by further training multiple decision trees to create a forest of trees. Each tree
has the same distribution while a random variable determines the vector data to train each
decision tree.
A method that utilizes deferential privacy has been proposed to train a random forest
while maintaining high utility [157]. Each decision tree trained in the random forest en-
semble is differentially private. When creating a decision tree, first an attribute is selected
at a tree node that best splits the data. Child nodes are populated where the node was split
and statistics are computed for the leaf nodes. The measure of information gain (IG) is used
to determine attributes that are best for splitting. Laplacian noise is added to the rankings
of IG based attributes and later to the computed statistics than generate the classification
labels. The decision trees are ensembled in a manner that ensures the variance of each vari-
able is unbiased. The results of this approach indicate that high utility is maintained when
comparing to standard random forest.
The self organizing map (SOM) is an unsupervised neural network commonly used to
explore complex data. Its key benefit is its ability to consider multiple data attributes at
once by applying a mathematical model to all the available data. Two dimensional visual
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Figure 2.17: SOM Images of Common Mobile Data Features
representations are generated where an analyst can draw inferences from the data. SOMs
are suitable for accelerating the analysis in determining what key variables to consider.
Examples of SOM images for smartphone data features are shown in Figure 2.17.
SOM’s can be trained and evaluated while preserving privacy of the individual data
[158]. SOM does not make use of any hidden layers and is a feed-forward network. The
challenges of training a SOM securely is to discover the winner neurons privately and se-
curely update the weight vectors of neurons and determine when the SOM training has been
completed. Protocols have been proposed by the authors to perform these functions.
The method assumes that there is at most two parties training the SOM. Initially each
neuron is initialized with its weight vector. Random input data is selected at each iteration of
training. The distance between the input data and weight vector neuron is calculated and the
winning neuron is found by running the Secure Computation of Closest Cluster Protocol.
Weights are updated based on the winning neuron using the Secure Weight Vector Update
Protocol. Both parties are updated on the progression of the SOM and training is continued
until the Secure Detection of Termination Protocol halts the process.
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Traditional clustering techniques are also available to perform segmentations that can
be displayed on the visual representations. SOMs are a popular tool for conducting complex
behavioral analytics. When reading a SOM visual it is important to understand that proxim-
ity on the map means that nodes are similar while taking all data into consideration. Once
the model places an account in a particular node, it remains in that node on all visuals. This
allows analysis by using the colors of the visual of all the data attributes. There are no axes,
instead each of the maps scale drives the colors on the map, essentially, a heat-map.
The SOM maps below illustrate the relationship between aggregated variables from a
mobile device. There is a clear relationship between SMS Received and SMS Sent, however
there are nodes showing different behaviors in sections.
2.7 Smartphone Privacy
The architecture of smartphones influences how private stored user data is kept. General pri-
vacy concerns related to smartphone users discussed earlier were dataset privacy, location
privacy and trajectory privacy. Initial research related to mobile privacy heavily focused
on location privacy and considered it the number one concern. There is a now additional
concerns due to the growing number of sensitive data types smartphones store as they be-
come more sophisticated. Smartphones not only capture location tracks but also store other
sensitive metrics like bank account information and photos of friends and family.
In this section, we focus on smartphone user attitudes towards privacy and comprehen-
sion of security and privacy mechanisms put in place to protect them. Modern smartphone
platforms provide rich development environments allowing third party apps to access much
of the devices native functionality. This functionality has been exploited to mine for user
information. Bluetooth is a well-established wireless communications standard that is em-
bedded into every modern smartphone. While Bluetooth provides great convenience, secu-
rity and privacy concerns have been noted. We discuss how Bluetooth can be exploited to
learn information about an individual.
2.7.1 Smartphone Malware
Smartphones being pervasive in society makes them a target of adversaries who wish to
mine for sensitive information or control a device for other purposes such as running a
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distributed bot-net. In this section, we provide a brief history of the evolution of malware on
mobile devices, how the malware is propagated and common intended purposes. Malware
continues to be a growing problem for smartphones. Several investigations have attempted
to document the evolution [159, 160, 161, 162].
Malware has different intended purposes as detailed by Felt et al [161]. The main aim of
Malware is to gain access to a device to perform functions for adversary such as extracting
data, causing the device to malfunction or causing issues for the user such as sending in-
trusive alerts. An adversary will find a way to directly install the malware using techniques
such as social engineering or finding a vulnerability in the device to install the malware.
Spyware is a class of Malware that sends information about a person such as messages they
receive and calls they make. Spyware is a popular method used by suspicious spouses and
while it is legal to download, it is illegal to deploy without the owner of a smartphones
knowledge. Grayware is another specific class that provides a useful function to the user but
also may perform malicious tasks in the background such as collect personal information.
Malicious malware can be delivered via multiple infection vectors. The most common
include SMS/MMS, Bluetooth (Described in detail in Section 2.7.3), Internet access and
USB [163]. Cellular services have long provided SMS services to send short 140 character
messages and later MMS messages. SMS services do not require the user have access to the
Internet and can be used to deliver malware if an exploit can be found or spread malware by
sending links to all users in the victim’s phonebook. Smartphones often maintain continu-
ous connection to the Internet exposing it to the same threats as PCs. Browsing the Internet
and downloading email attachments can lead to malware being deployed without the user’s
knowledge. USB can also be used via infecting synchronization services that move data be-
tween PCs and mobile devices. Another recent example is charging stations can be infected
and spread malware when a user attempts to charge their device demonstrated in [164].
There are a number of risks posed by a user’s smartphone being infected by malware
[163]. The system can be damaged by draining the battery or make the system unusable by
changing settings and disabling functionality such as calls. Economic loss is also possible
through the use of dialing or messaging premium rate numbers without the user being aware
or deleting important information such as documents or photos on the SD card. Another
common use case is to establish a bot-net for denial service attacks of mining for crypto-
currencies. Furthermore, infected nodes can deplete a networks resources by generating a
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high amount of fictitious traffic. Information leakage is also a concern though the use of
malware extracting personal information about a user and is a major focus of this thesis.
While smartphone malware was discussed early on as a theoretical threat, actual cases
of malware has been found to exist on all the popular mobile platforms including Symbian,
Android, iOS, J2ME and windows mobile. Kaspersky lab discovered Cabir [165], the very
first smartphone malware and propagated via Bluetooth. The first Android Trojan labeled
Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.a [166] pretended to be a media player while running
malicious code in the background to sending premium SMS messages to extort money from
those that installed the app. Ikee [167] was the first worm targeting jail broken iPhones by
using the installed SSH server to access the device. J2ME was the most targeted mobile
platform up until 2011 when the market dominance shifted to Android and iOS. Jupiter
networks noted in 2011 Android became the most targeted platform shifting from J2ME
[168]. Windows Mobile has also been targeted with Brador [169], the malware opens up a
backdoor between using a TCP/IP connection.
2.7.2 App Privacy
Research into the privacy implications of third-party app usage is a relatively new topic.
Automated systems have been proposed for both iOS and Android to detect privacy leaks at
an API method call level. While these systems are very useful in detecting where sensitive
information is leaked, they do not indicate if it is justified given the functionality of the app.
The iOS platform relies on a strict auditing process to protect their users as opposed
to a permissions system. A system called PiOS [170] gained much attention demonstrating
the ability to de-construct an iOS application and demonstrate where privacy leaks occur.
PiOS found that most of the applications that were analyzed on iOS do not leak much
personal information, however more than half leaked the device ID. Considering Apple
perform many quality checks on apps during submission and are quick to remove any apps
that malicious apps that make it past the submission process, the results make sense. It
should be noted however that users that jailbreak their phones and install apps through
non-official sources may be at more risk since there is no auditing process or permissions
system.
A similar a system called AndroidLeaks [171] was created for the Android platform also
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capable of automatically detecting potential privacy leaks. By decompiling the Java byte
code, AndroidLeaks analyzes an app by looking for methods that pass personal information
to the third-party app. In the case of Android, many applications were found to be leaking
private information.
Another system called Stowaway was demonstrated in [9] which compares method calls
made by an app relative to the permissions the app developers request in the Android Man-
ifest. It was found that one third of applications are not following the least privilege path
with their permission requests. For example, a developer may request fine-grained location
access but only actually use coarse grained access. This is likely a result of developers not
understanding how to request permissions correctly due to unclear documentation.
Currently there is nothing in the literature that allow for method calls to private informa-
tion were justified based on the advertised functionality of the app. A location based social
network will need access to location services and a messaging app will need access to a
user’s contact. When an app is requesting information that is not required, that is when a
user has more cause to be concerned as there is no motivation for the information other than
to store it.
2.7.3 Bluetooth Privacy
Bluetooth is a wireless standard used to facilitate devices sending data over short distances.
Its intended application was to be used as the communications layer in wireless headsets.
Applications for Bluetooth have since expanded considerably to include speakers and file
transfer. Almost every mobile from released in from the year 2000 onwards are Bluetooth
equipped which have made it a target for hackers. Bluetooth has been of concern to privacy
researchers as several vulnerabilities have been identified allowing for an attacker to turn on
the microphone, extract contacts data and upload malware.
Nine attack vectors were proposed in a Bluetooth Threat Taxonomy [172]. These vec-
tors are Surveillance, Range extension, Obfuscation, Fuzzer, Sniffing, Denial of Service,
Malware, Unauthorized direct data access and man in the middle attacks. In this section,
we provide a summary of each of these Bluetooth attack vectors with an expanded focus on
how these can be exploited to invade a user’s privacy.
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Bluetooth Surveillance Bluetooth surveillance techniques aim to profile a device in range
in order to gather information that may be useful for an adversary. Types of information
include device specifications, communications channels and physical location for the pur-
poses of location tracking. It is also useful to know what services the device supports such
as headset communication or file transfer. Surveillance techniques do not pose any threat
to the device but do yield potential insights about a user that are considered privacy invasive.
Bluetooth Range Extension Each Bluetooth device has a uniquely assigned address which
provides key information about the specifications of the device. An adversary obtaining de-
vice information could then look up known exploits in order to gain access to the device.
Any device in discoverable mode broadcasts its address. Even devices not in discoverable
mode can probed to determine if they are in range if the address is known using specialized
hardware and software. A smartphone a user owners is indirectly provided to surrounding
years.
Bluetooth Obfuscation Communications channels can also be probed to determine what
services a device supports which can lead to an adversary gaining unauthorized access.
Bluetooth communicates using RFCOMM channels which is similar to TCP/IP. A device
can be scanned for services that are not secure. Even gaining access to one unsecured service
can lead to a privacy invasion. For example, an adversary can ears drop on conversations
with access to the audio headset service.
Bluetooth Fuzzer Location tracking can also be performing using surveillance techniques.
Specialized Bluetooth beacons can be deployed in areas that are of interest to determine
if persons of interest are in the area. A technique referred to as War Nimbling has been
demonstrated to be taken further by equipping beacons with camera. Whenever a user is in
proximity, the camera takes a photo in the direction they estimate the device is whenever
they walk past the beacon. In Chapter 4, we demonstrate how Bluetooth can be used to lo-
cate users indoors and propose a localization scheme.
Bluetooth Range Extension Bluetooth works under the assumption that communication
is short range, normally within 10m. Short distances of communication can be overcome
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with high range antennas that allow for communications from kilometers away. An attack
can be performed from a discreet distance allowing the adversary to access private informa-
tion without exposing themselves. A user may feel it is safe to leave Bluetooth on because
there is nobody in the surrounding area or they are not in a public location such as apartment
building. This assumption is incorrect as modern smartphones do not provide any indicator
that Bluetooth communications is occurring. There is no network monitor such as a flash-
ing icon that indicates data is being sent and received. Thus, the user cannot detect when
devices are accessing a device unless they have the technical sophistication to understand
how to access the system logs.
Bluetooth Range extension Bluetooth devices are all assigned a unique address, normally
be the chipset manufacturer. Tools have been developed that allow for an adversary to
change the identity of their Bluetooth device to that of another device. Thus, it cannot be
assumed that the device that is being communicated with is actually the trusted device ini-
tially paired. The trusted device may initially connect to a device, a device with the same
identity can then intercept the packets that are sent between the devices. An adversary may
be able to learn information from the packets intercepted.
Bluetooth Fuzzer Fuzzing tests how the Bluetooth stack of a device handles various in-
puts to try determine any flaws in how the stack is programmed. Similar to TCP/IP packets,
Bluetooth packets follow a well-defined formatting standard. Assumptions are made on the
length of certain fields within the packet. While information cannot be obtained about a
smartphone user directly from fuzzing, it can be used to cause inconvenience to a user.
Various custom Bluetooth packets can be constructed by an adversary and sent to a
device. One possibility of sending a malformed packet is it could cause the Bluetooth stack
to crash. Assuming a smartphone user is on an important call and using a headset, the call
will be interrupted. This could have unintended consequences for the user if the person
they were on the phone to assumes they hung up on them. Another possibility is the entire
smartphone can crash since the Bluetooth stack normally runs at kernel level. Considering
that smartphone users are now performing office tasks on a device, important work may
be lost. Causing inconvenience to a user is a form of privacy invasion. As stated, even if
information is not obtained, the user is still disrupted from usual activities they perform on
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their smartphones. Bluetooth communicating over radio frequency channels is susceptible to
packet sniffing. Commercial packet sniffers are available for purchase that intercept data in
range. Packets intercepted normally have encrypted contents, although analyzing the packet
structure itself can be used to discover vulnerabilities.
Encryption of the contents of the packet leads to the assumption that others cannot
eavesdrop on communications or intercept files. However, if the encryption scheme is com-
promised on the devices then the contents can be decrypted. An example is if two smart-
phones have installed a custom public/private certificate which apps then use to encrypt the
data. An adversary can then decrypt the contents of the packet given they have access to the
private key. Information about a smartphone user could be learned simply by monitoring
Bluetooth traffic over a period of time.
Bluetooth DDos Communications platforms are susceptible to denial of service attacks.
These attacks involve sending requests at a high frequently to saturate the devices resources.
Radio technologies like Bluetooth are susceptible to jamming and constant requests can be
used as a form of abuse. When sending a request to a device, it often prompts the user. These
prompts can be used to send unsolicited messages or render the device unusable. The right
to privacy is also the right to be left alone. Flooding a device a user uses frequently is a form
of privacy invasion.
Bluetooth Malware Bluetooth has been used as a method to spread malware by attacks.
Normally a security flaw with the Bluetooth stack is required in order to deploy the mal-
ware. Attacks have been demonstrated in the past where a smartphone user is asked to
accept a file. Once pressing accept, the malware is installed on the device without the user
being aware. Bluetooth is not used to install apps so these types of attacks are rare. How-
ever, if executed, the malware could spread really fast given how almost every person has
a smartphone. Installed malware will be able to access all a user’s sensitive information on
the device as well as monitor the smartphone user without them being aware.
It is possible to gain full access to a device via the Bluetooth communications channel
using security flaws or loop holes. One such example is an attempt to Bruteforce the pin of
a device. The time it takes to break a pin is often proportional to the length of the pin. It has
been demonstrated that a four digit pin can be broken in minutes, however a 16 digit pin
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can take thousands of years with current technology. Many smartphone users do not even
change the default pin, often attempting to connect with manufacture defaults work. Once a
device is paired then every service provided by the Bluetooth channel is accessible. Using
additional security flaws an adversary may be able to execute arbitrary code and gain full
access to the device.
These attacks involve a device acting as a relay between two devices that actually want
to communicate. By acting as a relay a packet is intercepted and sent to its intended destina-
tion. This type of attack may allow for an encryption key to be learned which will then allow
sniffing tools to decrypt the data it intercepts. Many of these attacks have been prevented
with recent security upgrades. However, authentication models such as just works are still
susceptible. In public areas such as an office complex where many Bluetooth devices are
operating, it is possible that a user connects to the relay with a similar name as the intended
device instead making these attacks possible.
2.7.4 User Comprehension of Smartphone Privacy Controls
There has been research conducted to better understand the level of privacy comprehension
of smartphone users. Surveys indicate that user comprehension is low which inhibits them
to make the correct privacy minded decisions. However, users do express actual concern for
their digital privacy.
Early work performed by Chin et al. into understanding user attitudes towards smart-
phones found that users were hesitant to complete certain tasks [173]. The aim was to de-
termine if users avoid smartphones due to privacy concerns verses their privacy attitudes
towards traditional PCs. It also aimed to find insights into how users evaluate what apps
they consider trustworthy. Interviews and surveys were conducted for 60 users across vari-
ous demographics to eliminate potential sources of bias.
Chin et al. discovered that users’ have an equal amount of concern for security both
on smartphones and laptops [173]. Users were more concerned about privacy on mobile
devices since smartphones contain more personal information. Users that were more con-
cerned about privacy on their laptop had the opposite response saying they have more per-
sonal information on their laptop. The amount of sensitive data stored on a device indicates
a user’s level of concern. Some users perceptions of security were influenced from incorrect
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knowledge about wireless technology. Participants felt wireless networks such as GSM/WI-
FI were less secure and be easily intercepted.
It was also found in [173] that users are worried about physical phone loss or damage be-
cause of all the sensitive data it contains like photos of friends and family. In the study, 85%
of app downloads were from the official marketplace. User reviews tend to be frequently
used to determine if an app is trustworthy or not. Although it was noted this may cause
incorrect privacy decisions as an app can be popular and invasive. Brand name recognition
also played a major part in contributing to the user’s decision-making process. Price was a
major consideration as users tended to have significantly more free applications than paid.
Few participants used factors such as user agreements indicating reviews and recommen-
dation were used as the indicators of trust. Overall users were worried about smartphone
privacy but did not have the tools to make better privacy decisions.
In a survey conducted by Felt et al. [174], 99 risks were presented to users to determine
what smartphone risks were of most concern. Mechanical Turk was used to advertise the
survey and users were paid $1.00 to complete it. Over 13 days, 3,115 users responded. It
was found that users were really concerned with text messages, e-mails, photos, contacts list
and call history being accessed. While location was of concern, it was less of a concern than
aforementioned types of data being accessed. Most users indicated that they would remove
apps that access sensitive data while a few users indicated they would contact authorities
or take legal action. The survey clearly communicated the risks of using certain apps so the
participants understood the potential privacy ramifications. In practice, with current plat-
forms it is hard for a user to detect current privacy threats apps pose.
Felt also performed a user study aiming to determine user attention, comprehension
and behavior of participants [175]. It was found that current protection systems do not aid
users in making correct privacy decisions. An Internet survey of 308 participants and a
laboratory study of 25 Android users was conducted. The demographics of participants was
representative of Android users. The comprehension of the reading SMS permission was
low with only 31.2% responses being correct. The survey was designed to be completed on
Android phones and was nine pages long. Permissions dialog boxes were displayed to users
where they had to answer what types of functionality they were granting the app.
In the laboratory study conducted in [174], it was concluded that permission warnings
do not help a majority of users in making correct security decisions. Non-technical found
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permissions confusing and hard to understand. Only a minority of users canceled installa-
tions of apps due to permission requests. A series of questions were asked and participants
were promoted to find and install applications. It was found that only 17% of participants
actually looked and paid attention to the permissions. The number of users who were aware
of permissions but did not look was 42% and the remaining 42% paid no attention to the
permissions.
A comprehensive study was conducted by Mylonas [176] drew the same conclusions as
Felt [174] using a different methodology and expanded focus on user attitudes as opposed
to user comprehension. The study aimed to determine if users enable security controls, do
users consider security while downloading apps and are official app repositories trusted.
The demographics of the survey included 458 smartphone users with a minimum age of 15
and a maximum age of 52. The demographics were skewed by age as 81% of respondents
were aged between 15 and 30. There was a fairly even distribution of users who considered
themselves security savvy at 56.3% versus 43.7% that do not consider themselves security
savvy.
In contrary to findings related to the security of app repositories, 76% of users believed
apps coming from official repositories were trustworthy. Furthermore 54.6% of people were
unaware any testing of apps took place by the maintainers of the repository. The results
indicate that the repository simply being associated with a popular brand is enough for
users to trust it. It has been found that if a dialog interrupts a task a user is attempting to
perform, they are more likely to skip over it. Users did not pay attention to or inspect security
messages and warning dialogs. Similar results were found with EULA license agreements
presented to users [8].
Survey participants in Mylonas’ study disregarded security issues when it comes secu-
rity and privacy. Smartphone users concerned with privacy spent more reviewing the app.
Usefulness was considered the influential app selection criterion with 58.5% of survey par-
ticipants. Only 3.5% of respondents did not install an app it showed privacy invasive per-
missions at installation time. Attitudes towards pirated apps that were also studied, they
commonly contain malware and are spread through unofficial app repositories that promise
users popular apps for free. These unofficial repositories circumvent many of the security
features on the platform. 60.7% of respondents reported a preference to pirated applications.
Participants in the survey using platforms of wall-gardened models were less likely to use
2. Literature Review 75
pirated apps than platforms that provided more flexible options to install apps.
Mylonas also reported that the study also suggests that smartphone security controls are
poorly adopted by users. Security software was only adopted by 24.5% of survey partic-
ipants while 85.8% of the same participants used security software on their desktop PCs.
Furthermore just 34.4% believed that security software on the mobile is essential. This
could be as a result of the platforms applying restrictions making it hard for third party app
developers to create software that provides additional security as well as causing the user
possible inconvenience with additional restrictions imposed on features such as access to
further party apps.
Egelman et al. discovered that there is a market of users that have concerns for app
privacy [177]. Concerned participants willing to pay a premium for less sensitive apps. A
quarter of study participants indicated they are willing to pay a $1.50 premium for a more
privacy aware app. Users are more likely to weigh up privacy between apps when they are
able to compare permissions easily across apps.
2.8 Regulatory Policies
There has been a number of legislative proposals that will directly impact the implemen-
tation of smartphones when they come into effect. Legislative frameworks are necessary
to protect individual data privacy effectively. The adoption of technological solutions that
protect user privacy is often dependent on the political will of organizations to adopt them.
Compliance with regulations can be difficult to implement without technological solutions.
Thus, both regulatory compliance frameworks and technological solutions are both required
to protect individuals.
Regulatory policies with the aim to protect individual data privacy have been proposed
and enacted in various states worldwide. These policies provide added protection to indi-
viduals through various compliance practices that need to be adhered to by organizations
with penalties issued by the state to those that are non-compliant.
In this section, we discuss the United Nations proposed articles to protect digital user
privacy. Global legislative frameworks in privacy protection can vary immensely. The Eu-
ropean Union has strong data protection laws and has recently passed new legislation that
imposes additional protections related to new technologies.
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2.8.1 United Nations Articles
An individual’s right to privacy is declared in the United Nations charter of human rights in
Article 12 [178]. The article states that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy”. This can be interpreted to expand to digital privacy where inferences
should not be made about an individual based on data collected about them.
Recently in December 2013, the United Nations proposed the resolution 68/167 named
“The Right to privacy in a digital age” which clarifies the view of the UN on the issues
surrounding digital privacy. In the resolution, it was reaffirmed that there should be no un-
lawful or arbitrary interception of communications as well as the collection of data. The UN
considers invading digital privacy as a highly intrusive act that limits freedom of expression
and contradicts the tenets of a democratic society. There were also concerns noted that such
inferences can lead to public security being put at risk.
Smartphones collect almost a complete digital profile of an individual. Access to the
data contained in a smartphone violates the right of user privacy. Furthermore, apps and
services that collect this data and send it to data warehouses for the purposes of data mining
can also potentially infringe on this right if care is not taken to anonymize the user data.
2.8.2 European Union Legislation
The European Union has amongst the strongest protections worldwide for the handling of
data privacy and has recently expanded its legislation to take into account new technologies
such as smartphones and social networks. Initially the Data Directive proposed by the EU in
1995 had to be adopted into law independently at the member states. Recently this directive
has been expanded to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which was adopted
in April 2016 and will apply to all member states without having to be passed into law in
2018. This legislation will have implications on how smartphone providers handle data.
An individual that is the data subject now must provide consent before any data can be
collected and this consent can be withdrawn at any time. Furthermore, multiple consents
are required for different processing activities. For example, if user data is used to train a
model, additional consent may be required. This requirement applies even if the service is
free. Many services use the freemium model to generate revenue from data collected, this
will prove to be more difficult. Smartphone platforms and deployed apps at present do not
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clearly communicate to the user what data is going to be obtained and for what purposes.
When these laws come into effect, platforms will need to take steps to ensure they comply
in order to distribute and sell products in the EU.
Information is required to be provided to an individual of all the types of processing
data may undergo. This included aggregation or simply being backed up on another form
of media. How transparency will be best achieved is still being worked through by the
legislators. This may well extend to how data is processed within smartphone apps. It will
be required that a user needs to be informed that data may collected and sent to remote data
warehouses. In Chapter 7, we demonstrate our proposals to address transparency.
The framework distinguishes between personal and sensitive data. This applies to all
data collected that can lead to the identification of an individual either directly or indirectly.
Processing sensitive data such as genetic and biometric data is stringent to stricter controls.
This can apply to smartphones that collect fingerprint information to unlock the device and
make purchases. Further clarification is being proposed on how only data such as the han-
dling of device identifiers and IP addresses. In Chapter 6, we demonstrate how to indirectly
identify a user with diagnostic data.
Personal data of a data subject can be processed so it cannot be attributed to a data
subject without the use of additional information. This additional information must be kept
separately and subject to measures to ensure it cannot be used to attribute the data subject.
Pseudonymisation is encouraged by the legislation when data is being used for research
purposes. As we demonstrate throughout this thesis, it is possible to infer insights from
data considered non-sensitive. When performing psudonymisation, organizations will need
to take extra care.
Organizations will need to clearly communicate to its customers if a security breach
occurs where data may be stolen. Considering smartphone users do not always provide
contact information within the app. Developers may need to implement a mechanism to
push notifications to the device to alert them if any unauthorized data access has occurred.
It will be expected that organizations build in data privacy by design and not treat it as an
additional measure later in the process. For example, all smartphone apps must encrypt any
data that is stored on the device irrespective of the data type. There will be implications for
developers as additional investment will be required to make apps compliant.
Modern individual data rights include the right to have data erased as well as the right to
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data portability. An individual can request an organization erase all their data. This includes
digital, hard-copy and any data that resides in any backups. Furthermore, an individual can
request a copy of data stored at any time and it needs to be provided by the organization
in a popular format such as a PDF. Smartphones collect a wealth of information, however
this information is stored in a format internal to the device and not easily accessible unless
a person has technical skills. Smartphone manufacturers will need to provide some sort of
export functionality. In addition, data sent to remote servers will need to be removed upon
user request.
2.9 Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter, we presented the state of the art of privacy research that directly impacts
modern smartphones. A strong focus was placed on dataset privacy, location/trajectory pri-
vacy, privacy protection in current smartphones, user attitudes towards privacy and regula-
tory frameworks. These privacy research disciplines are often pursued independently and
are relevant to smartphones. Thus, we aimed to explore the relevance of these fields and
how they apply to researching smartphone privacy.
The foundations of information privacy were explored. Privacy was once implicit as it
was difficult to collect information about an individual. The transition from implicit pri-
vacy too little privacy begun from the time of when the printing press and photography was
invented. Privacy continued to erode with every iteration of information technology with
electronic databases allowing for easy storage and retrieval of data, desktop PCs facilitating
users creating and capturing their own data and the Internet allowing for content to be shared
almost instantaneously. The latest iteration is the smartphone, providing all the functional-
ities of previous iterations of information technology in addition to more sensitive sensors
such as location in the one device. Smartphones like every information technology before it
has presented new and unique privacy challenges.
Dataset privacy was considered from the moment databases became commonly used.
Researchers considered that databases provided a unique opportunity to solve problems
with knowledge that could be derived but struggled to find a way to do it in a way that
did not compromise user privacy. The k-anonymity model was one of the first cornerstone
works that provided a way to share datasets that can be used to run queries without compro-
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mising an individual in the set. The premise being to ensure a person is indistinguishable
from k people in a set for quassi-identifier attributes. Extensions to these works included
l-diversity and t-closeness. Differential privacy was later proposed and provides a more
mathematically rigorous guarantee of privacy. It uses mechanisms to add noise based on
probability distributions to ensure individuals in a dataset cannot be identified. Two such
mechanisms in common use are the Laplace and exponential mechanisms.
Exchanging datasets in a private manner is evidently difficult even for large multina-
tional companies with famous attacks occurring on datasets over the years. Individuals in
the Netflix rating dataset were able to be identified by performing a linkage attack with the
IMDB database. AOL search data was not correctly sanitized using best practices and the
search history of users were identified. The appeal of crowd-sourcing solutions will likely
lead to more breaches in the future.
The spatial nature of mobile devices coupled with positioning functionality led to lo-
cation privacy to be considered as a key issue. We explored potential attacks as well as
protection mechanism. Location privacy was once considered a potential barrier to entry
for smartphone adoption by mainstream society. Inference attacks were presented that can
determine a user’s home location and significant places. Protection mechanism are often
based on spatial k-anonymity or make use pseudonyms. While theoretical solutions exist,
many LBS providers do not implement the necessary functions to use them in practice. Nav-
igation software now available on smartphones is commonly displacing traditional satellite
navigation systems. This leads to a user’s traveled routes being exposed and promoted the
research discipline of trajectory privacy. One such attack we presented was using routing
instructions to reconstruct the path a user traveled along. Protection techniques rely on tra-
jectory k-anonymity as well as confusion.
Sensitive data stored on smartphones is of potential value to researchers. There are many
standard data mining approaches that are in common use such as SVM and neural networks.
We demonstrated possible techniques to mine for data in a secure manner without the user
actually exposing their data. This allows for the benefit of data mining to be achieved with-
out the drawback of violating a user’s privacy. Many of these methods involve secure com-
putation techniques proposed by the cryptography community. It is likely that these methods
will be implemented on mobile platforms in the future.
The design of smartphones themselves directly impact on privacy protections. Early
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smartphone operating systems were really restrictive while modern platforms relaxed the
requirements to encourage third party development. The most popular platforms at present
being Android and iOS take two varied approaches. Android relies on a system of permis-
sions that apps require from the user to access functionality while Apple manually review
the apps. Each approach has their own drawbacks. In the case of Android, many users do not
comprehend the permissions or simply agree apprehensively for the convenience of what the
app provides. The manual review process used by Apple for iOS requires users to have faith
that the process is adequate without having exact knowledge of what is performed.
Regulatory protections were considered as these are often needed to motivate developers
to safeguard user privacy. New laws coming into effect will directly impact the design of
smartphones. The current generation of devices are not compliant and will need to adapt if
the manufactures want to continue to sell within certain markets, especially in the EU. New
protections offered include full disclosure of what data is being captured and stored by an
organization and the right to request a copy of the data in an easily comprehensible format
as well as the right to erase the data from organizational stores via requests.
Many studies into user attitudes of privacy show that users are concerned but are willing
to sacrifice their privacy for convenience or financial compensation. There is evidence to
suggest that users understanding the potential implications of giving away privacy such as
being able to be physically located reduces the likelihood a user will share this information.
Other studies have shown there is a segment of users willing to pay a premium for a more
secure phone leading to more motivation for research in this space to meet the said privacy
requirements.
A gap in the literature is the potential impact of the nature of data being explored. Data
that appears to be innocent upon first glance can reveal sensitive information a user may not
wish to share once it has undergone thorough analysis. In this thesis, we aim to bridge that
gap by presenting algorithms and techniques that reveal sensitive insights about a user via
data captured on a smartphone. Given this knowledge, we also explore ways to protect user
smartphone data at an operating system level. This understanding is needed to ensure the
next generation of smartphones are more privacy conscience.
Chapter 3
Trajectory Inference Attacks on
Smartphone Users
In Chapter 2, techniques to protect location and trajectory privacy were presented. In this
chapter, we explore how direct location data can be inferred indirectly using query results
data. Query results appear to be anonymous by not revealing the exact user location, how-
ever the location of the query results act as a proxy for indirect inference. Most existing
studies focus on protecting trajectory data through obfuscating, anonymizing or perturbing
the data with the aim to maximize user privacy. Although such approaches appear plausi-
ble, our work suggests that precise trajectory information can be inferred even from other
sources of data.
Smartphones can position users with accuracies of up to 5m. Third party apps can re-
trieve location data and build a dataset of an individual’s location tracks over time. Trajec-
tory data does not only show the location of users over a period of time, but also reveals a
high level of detail regarding their lifestyle, preferences and habits. The potential exchang-
ing of sensitive location data is of concern. Datasets are often exchanged to improve the
performance of search algorithms or derive marketing insights to better understand what
contextual ads to show a user.
Trajectory privacy has become a key research topic when sharing/exchanging trajectory
datasets. The query results in these datasets are commonly exchanged under the assumption
they are anonymous if location tracks are removed. We consider the case in which a location
service provider (LSP) only shares POI query results of users with third parties instead of
This chapter is based on
Tell Me What You Want and I Will Tell Others Where You Have Been - CIKM 2013
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exchanging users’ raw trajectory data to preserve privacy. We found that the query results
provide enough location information to still locate where a user is at a certain time and the
route they travel along.
We develop an inference algorithm and show that it can effectively approximate orig-
inal trajectories using solely the POI query results. The algorithm demonstrates high per-
formance in reconstructing the route a user travels along and their location at a given time.
The advent of services making use of continuous queries makes this inference technique
feasible on real world datasets. This finding prompts data providers to take additional care
when exchanging query results.
3.1 Introduction
Many applications, e.g., traffic management, urban management and geomarketing, gain
substantial benefit through mining such sources of trajectory data. However, sharing this
data in a raw format with third parties may incur serious privacy threats. Particularly, if in-
appropriately protected, such data may turn into powerful means of privacy invasions [179,
180, 89] such as location-based spams, physical threats, or inference attacks [74]. Findings
of a recent study indicates that a large number of location based service (LBS) users are
concerned about their privacy, which places a great impediment to sharing trajectory data
and the growth of LBSs in general.
Various approaches in the literature focus on preserving privacy prior to publishing/shar-
ing trajectory data [104, 181, 182, 142, 183]. The authors in [144, 184] propose publish-
ing a k-anonymous trajectory dataset to make a user indistinguishable from k − 1 other
users [33]. Other studies adopt cloaking/obfuscation techniques to coarsen the spatial and/or
temporal features of a trajectory [115] before publishing it. The authors in [107] propose
an approach that adds dummy trajectories to keep the data private.
To motivate our work we consider the case of an LBS provider who sanitizes a dataset by
omitting all sensitive attributes from the dataset [13]. In other words, instead of anonymizing
or obfuscating trajectory data, the LBS provider removes all GPS tracks of its users along
with their identity, presuming this will provide maximum privacy. This means that only
the results of user issued queries, which is generated and owned by the LSP, remain in the
database when sharing it. Recent features built into modern smartphone platforms location
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APIs also make it possible for third-party apps to access continuous location updates even
when the app is running in the background [185, 186]. Thus, it is possible for both service
providers and app developers to have access to sensitive location data.
To identify the risks of such a plausibly bullet-proof practice, we consider a scenario
where users continuously request the closest POIs to their position. For instance, a user is-
sues a query like “Where is the nearest gas station to my path?” or “Send me the closest
Italian restaurant?”. POI queries do not necessarily need to be issued by a user manually.
LBSs commonly make use of continuous queries that constantly require positioning up-
dates. Location recommendation systems [187] and the “nearby friends” feature commonly
available in social networks makes use of continuous queries. If detailed GPS tracks are
removed from the database, the LBS provider may lead others to believe that it is safe to
exchange the POI query results – a set of POIs ordered based on querying time.
In order to demonstrate the vulnerability of sharing LSP query results with a third party,
we develop an algorithm to perform an indirect inference attack on query results. The algo-
rithm infers individuals’ trajectories using the response of LSP to the requested POIs. The
trajectory reconstruction is performed without using GPS tracks captured by the LSP but
instead, the requested POIs sequence. As background knowledge we assume the availability
of road types including how central a road is (e.g. main road), how often a road is used by
motorists, the speed limit and basic transportation information about the area.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to attack trajectory privacy without
directly using trajectory information (either fine-grained or coarse-grained). The accuracy
of our approach suggests that indirectly inferred paths are sufficiently precise to raise serious
privacy concerns. By demonstrating what indirect trajectory inference attacks can achieve,
we show that there is an urgent need to address the privacy implications of LBSs when
exchanging trajectory datasets even when the provider omits the sensitive location data.
3.2 Background
Generally, analyzing data in order to gain knowledge about a subject in an adversarial man-
ner is known as an “inference attack” [87]. A key work to highlight the potential of location
data in predicting users’ movement behavior was given in [90]. Ashbrook et al. have used
GPS data of mobile users to determine significant places being visited by them [90]. To un-
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derline the risks of leaked location data [87] used real GPS data of 172 subjects and found
each person’s home location with a median error of about 60 meters. Finally, [87] identi-
fied people based on their pseudonymous location tracks using simple algorithms and a free
Web service. In contrast, our algorithm can estimate a user’s trajectory without using the
GPS tracks stored by the LSP.
In another study, [99] succeeded at reconstructing an unknown trajectory using its dis-
tance to a few fixed trajectories. In order to achieve this, the authors have introduced speed
limit and known trajectories as a background knowledge used by an adversary. Similarly,
assuming it is possible to observe a user’s movement behavior in public places, or even in-
ferring a couple of her visited spots using social networks, weblogs etc. [188] used some
snapshots of a user’s trajectory as adversary’s background knowledge. [188] proves that
this “general world knowledge” can breach user’s privacy with a high probability regard-
less of how much attempt is being taken to anonymize or cloak her location data. These two
works clearly show the potential risks stemming from combining the available background
knowledge along with the mutual distances released for analytical purposes.
Probabilistic map-matching methods such as [189] attempt to construct a trajectory from
a set of discrete location samples. Map-matching techniques heavily make use of shortest-
path algorithms to find the most likely path between samples. These techniques work well
provided the granularity of samples is fine enough to reduce possible paths a user could have
traveled along. Current map-matching algorithms also suffer from high time complexities
making it difficult to apply at scale. Our problem domain assumes sparse location samples
so these techniques are not directly applicable.
Voronoi diagrams [190] are widely used in computational geometry. The region of a
Voronoi cell is comprised of all points that are closet to the Voronoi point corresponding to
the respective cell. Its structure lends itself nicely to answering nearest neighbor queries as
each POI within a Voronoi cell will correspond to the closest POIs. The structure has also
found practical applications in a variety of other fields.
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3.3 Problem Definition
3.3.1 Closest POIs Database
POI queries are a common applications of LBSs. An LBS user sends her current location
accompanied with a query asking for her closest points of interest, e.g., the closest gas
station, Italian restaurant, etc., and the LSP returns a set of points as query result. The
query database records are in the form of (ID, PT ), where ID determines a user. PT is the
result of successive POI queries along the user’s trip. In other words, PT = {p1, p2, ..., pn}
where each pi represents a the closest point of interest for the ith query. Note that ID is not
necessarily a user’s actual identity, but rather a unique identifier such as a pseudonym.
3.3.2 Adversary Model
An LSP may remove both user identity and location information as the sensitive attributes
from the query database, presuming this would guarantee the user’s privacy. This suppos-
edly anonymized database is then shared with third parties. We suppose that an adversary
is any third party with whom this query database is shared. One example of this occurring
recently is researchers were able to mine check-in locations from Foursquare users to con-
struct a dataset and made it publicly available [191]. In addition to the closest POIs database,
we assume that the adversary has one of the following two types of background knowledge
about a transportation network:
Edge Centrality: The adversary may consider each street as an edge in a graph and as-
sume that the more central an edge is, i.e., how frequent an edge occurs in a set of candidate
paths, the more likely it is that a user travels along it. Hence, edge centrality can be modelled
introducing a weighting function. Generally, main roads are more likely to receive higher
weights.
Edge Frequency: The adversary may have access to the trips users have taken in the past.
In this model, we assume that the adversary assigns a higher weight to more frequently
travelled edges. The count for a specific edge is incremented for every trip that it could be
part of to account for the GPS error. In addition, we assume that an attacker also has the
following information:
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(a) GPS Error and Line Interpolation (b) Accuracy ≈ 0.91
Figure 3.1: Proximity Circles to Measure Location Privacy
Maximum Velocity Bound: The adversary may also assume that there is a maximum ve-
locity with which a user can travel between two subsequent time stamps. The velocity of a
user at a given time can be estimated based on the maximum speed limit of a road.
3.3.3 Attack Success
GPS points do not uniquely identify the roads a user has taken, so the actual trip is generally
not known. Thus, conventional trajectory similarity measures such as the Hausdorff distance
and DTW are not suitable to assess the success of our algorithm. Take Figure 3.1a as an ex-
ample, where the GPS logs do not overlap with the actual path due to the measurement error.
Using linear interpolation between GPS points (the dashed line connecting points) does not
provide a robust means of inferring the original path, and as can be seen in Figure 3.1a, this
interpolation may barely overlap with the underlying road network. Even map matching
cannot resolve such a situation because a GPS point cannot be uniquely mapped to a single
edge.
To address this issue, we determine the closeness of an inferred path to the original one
through proximity circles. We draw circles with r radius around the location of each GPS
point (Figure 3.1a) and estimate the attack success based on the circles. More specifically,
the overlapping percentage of the inferred path within r meters to the original path deter-
mines the success of the inference attack. This is measured by the number of proximity
circles that are visited by the inferred path segments divided by the total number of circles.
Figure 3.1b shows the example of an inferred path as well as the proximity circles
representing the original GPS logs. The inference accuracy is measured using the above
equation and is 0.91. This metric is useful in evaluating how well the algorithm works in
identifying the band a user is travelling along.











Figure 3.2: Generation and Extension of Initial Path Segments
3.4 Indirect Trajectory Inference Algorithm
Our proposed inference algorithm utilizes the location of query results to generate a Voronoi
diagram, which for a given set of points, pi ∈ P , divides the space into a number of cells
(regions) such that all the points in any cell, ci, are closer to the corresponding pi than to
any other p. Voronoi diagrams are widely applied in nearest POIs problems. For the set PT ,
we generate a Voronoi diagram V , and retrieve a set of candidate paths that travel from
one Voronoi region to the next. However, since Voronoi cells can be quite large in many
areas, the number of these candidate paths is not restrictive enough to reconstruct a unique
trajectory and needs to be further reduced. Therefore, maximum velocity bound and edge
centrality have been employed in this work to infer the most likely path that was taken by
the users.
3.4.1 Indirect Path Generation
To generate our initial paths, we propose an incremental search algorithm that iterates
through each pair of points. On the first iteration, the Voronoi edge between the first and
second point is determined and every path segment that intersects with the Voronoi edge is
retrieved. This is illustrated on the left of Figure 3.2. All streets that intersect the Voronoi
edge between p1 and p2 are retrieved. The initial retrieved path segments are considered as
the starting path segments for the candidate path(s). The initial segments are then passed to
a function which retrieves all the connected path segments to the initial one and add them
to the respective candidate path (Figure 3.2). Once a set of paths is generated, the last path
segment of each path is checked to ensure that it is in the destination Voronoi cell, otherwise
the entire candidate path is discarded.
In addition, assuming a maximum velocity bound, maxv, we can compute the max-
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imum distance, d, that a user could have traveled between two consecutive timestamps.
Therefore, the length of the path is checked and only if its difference with d is less than a
threshold, δ, it is added to the set of candidate paths. Since the beginning of a path segment
is not necessarily the start point of the trajectory, we assume the generated path may be
slightly longer than d, i.e., δ longer.
3.4.2 Candidate Path Selection
To select a single path from the set of generated candidate paths we derived a weighting
function to rank the paths based on edge centrality, and then select the top ranked candidate
path as the path representing the user’s trajectory.
The weighting function counts the frequency of path segment occurrence in each can-
didate path and stores this value in a hashtable. The weight for each candidate path is cal-
culated by the summation of each path segment length divided by the length of the whole
candidate path which is then multiplied by the frequency value of each path segment stored









The weighting function returns the path that contains the greatest overlap with other paths in
the candidate path set. Therefore, edges that are more commonly used in a set of candidate
paths are favored over edges that are not. Provided users take fairly direct routes to their
destination, this weighting function works well.
3.5 Experiments
3.5.1 Dataset
In our work we employ the GeoLife trajectory dataset1 to evaluate the performance, i.e.,
accuracy, of our inference approach. The GeoLife dataset consists of more than 17,000
trajectories that have been collected by 182 individuals over three years. We focused on a
smaller part of the city of Beijing and retrieved those trajectories that fully reside inside this
part. In total we ran our inference algorithm on 279 routes.
1www.research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/geolife
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Figure 3.3: Voronoi Diagram Generated for a Path
3.5.2 Implementation
We generate random POIs in the city of Beijing and stored them in a database as our
PT . These POIs are generated uniformly inside the boundary of Beijing and they are then
mapped to their closest road segment. In order to evaluate the performance of our inference
algorithm for different scenarios, we create four POI batches of 400, 800, 1600 and 3200
points to reflect sparse and dense areas. For example, 1600 POIs equate to 4 POIs per square
kilometer.
In the road network, there are many path combinations a user can travel along to get
to a destination. This leads to a large search space and an inefficient search process. To re-
duce the search complexity, we employ a pruning method that discards any combinations
that terminates at the same road while expanding paths between Voronoi cells. Moreover,
due to the geometric nature of Voronoi diagrams, individual Voronoi cells can become quite
small and may create a case where some paths overshoot the cell and lead to zero candi-
date paths. In order to compensate for this case, the algorithm allows paths to continue to
expand even if they did not terminate in the current Voronoi cell. However a path is finally
removed if it does not end in the next Voronoi cell in the next iteration. In our implementa-
tion we use the OpenStreetMap2 data to generate the road network graph. A web interface is
also constructed to visually view the data using PHP, Javascript and the Google Maps API.
Javascript is used to implement the trajectory inference algorithm and an OpenStack cloud
2www.openstreetmap.org
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POI r = 50m (%) r = 100m (%) r = 250m (%) r = 500m (%)
400 27.73 39.10 51.83 64.74
800 35.10 47.97 61.31 73.76
1600 39.00 53.90 69.63 80.84
3200 36.32 49.74 64.38 75.37
Table 3.1: Trajectory Inference Experimental Results using Edge Centrality
POI r = 50m (%) r = 100m (%) r = 250m (%) r = 500m (%)
400 32.15 44.52 58.09 71.31
800 38.03 51.93 65.85 77.79
1600 41.07 56.44 71.62 81.40
3200 37.97 52.45 67.70 77.97
Table 3.2: Trajectory Inference Experimental Results using Edge Frequency
computing environment is utilized to run the inference algorithm. Moreover, the Bower-
Watson algorithm is employed to compute the Voronoi diagrams. An example GeoLife path
is also illustrated in Figure 3.3, where the purple (darker) flags illustrate POIs along the path
and their respective Voronoi cells. The green (lighter) flags show the original GPS logs.
3.5.3 Experimental Results
We measure the accuracy of our inference algorithm as the number of proximity circles that
are visited by the inferred path divided by the total number of circles (Section 3.3.3). To
estimate the inference accuracy of our approach, we consider varying radii, r, in meter to
generate proximity circles, where r ∈ {10, 50, 100, 250, 500}. Table 3.2 shows the perfor-
mance of our inference algorithm for varying POI densities. Although the overall accuracy
is low for very small radius of 10 meters, our results show that for more realistic buffers and
higher densities our approach is successful in accurately estimating a user trajectory and
can achieve an average accuracy level beyond 80%. When POI densities are excessively
high, this can cause accuracy to drop slightly in our approach as the Voronoi cells become
smaller causing additional but possibly legitimate routes to become pruned. However, over-
all the trend is that the increase in POI density and for urban areas with higher POI densities
such as city centers, the inferred paths get closer to the original paths incurring higher pri-
vacy risks for a user.
In order to understand if access to the trip patterns of users can increase an attacker’s
ability to infer a user’s original path, we ran experiments using edge frequency instead of
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edge centrality. The edge frequency (see Section 3.3.2) is computed on the basis of actually
travelled trips. Our experiments show small gains in terms of accuracy but also demonstrate
that this additional knowledge does not significantly improve an attacker’s ability to infer a
user’s path. Our findings show that in either case the ability of an attacker to infer a user’s
path based on POI information is high.
3.6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we presented an algorithm that only employs a set of POIs to indirectly
infer a user’s trajectory. Our results suggest that even coarse location information allows us
to approximate a user’s trajectory within dense urban areas with high accuracy. Therefore,
exchanging query results of LBS users instead of their tracks does not offer adequate privacy
protection.
While our inference attacks are effective in areas with high POI densities, there are still a
number of directions that are likely to make the overall inference strategy more effective. We
assume in our work that for every request there is only the closest POI available, however,
an LSP usually provides users with several POIs for a single request. This information could
be encoded as a higher-order Voronoi diagram that leads to smaller cells and thus should
enable a more refined attack strategy.
In our work we have used positive information, i.e., information directly shared by a
location service provider. However, another location service provider (or adversary) could
also have the information about all the POIs that were not revealed because they were not
among the closest POIs. Since the overall number of POIs is much larger than the number
of POIs returned as a query result, the underlying Voronoi diagram may result in smaller
cells, which in turn should improve the accuracy of an inference attack algorithm.
Chapter 4
Locating Smartphone Users Indoors
In Chapter 3, we presented how to reveal user location indirectly from query results. In
this chapter, we demonstrate how to reveal user location indoors via Bluetooth using a
localization scheme we developed. Smartphone users may not want to reveal their location
in an indoor environment. For example, an employee of an organization may be happy to
make knowledge of where they work public but do not want their exact location within an
office complex to be known.
Many users also leave on Bluetooth to connect to headsets and other smartphone de-
vices. Our localization scheme indirectly reveals a user’s location by comparing the signal
strengths of audible beacons and other devices to pinpoint the user. This chapter demon-
strates how a numeric value indicating signal strength can be used to narrow down a user’s
location.
Signal strength data is considered to be not sensitive and can be captured by being within
range of another device. Smartphones are equipped with Bluetooth which uses radio signals
to communicate. Nearby devices can perceive these signals and determine the relative signal
strength. Also revealed with the signal strength is the device name. Many smartphone users
set this device name to their name. In this chapter, we present a localization scheme that can
accurately position users.
Localization schemes used for positioning in wireless networks are currently based on
either range-based or range-free principles. Both methods when used in isolation have dis-
advantages that can reduce the accuracy of positioning estimates. We propose a unified
approach that combines the strengths of both methods while overcoming their limitations.
This chapter is based on
Combining Range-Based and Range-Free Methods: A Unified Approach for Localization -
SIGSPATIAL 2015
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Range-based methods rely on taking reliable measurements in which geometric techniques
are then applied to locate a node. These techniques are very susceptible to imprecision in
captured measurements. In contrast, range-free methods do not consider the actual numer-
ical value of a positioning device, rather reading magnitudes compared to other measure-
ments provides the most reliable information. These comparisons are not always reliable
and may lead to an accumulation of error, particularly in large spaces.
Reliable schemes rely on beacons of known locations, geometrically it can be seen that
a greater number of beacons can lead to better granularity in positioning estimates. Our
unified approach mitigates these effects by first using a range-based method to determine
an approximate location which can be then used to reduce the search space. A range-free
method is then employed to refine the positioning estimate further within the reduced space.
Deploying a sufficient number of beacons required to achieve high precision is not al-
ways practical, thus we introduce the concept of virtual beacons that estimate signal mag-
nitudes at points to improve granularity. Our experiments show the mean estimation error
improves when applying our localization scheme to a Bluetooth system and improves fur-
ther with virtual beacons.
4.1 Introduction
Positioning mobile devices in a wireless sensor network requires advanced localization
schemes. Current algorithmic principles are either range-based or range-free. Neither method
in isolation currently provides a general solution that works well in a wide range of scenar-
ios, especially for indoor settings.
Localization schemes require anchor points or location beacons of known locations in
order to perform location estimation. Common estimation techniques make use of trilatera-
tion, triangulation, fingerprinting and proximity principles [192]. Trilateration measures the
distance from multiple reference points while triangulation derives the angles. Fingerprint-
ing requires measurements to be manually taken and stored offline. A sensor will compare
its readings to that of the measurements taken earlier. Proximity commonly used in binary
sensors relies upon a dense grid of antennas and a location is estimated based on which
sensors are nearby.
Range-based methods are considered to be capable of achieving fine-grained precision.


















(b) APIT InToOut Case
Figure 4.1: Potential Issues Range-Based and Range-Free Methods Encounter
Measurements are first taken, then signal propagation models or timing methods are em-
ployed to estimate distances. Many assumptions are made about the environment in which
they operate. In signal propagation models, constants need to be adjusted depending on
the setting the positioning device is in. In timing methods, distances between location bea-
cons need to be known ahead of time. Thus, while providing good positioning accuracy in
known environments, in dynamic environments these models do not always hold. In con-
trast, range-free techniques do not make any assumptions that such information is available
or even valid. Range-free techniques use binary decisions, e.g. is a user in range or not
or is a user within a triangle. While range-free methods are robust, they are considered
coarse-grained as the level of granularity they provide is bounded by the geometry formed
by location beacons.
This chapter introduces a unified approach that takes features from both range-based
and range-free principles. By unifying these approaches, the accuracy of the positioning
estimate being negatively affected by imprecise measurements associated with range-based
methods and accumulation of error across large spaces that occurs in range-free methods
can both be mitigated. We use a range-based method to obtain an approximate location, this
location is within the three beacons that are considered closest. The location is then used
to reduce the search space, for which a range-free method is then applied. Since range-free
methods make use of information from other devices, it is suitable for further refinement.
This does not necessarily work as well in reverse because range-free methods are susceptible
to accumulation errors in large spaces.
We illustrate our reasoning with the following examples. Consider the scenario pre-
sented in Figure 4.1a where three location beacons and a user node are present. The actual













Figure 4.2: Combining Range-Based and Range-Free Methods
distance between the user node and beacons is 2m, 5m, 2m respectively, however using a
signal propagation model the distance calculated is 1m, 4m, 3m. What is known with more
confidence is based off the signal strengths, these beacons are most likely to be the three
closest. Thus, a node is somewhere between these beacons, however due to high sensitivity
of the models we do not assume the calculated position within the triangular area of the
beacons is accurate.
Range-free methods make use of information from neighboring nodes to estimate a
location. A popular range-free scheme referred to as Approximate Point In Triangle Test
(APIT) [193] overlays a geometry of triangles by joining location beacons. The key idea
is to be inside or outside a triangle. The test is performed through a comparison of signal
strengths of the received signals. More triangles leads to an increase in potential expected
accuracy as the position can be approximated through the intersection of all triangles a
device is located in. As the number of beacons is typically small, the expected accuracy will
be low as well. Through a process referred to as APIT aggregation, the position is estimated
to be at the center of gravity of the triangles all surrounding neighboring nodes consider
the device to be in. This method is not without limitations, consider the scenario shown in
Figure 4.1b. By performing a APIT test, the scheme estimates the node is outside when the
node is really inside the triangle. This occurs in cases where a node is close to the edges
of triangles. If there are many neighboring nodes clustered in one area, this will also cause
a bias. In larger spaces, range-free methods tend to favor where nodes are more central as
error accumulates, thus range-free methods work better in smaller regions. Having obtained
an approximate location from the range-based method, we only need to consider a smaller
region. Provided there are neighboring nodes nearby, this information is used for further
refinement.
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In our unified approach, a bounding box is created around the approximate location
obtained by the range-based method. Refinement is then achieved by using APIT which
makes use of information of neighboring nodes. A signal magnitude is compared in relation
to the magnitudes of all neighboring sensors to determine if its value is greater than or less
than its neighbors. The numerical value itself is not important, the binary result from the
comparison operation is the focus when refining the position. In the case where sufficient
neighboring nodes are present, this can lead to a significant reduction of error. An increase
in node density leads to more values for a sensor to compare. For example, in the case of
APIT, the algorithm can use neighboring nodes to determine if a node exists that is closer
to a location beacon than the node we are trying to locate. Consider the case presented in
Figure 4.2 which illustrates a hybrid of the above two methods. Trilateration results in a
position being above the actual position, a bounding box surrounds this point. Triangles are
generated using location beacons, APIT is restricted to the search space within bounding
box. The position estimate is now closer to the actual position due to the neighboring nodes
indicating which of the three polygons the user is closer to.
In coarse-grained schemes such as APIT, additional location beacons can lead to added
combinations of triangles which can improve the granularity of positioning estimates. Be-
cause actual location beacons may not be available, we propose the use of virtual beacons
that use real beacons to estimate a possible signal magnitude if a beacon actually existed in
a particular location.
Virtual beacons compute their location using the received signal strength of actual bea-
cons on the basis of a path loss model. Provided the virtual beacon locations are close to
actual beacons, they are robust to signal strength variations. The range-free component of
our algorithm treats actual and virtual beacons in the same way for location estimation. The
range-based component only uses real beacons as the measurement phase is much more
susceptible to signal noise. A similar principle was proposed in RFID based systems using
virtual references to yield improvement [194].
We focus on applying our localization scheme in an indoor scenario because outdoor
positioning is commonly achieved via GPS. It was also our aim to use off the shelf technol-
ogy, i.e. Bluetooth. Devices with Bluetooth capabilities are widely available ranging from
headsets and speakers to phones and tablets. Furthermore Bluetooth is available on both
modern and older generation mobile devices. Any programmable Bluetooth device can act
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as a sensor that reads values from multiple beacons. The ubiquity of Bluetooth makes it a
good candidate to create a practical, widely available and cost effective indoor positioning
systems.
The use of Bluetooth beacons are becoming increasingly popular in the application
of indoor positioning as they can interface with modern smartphone apps, relatively easy
to deploy and are cost effective for large scale deployments. The Eldheimar Museum in
Iceland recently created the automatic museum guide available for visitors to install on their
smartphones [195]. The museum guide service provides live navigation instructions and
presents content based on the user proximity to key exhibits. Similarly, American Airlines
released an app that provides important information based on a customer’s location [196].
Beacons are deployed throughout the airport pushing information content to users such as
the closest security checkpoint, boarding time and distance to the gate.
To evaluate our approach, we developed a Bluetooth simulator that visually allows the
placement of users, beacons and nodes in a room. Our results indicate we can achieve higher
positioning accuracy when using our unified approach as opposed to when using either a
range-based method and range-free method in isolation. Adding a sufficient, number of
virtual beacons also improves estimation accuracy.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• Propose a unified approach to localization making use of both range-based and range-
free methods;
• Provide an algorithm demonstrating the effectiveness of a unified approach;
• Introduce virtual beacons to demonstrate how they can be used to improve results;
• Demonstrate that our technique can achieve accuracies of under 1m.
4.2 Background
Localization is considered an important problem in which many techniques have been pro-
posed that can be classified as either range-based or range-free. Recent research has fo-
cused on applying schemes in an indoor setting [197, 198]. Early work focused on applying
range-based techniques commonly used for outdoor environments in indoor settings. These
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solutions often require expensive hardware and complex deployments. Later research aimed
to find a solution using range-free techniques as they are cheaper and more accessible.
4.2.1 Range-Based Methods
Range-based methods consist of two phases, the ranging phase and the estimation phase.
In the ranging phase, measurements are taken to estimate distance by communicating with
sensors of known locations. The estimation phase uses the measurements taken and applies
geometric techniques to estimate a position.
The Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) of a sensor can be used to measure dis-
tance. Timing methods including Time of Arrival (ToA) and Time Difference on Arrival
(TDoA) can be alternatively used to measure distance. These methods are usually more
accurate, however have a greater communications overhead. Sensor clocks need to be pre-
cisely synchronized for timing method to work with minimal error.
In ToA, the one-way propagation time is measured between a location beacon and a
node. Given the speed the signal travels is known, the distance can be then calculated by
using intersecting circles, triangles or spheres. TDoA is a more complex variant, examining
the time difference of when the signal arrives at multiple receivers as opposed to using just
the absolute time of arrival.
In TDoA, stations are at known locations and broadcast their signals at known times.
The difference in distance is measured resulting in an infinite number of locations that can
satisfy the measurement. When plotted, these locations form a hyperbolic curve. Taking
measurements from a second station combination will produce a second curve which in-
tersects the first. The two curves are compared. A small number of possible locations are
revealed producing a fix.
Angle of Arrival methods (AoA) measure the angle between a node and location bea-
cons. Directional antennas or an array of antennas are required. No time synchronization
is needed, however additional hardware is required and AoA solutions are expensive to de-
ploy. The angle the positioning device makes between two location beacons is measured,
by using this angle to form two lines, the position is the intersection of these lines.
The method used in the estimation phase depends on what ranging method is initially
used. When using distance measurements via RSSI or ToA, trilateration can be employed
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by using circles, triangles or spheres to locate a device. In contrast, triangulation can be used
when angles are measured from known points using AoA. The curves produced in TDoA
are compared via multilateration techniques.
Satellite-based systems including GPS make use of ToA methods and have proven to
be highly accurate for outdoor scenarios. Readings are taken by a receiver from at least
four satellites, four is required to perform trilateration in three-dimensional space. Position-
ing satellites carry atomic clocks which are periodically synchronized with ground stations.
While providing the widest possible coverage, satellite-based systems do not usually per-
form well when applied to indoor scenarios [199] due to the line-of-sight requirement.
The measurements taken in the estimation phase can greatly affect the accuracy of the
approach. Small errors in measurements such as distance and time leads to the estimation
accuracy dropping off rapidly. While range-based methods are conventionally considered to
be a fine-grained method to localization, in the case of our unified approach that is intended
for indoor scenarios, we use it to gain an approximate of where a user is located.
4.2.2 Range-Free Methods
Range-free methods make little to no assumptions about the environment in which they
operate and rely upon error reducing methods such as aggregation. Well known range-
free schemes proposed include Centroid [200], DV-HOP [201] and Amorphous [202] and
APIT[193] which will be described in detail in Section 4.3.2.
Centroid works under the assumption coarse grained localization information is avail-
able from location beacons. The centroid of all the received location beacons in an area
is then taken and used as the location estimate [200]. This approach has the advantage of
being easy to implement. The following formula is used to estimate the user location based
of locations received of all audible beacons (N ).
(Xest, Yest) =
(X1 + ...+XN , Y1 + ...+ YN )
N
In Figure 4.3, it can be seen that position P has been determined to be the center of the
three location beacons considered closest. The authors found that this method works well
for outdoor environments with the mean estimation error never exceeded 2m. In indoor
settings, the performance accuracies range greatly between 4.6m to 22.3m.
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P
Figure 4.3: Centroid Localization
The DV-HOP and Amorphous algorithms share similarities borrowing from principles
in classical distance vector routing. Initially location beacons are searched for by broad-
casting throughout the network outwards, initializing a hop-count parameter to 1. Nearby
nodes that receive broadcasts track the hop-count in a table, increment it and forward it to














Figure 4.4: DV-HOP/Amorphous Localization
Hop-count is then translated to physical distance, DV-Hop uses the average single hop
distance using formula (4.1) . The location of i and j is represented by (Xi, Yi) and (Xj , Yj)
respectively, furthermore the distance in hops is represented by Hj . The result of this for-
mula is propagated to nearby nodes.
HopSizei =
∑√
(Xi − Yj)2 + (Xi − Yj)2√
Hj
(4.1)
Amorphous converts to physical distance using a more complex method, the calculation
used is referred to as the Kleinrock and Slivester formula (4.2) [203].









An assumption is made that the density of the network is known (nlocal) so that theHopSize
can be calculated offline. The final step of both DV-Hop and Amorphous is to determine the
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closest three location beacons. by calculating the distance measurements, trilateration can
then be performed to estimate a node’s location.
Range-free methods are considered to be a robust coarse-grained approach, however in
our unified-approach we use range-free methods to refine a position further. Once a localiza-
tion scheme has an approximate location, range-free methods can use information provided
by neighboring nodes to refine estimate further.
4.2.3 Indoor Positioning Systems
Indoor Positioning Systems (IPS) aim to provide positioning and tracking of mobile devices
or persons. IPS have many practical applications, currently they are commonly used where
locating users in a building is required and inventory tracking of expensive equipment. In
this section we focus mainly on Radio Frequency (RF) systems as our work is based on
Bluetooth which uses radio waves. A solution that is accurate, robust, scalable and cost
effective is required for mainstream adoption. Table 4.1 compares different localization
schemes across these criteria. In our work we have applied both range-based and range-
free techniques to a Bluetooth system, utilizing methods from both ideas to refine location
further.
Many IPSs have also been proposed using varied indoor localization schemes. The
choice of frequency used is a major determining factor of what scheme a system should
employ. In this work, we focus specifically on Bluetooth systems that use radio frequencies
(RF). Indoor positioning has proven to be difficult to achieve. In free space, radio multi-
path models work well in determining distance. This does not usually generalize to indoor
situations except for in controlled settings [204]. Indoor environments pose difficulties due
to severe multipath propagation and signal attenuation caused by various objects. In Figure
4.5, the signal is split into two paths because it reflected of an object, it is then weakened as
it goes through the wall.
Early work focused on centralized approaches that built upon client-server architecture.
A system called BIPS [205] used computer workstations as beacons of known locations.
The beacons constantly scan for mobile devices and readings are sent to a server for pro-
cessing. Similarly Bluepass [206] applied the same approach using USB Bluetooth adapters
connected via USB cable as fixed stations as opposed to computer workstations.
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Technique Accuracy Robustness Scalability Cost
Range-based High Low High Medium
Range-free Medium High Low Medium
Fingerprinting Medium High Medium High
Cellular Low High High Low
Table 4.1: Comparison of Different IPS Localization Schemes
Wall
Figure 4.5: Signal Multipath and Attenuation Effects
Trilateration via RSSI has been demonstrated in [207, 208] using values received from
location beacons to locate a user holding a Bluetooth enabled device. The proposed systems
used laptops or inexpensive Bluetooth dongles as location beacons. They demonstrated ad-
equate performance in controlled environments such as large office spaces and laboratories.
A much different approach that makes use of fingerprinting techniques has also been
investigated. Fingerprinting takes advantage of modern sensors being able to access online
resources in order to compare and store readings. Data-mining techniques are applied to
captured measurements. Fingerprinting involves capturing signal measurements of known
locations and storing the features offline. When a node needs to be located, its measurements
will be compared to what is captured prior. Data-mining techniques including probabilistic
methods, support-vector machines (SVM), k-nearest-neighbor and neural networks are then
employed to perform the comparison. Fingerprinting has been demonstrated to be promis-
ing as it provides good accuracies and does not require deployment of complex hardware.
However, capturing enough samples at known locations is a significant undertaking.
Microsoft RADAR [209, 210] makes use of WLan technology and uses fingerprinting
methods. RADAR creates a radio map of all access points in an area and corresponding
signal strengths. A user’s mobile will compare its signal strengths with those on the radio
map using a kNN Viterbi-like algorithm. GSM fingerprinting has also been demonstrated
to achieve median accuracy up to 5m in large multi-floor buildings when using signals from
the six strongest cell towers [211].
The drawback of using fingerprinting techniques is that accurate radio maps are re-
quired. The radio maps need to be constructed for all areas positioning is required. This
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increases the cost and effort of deployment, particularity when large areas need to be cov-
ered. Furthermore, the maps need to be reconstructed subject to hardware changes. Our
approach makes use of easily deployable beacons and neighboring mobile devices to accu-
rately position a node.
Inspired by cellular routing techniques used in mobile cell tower networks, indoor posi-
tioning has also been achieved by placing beacons in non-overlapping locations. The limited
range of Bluetooth is used as an advantage as a confident location estimate can be achieved
when a device is in range. This has been shown to work in a practical system in [212]
designed to test context aware phone applications. The authors modified cheap Bluetooth
headsets to stay in discovery mode and used them as beacons. An algorithm has also been
proposed in how to place beacons in a non-overlapping manner in [213]. While cellular
techniques are robust and low-cost, its precision is lower.
While indoor positioning is difficult, many solutions can achieve accuracy within 2m
to 5m in most situations when deployed correctly. This has led to the development of com-
mercial systems available for purchase for specialized applications.
Tadley Systems developed an IPS called Topaz combining the strengths of both Blue-
tooth and Infrared (IR). Bluetooth is firstly used to determine what room a user is in using
a proximity detection algorithm. Infrared is then used to provide an (X,Y ) coordinate of
where the device is located in the room. Infrared has been shown to be very accurate within
a low range and is used by Topaz for refinement.
Bluetooth LE has also been used for indoor positioning. The recent introduction of
Apple iBeacon which is built on Bluetooth LE allows for interaction with a smart-phone
when a user is in proximity. Systems such as indoo.rs have been built on top of iBeacon and
has been demonstrated in practice to work for large scale IPS.
RFID Ultra-Wide Band (UWB) based IPSs have gained popularity, they have proven
to be a viable alternative as the UWB frequency has less interference than RF. Ubisense
and Snappire Dart have achieved accuracies to the centimeter [214]. The downside is that
deployments require many tags, are costly and not widely accessible.
Our approach to Bluetooth localization is completely decentralized and makes use of
widely available smartphones and Bluetooth devices.
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4.3 Problem Definition
In this section, we describe the problem we aim to solve with our unified localization
scheme, the APIT range-free algorithm and a method to measure the accuracy of various
schemes in order to evaluate their effectiveness.
4.3.1 Problem Statement
The problem is to determine the position of a wireless node n in a scene through the use of
a localization scheme that makes use of various information available to n. A scene can be
considered anywhere in space a node may need to be located, examples include a meeting
room in a building or in a large lecture theater.
Audible location beacons are considered a special case of wireless nodes in which their
location is known ahead of time. They provide location information to querying nodes. For
example a location beacon may advertise its (X,Y ) position to all wireless nodes in range.
Neighboring nodes surround n, however their location is not known. They provide in-
formation including signal strength relative to n and audible location beacons in the scene.
This information can be provided either by continuously broadcasting it or establishing a
communications channel with n.
The localization scheme is required to utilize information provided by both surrounding
neighbor nodes and audible location beacons to improve estimation accuracy. Localiza-
tion schemes commonly fall under range-based or range-free approaches. Range-based ap-
proaches that use measurements and range-free approaches that use comparisons. By using
a hybrid approach that makes use of techniques from both principles, the aim is to determine
if better positioning estimates can be achieved by using each method in cases where their
strengths can be leveraged while mitigating their weaknesses.
4.3.2 APIT
The APIT algorithm was designed to perform well when radio patterns are irregular and
nodes are placed randomly. Given three location beacons are present: A, B, C, the aim is
to determine whether a point M with an unknown position is inside the triangle4ABC or
not. The perfect Point in Triangle Test (PIT) provides a theoretical solution to this problem
as presented by the following two propositions.











Figure 4.6: P.I.T Propositions
Proposition I: If M is inside triangle 4ABC, when M is shifted in any direction, the
new position must be nearer to (further from) at least one anchor A, B or C (Figure 4.6a).
Proposition II: If M is outside triangle 4ABC, when M is shifted, there must exist a
direction in which the position of M is further from or closer to all three anchors A, B and
C (Figure 4.6b).
A formal proof is available validating the correctness of the propositions. The issue aris-
ing from this solution is that the movement of nodes is required and is infeasible to imple-
ment. The APIT algorithm approximates the PIT test without requiring any node movement
by using information from neighboring nodes. The departure test is run on each neighbor
to determine if M is further away from an anchor than a neighbor. The signal magnitude
is used to determine this by assuming that the magnitude will monotonically decrease with
distance. APIT is formally defined as follows:
Approximate P.I.T Test: If no neighbor of M is further from/closer to all three anchors
A, B and C simultaneously, M assumes that it is inside triangle 4ABC. Otherwise, M
assumes it resides outside this triangle.
The algorithm runs APIT on every combination of triangle that can be formed with the
location beacons. APIT aggregation is then run when each individual APIT test is finished.
By using a grid SCAN algorithm, each grid cell is incremented or decremented based on
whether an intersecting triangle passes or fails the APIT test. The grid area that has the
maximum values is used as the area that is the most likely where a user is located, the
center of gravity of this area is considered to be the location estimate.
4.3.3 Mean Estimation Error
To measure the accuracy of our approach and other various approaches, the estimation error
is calculated by calculating the Euclidean distance between the actual user position and
4. Locating Smartphone Users Indoors 106
the estimated position. Accuracy can vary depending on room position, to account for this





The equation above is used to calculate the mean estimation error in our testing where i is
the sample index for where the actual user location is and n the number of samples taken in
a setting.
4.4 Our Unified Approach
In our approach, techniques are drawn from both range-based and range-free methods. The
unified approach we propose makes use of the range-based trilateration using signal mag-
nitudes to calculate distances combined with the range-free APIT algorithm [193] which is
used for further refinement.
Initially the three closest beacons are determined by selecting the top three audible
location beacons with the greatest signal magnitudes. Distance estimates are calculated to
each of these three location beacons via a signal propagation model. In the case presented
in Figure 4.7, the location beacons are P1, P2, P3. The node the algorithm is attempting to
position is assumed to be somewhere within these beacons, the position need to be narrowed
down further.
Trilateration is then performed using these estimates by placing three circles around
each location beacon using the position as the center point. The radius of the circle is set
as the distance calculated initially. It can be seen that these circles intersect at a point,
the center of gravity of the intersection is considered the location estimate. The resulting
location from the trilateration is then used as the center point to create a bounding box Bm
which is indicated by the red box at the intersection of the three circles. At this stage, it is
assumed that the location estimate could be refined further within the bounding box
The APIT algorithm is applied to the entire scene. Triangles are formed between all
combinations of audible location beacons creating a geometric overlay. For each formed
triangle, it is determined whether the node that needs to be positioned is inside or outside
each triangle. This is determined by running an APIT test which examines the surrounding





Figure 4.7: Unified Approach to Localization
neighboring nodes to determine if any are further or closer to all three location beacons that
form a triangle. A grid is then overlaid on top of the scene for which APIT aggregation is
run.
Triangles within the red bounding box are clipped using the Sutherland-Hodgman algo-
rithm [215], this will return a list of polygons. This can be seen in Figure 4.7, all the triangle
lines forming the initial triangles terminate at the edge of the box. All polygons inside the
bounding box that intersect with any grid cell with the maximum SCAN index value are
taken and the intersection between these polygons is found.
The center of gravity of the resulting polygon is used as the new refined positioning
estimate. This has the effect of refining the initial position obtained by the range-based to
be closer to the actual user position using information provided by surrounding neighboring
nodes.
4.4.1 Unified Algorithm Walkthrough
In this section, we detail each steps taken by our algorithm to locate a node. These steps
need to be run consecutively as the range-based method is used to establish a range where
the node is located while the range-free method is used to refine the position within that
range. This does not work as intended in reverse as range-free methods are susceptible to
accumulating error in large spaces.
Our unified approach performs the following:
1. A node that requires positioning scans for audible location beacons, it can sense and
requests their location and signal strengths. The received data is stored in a table and sorted
by signal strength (Figure 4.8). The signal strengths provides a relative indication of node
proximity to the fixed location beacons.
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Xm Ym RSSIn
A 0 0 -63
B 0 10 –60
C 10 10 -57
Figure 4.8: Storing Values Sensed
2. The three closest location beacons are selected using the RSSI value as an indicator of
distance. The algorithm assumes the user is somewhere within the triangular region con-
necting the location beacons (Figure 4.9) further narrowing down the node position.
P
Figure 4.9: Closest Bluetooth Nodes are Found
3. Distance estimates between the user node and location beacons are calculated using the
path-loss equation described in Figure 4.10. The RSSI is set as the signal strength of the
location beacon, RSSI0 needs to be known ahead of time, this information can be derived
ahead of time for different receivers. The distance estimates provide spatial information of
node positions relative to surrounding nodes.
RSSI = −10× n× log10(distance) +RSSI0
RSSI0 RSSI value when receiver is 1m away
n The rate at which path loss increases
Figure 4.10: Path Loss Equation
4. Trilateration is performed using the distance estimates to obtain an approximate location.
This is performed by drawing three circles from the center point of each respective node,
the radius is the distance estimate. The location estimate is the center point of where these
circles intersect. This location is assumed to not be precise, however close to the user and
other nodes surrounding the user (Figure 4.11).
5. A bounding box of Bm is created using the rough user position as the center point, this
results in a region with an area of A2. A range-free technique is then employed within the
bounding box (Figure 4.11). The positioning estimate is constrained within B.





Figure 4.11: Bounding Box Surrounding Approximate Location
6. The node builds a table combining the signal strengths for each beacon, its location and
the signal strengths of each beacon from the perspective of neighboring nodes (Figure 4.12).
This information is later used to refine the positioning estimate within B.
Xm Ym MyRSS RSSI1 ... RSSIn
A 0 0 -63 -72 ... -41
B 0 10 –60 -66 ... -45
C 10 10 -57 -60 ... -43
Figure 4.12: Merging Tables of Sensed Values Across Devices





combinations. These triangles are then used in APIT range-free localization (Figure 4.13).
These triangles are used to narrow in on the location.
Figure 4.13: All Combinations of Triangles are Generated
8. Each column is evaluated using APIT; if a neighbor node exists with consistently larger or
smaller RSSI values then the user assumes a position outside the triangle, otherwise inside
(Figure 4.14). Triangular areas where the node is not found to be within can be disregarded,









Figure 4.14: Determining if the Node is Inside or Outside the Triangle
9. Step four is repeated for every combination of three beacons (Figure 4.14).
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10. For each individual APIT test, if a node is estimated to be inside the triangle, the scan
index value is incremented, otherwise if outside the value is decremented. The scan index
values are maintained in a table with a reference to each triangle (Figure 4.15). This scoring




Figure 4.15: All Combinations of Triangles are Generated
11. A grid with a side of 0.1 × RoomWidth is overlaid. The scan index of each triangle
in which the point resides is aggregated to the grid cell (Figure 4.16). The grid allows for
taking into account the overlap between triangular regions and allows for further areas that























































Figure 4.16: SCAN Grid
12. Triangles are clipped using the Sutherland-Hodgman algorithm [215] and the bounding
box from the initial trilateration, this results in clipped polygons (Figure 4.17). Any trian-
gular areas that are not within the bounding box are not considered in the final positioning
estimate.
Figure 4.17: Polygons Clipped
13. The center of gravity of the resulting polygon is then found by taking the intersection
of polygons that share the maximum scan grid value, and used as the positioning estimate
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(Figure 4.18). The center of gravity of the overlapping polygons is the most likely to be the
correct positioning estimate as the node was found within all the overlapping regions.
Figure 4.18: Center of Gravity of Polygon
4.5 Virtual Beacons
In localization schemes, a sufficient number of location beacons are required to achieve
accurate positioning. The amount required depends on the technology being used. For ex-
ample, if the range of a beacon is only 10m, then a sufficient number of beacons need to be
placed every 10m to achieve accurate positioning within the area.
In the case of the APIT range-free method, additional beacons placed across an area
leads to added combinations of possible points in which triangles can be formed. Since
placing many real beacons may not be feasible, we propose the use of virtual beacons.
4.5.1 Signal Magnitude of Virtual Beacon
Virtual beacons derive proxy RSSI values using real beacons as a point of reference to then
infer what an RSSI value in a nearby location would be. Figure 4.19 illustrates the flow of
how RSSI values are assigned. These values are derived using the path loss equation which


















































































































Figure 4.19: Calculation of Virtual Beacons Signal Strength
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Each real beacon in a scene maintains a grid separated by Xm, each grid point contains
an RSSI value calculated from the path loss equation using the Euclidean distance from the
grid center point and the beacon location.
The reference beacon is selected based on which real audible location beacon has the
strongest signal. To assign an RSSI value to the virtual beacon based upon user location, a
lookup is performed to find the cell that is the closest match based off the primary beacon
RSSI. The resulting grid cell is then used to perform a reverse lookup on the virtual beacons
grids.
The resulting RSSI is assumed to be the RSSI from the user’s perspective to the virtual
beacon. The key to placing virtual beacons is to place them not too far from the real beacons
and inferring its RSSI value based off the closest real beacon.
4.6 Experiments
To evaluate our approach, we developed a Bluetooth simulator in Java for the purposes of
testing and comparing different localization schemes. The simulator allows for Bluetooth
location beacons and Bluetooth nodes to be placed arbitrary in a room.
4.6.1 Indoor Scenario
The indoor scenario we considered for testing was to position a node in a 10m x 10m room
(Figure 4.20). We considered this a good candidate room size as many Bluetooth devices
have a maximum range of 10m. In addition many rooms in indoor settings rarely have an
area larger than 10m2 unless considering larger floor spaces like hall ways and office spaces.
In these cases additional location beacons can be deployed. Provided beacons are placed in
every room where node positioning is required and additional beacons are placed in spaces
larger than 10m, our approach scales.
10m
10m
Figure 4.20: Indoor Positioning Scenario
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4.6.2 Positioning Estimate Locations
Location estimates can vary in accuracy depending on where the node that needs to be
positioned is located in the room. To account for this, location estimates were taken at
multiple locations to calculate the mean estimation error as described in Section 4.3.3.
Figure 4.21: Overlay Grid
By overlaying a grid on top of a room with a grid side of 1m, an estimation is performed
at each cell as highlighted by the black circles in Figure 4.21. In the indoor setting we tested,
100 location estimates are captured across the entire 10m x 10m space effectively covering
every position a user can stand in a room.
4.6.3 Location Beacon and Node Placement
Location beacons were placed in six different configurations starting with 4 real beacons
and gradually increasing to 20 beacons in total as listed in Figure 4.22. In a real scenario,
placing more than four beacons in a 10m x 10m room may not be practical to deploy
or maintain, for this reason we considered the use of virtual beacons. Four real beacons
were always placed in the corners of the room, the remaining beacons are virtual. The real
beacons are used to bootstrap the virtual beacons values.
Neighboring Bluetooth nodes surround the user node the localization scheme attempts
to position. The ubiquity of mobile smart phones makes it realistic to consider that there
would be devices nearby that could be used as additional nodes for refinement by a range-
free component. In our experiments, we increased the neighboring nodes from 1 to 15 and
test if an increase leads to better positioning accuracies.
Two configurations for placing neighboring Bluetooth nodes surrounding the user Blue-
tooth node is considered. Random placement and Uniform placement. In random placement
the (X,Y ) coordinates are generated randomly. In Uniform placement neighbor nodes are
increased perfectly spaced centered vertically and horizontally.
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(a) 4 Real (b) 4 Real 4 Virtual
(c) 4 Real 12 Virtual (d) 4 Real 16 Virtual
Figure 4.22: Beacon Configurations Used in Our Evaluation
4.6.4 Signal Strength Simulation
For each Bluetooth node, perceived RSSI values are calculated for each location beacon that
can be sensed via the path loss equation by setting the distance value to be the Euclidean
distance between the location beacon and the respective node.
To add some interference, the propagation constant was set to n = 2.2. As evidenced in
ZigBee wireless networks and transceivers [217], this propagation constant represents what
would occur in a retail store. This simulates what happens in real scenarios where signal
attenuation occurs due to various objects in a room.
Through experimental evaluation of multiple real Bluetooth devices, we found the RSSI
value tends to be -51 when placed 1m from one another. Thus,RSSI0 = −51 was set in the
simulator when calculating RSSI based off path-loss. When taking range-based estimations,
the localization algorithm assumes n = 2.0 as the exact environment in which we are
operating is not known.
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(a) Mean Estimation Error
































Figure 4.23: Results When Using Virtual Beacons, Neighbor Nodes Arranged in a
Uniform Placement
4.6.5 Evaluation
In our evaluation we tested RSSI Trilateration and APIT isolation in addition to our unified
approach to clearly demonstrate the difference in performance. The location beacon config-
urations tested are displayed in Figure 4.22 are as exported by our simulator. Neighboring
nodes were placed in both a random and uniform manner to study the effects of whether or
not the positioning of neighboring node locations makes any significant difference.
It can be seen in Figure 4.23a and Figure 4.24a that the unified approach performed
better than when using either RSSI Trilateration or APIT in isolation. The red dashed line
indicates RSSI Trilateration, because neighboring nodes and virtual beacons are not con-
sidered by this method, it always produces a consistent MSE of 2.30m in every case. Our
unified approach achieves a MSE of just under 1m in some cases.
To put the improvement in estimation error into context, current methods achieve an
accuracy of 2m to 3m while our method improves this to under 1m. In a scenario where a
user needs to be located holding a mobile device in a building, our approach can differentiate
between two people standing next to one another while current methods may confuse the
two people.
The average runtime our approach as shown in Figure 4.23b and Figure 4.24b indicates
that the positioning estimates can be derived in under a second. Communications costs
remain low since the neighboring nodes and positioning beacons only send signal strength
information with the node that needs to be positioned only once.
Initially in our preliminary experiments, location beacons were placed in a perfectly
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Figure 4.24: Results When Using Virtual Beacons, Neighbor Nodes Arranged in a Random
Placement
uniform manner along the edges of the room. We achieved much better results when the
placement is less symmetrical due to the APIT test better predicting if the user node is inside
or outside a triangle. Thus, while additional beacons were placed in a near symmetrical
manner, they are not perfectly aligned.
Increasing neighboring nodes leads to improved performance in a logarithmic like trend
when only using APIT. However in the Unified approach the effect of increasing nodes is
negligible. This is because the bounding box restricts the search space to the point where
looking at just one neighbor node is enough to refine within the box further. Our results
suggest, there only needs to be at least 1 neighbor distributed around the room to achieve
high accuracy.
The baseline to improve upon when using virtual beacons is to compare the results to
when using only four real beacons in isolation. Virtual beacons are only considered for
use in the range-free APIT component of the algorithm. This is due to range-based method
being much more sensitive distance errors, range-free methods are more robust as they do
not directly rely on measurements.
When placing neighboring nodes uniformly as opposed to randomly, the trend of im-
proved performance attributed to the increase in virtual beacons is slightly more prevalent.
It can also be seen that uniform placement of neighboring nodes eventually leads to the
performance of APIT converging with the performance of trilateration. Adding virtual bea-
cons while leading to increased performance, the performance improvements plateaus once
many are added in the space.
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4.7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we proposed a unified approach to localization and introduced the concept
of virtual beacons to further refine location estimates. The key contribution of this work is
using a normally considered fine-grained range-based methods to get a rough estimate and a
course-grained method to refine further within smaller search space can improve positioning
results.
Initially, it may not seem obvious to combine a fine-grained localization method with a
coarse-grained localization method to improve the accuracy of positioning estimates. How-
ever, in practice radio maps are not usually available and performing localization simply via
triangulating from the use of Bluetooth location beacons is insufficient due to signal mul-
tipath and propagation effects. Applying a coarse-grained approach to refine the position
within an estimated boundary based on the position yielded by the fine-grained method can
be used to further improve the accuracy of the positioning estimate.
The accuracy of range-based methods suffer when signal propagation occurs, however
by using the three closest beacons based on the greatest signal strength, a user will be
within the triangular area. The range-based method does not take into account any neigh-
boring nodes to refine further. This is where range-free methods can be used. The magnitude
of signal strengths of each node in an area to the anchored location beacons to further re-
fine position. Because they work using binary decisions, they suffer in cases where a node
is on an edge. Furthermore they also tend to favor location estimates closer to where the
concentration of nodes is.
Virtual beacons were also introduced as a means of further refinement. They derive a
signal magnitude from a primary beacon and allow for a finer spatial resolution. The signal
magnitude of a virtual beacon is derived by the primary beacons maintaining a table of
RSSIs derived via path loss equation. A virtual beacon looks up the table of the closest real
beacon to assign a signal magnitude.
Our experimental results indicate that using our unified approach produces more accu-
rate location estimates than when using either approach in isolation. Furthermore when used
correctly, virtual beacons can improve performance and provide a comparable performance
to real beacons when a small number is derived from each real beacon.
At present we are in the process of implementing our IPS based on our proposed unified
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localization scheme. The IPS is built on top of the Android platform and will be evaluated
by taking location estimates at known locations and comparing where the IPS estimates the
user to be. The IPS will be deployed in a campus setting, a user study will also be performed
to test its usefulness as an indoor navigation tool.
In future work we plan on working on an algorithm to determine the optimal config-
uration of beacons in larger spaces when using our localization scheme. We also wish to
investigate the effects of virtual beacons further both determining what their optimal con-
figuration is and if they work to improve performance in other localization schemes.
Chapter 5
Mining Encounters of Smartphone
Users in Real-Time
Location information can be used to determine the high level activities of a user. In this the-
sis, we demonstrated how to position a smartphone user’s location indirectly via analyzing
the query results or analyzing Bluetooth signals. In this chapter, we reveal how direct lo-
cation updates can also indirectly reveal encounters a smartphone user may be having with
other individuals. Recent advancements in data mining coupled with the ubiquity of mobile
devices has led to the possibility of mining for events in real-time. We make the assumption
that a service provider has direct access to continuous query requests made by a smartphone
user. Many location based apps and services make use of continuous queries, thus provid-
ing a reliable snapshot of user locations in near real-time. Continuous requests provide an
accurate proxy of where a user is located. With this knowledge we reveal how encounters
with other smartphone users can be detected in near real-time.
As people travel, they may have encounters with one another. We are interested in de-
tecting the encounter patterns of traveling individuals at the exact moment in which each of
them occur. We introduce the problem of mining for an individual’s encounters. A simple
solution is to use a nearest neighbor search to return potential encounters, this results in slow
query response times. It is significantly more efficient to check just for neighbors that are
in predefined proximity instead. Current techniques miss potential encounters that happen
quickly because the evaluation time is too long for city scale problems, thus the benefits of
continuous mining will not be fully realized.
This chapter is based on
Mining City-Wide Encounters in Real-Time - SIGSPATIAL 2016
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To mine for encounters in real-time, we introduce a new algorithm that is efficient in
capturing encounters by exploiting the observation that just the neighbors in a defined prox-
imity needs to be maintained. Our evaluation demonstrates that our proposed method mines
for encounters for millions of individuals in a city area within milliseconds.
A user may be happy to reveal their location but may not want to reveal their encounters.
A service provider that many smartphone users make use of such as a popular social network
have access of location updates for many users. If users are having an encounter and are
using the same social network, we can determine if they are in proximity. However, in this
chapter we demonstrate how a user’s location can also indirectly reveal their encounters.
5.1 Introduction
Vast quantities of spatial data is generated by mobile smartphone apps. Captured data in turn
is sent to online services for processing for the purpose of providing additional functionality.
For example, tagging a place on a map or routing indoors based on GSM signals and user
location [211].
The occurrence of encounters between people are possible when they are within proxim-
ity to one another. Many individuals keep their smartphones present with them at all times
or at least within the same room [218]. This provides an approximate location of where
the individual is located. With spatial data captured from mobile devices, it is possible to
mine for potential encounters by checking for individuals that are in proximity to each other
via performing queries on the spatial data. Many devices now send continuous positioning
estimates, allowing for the detection of encounters in real-time.
Mining for encounters has many practical applications. Benefits to an individual include
suggesting potential places for meeting participants, automatically finding more suitable
meeting times and suggesting new social connections by finding nearby friends to join an
open meeting. Organizations will also benefit from real-time mining of encounters, for ex-
ample in law enforcement it can be used to monitor exchanges between a predefined set of
persons of interest.
Early apps that used location often updated user positions during the app being in focus.
For example, many users access and update social networks frequently. Modern smartphone
apps now send continuous updates to these services of user positioning estimates captured
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by the device. With the data generated and collected, it is possible to determine if users are
in proximity of each other. Social networks such as Facebook continuously collect location
updates.
Current apps make use of coarse grain proximity, insights derived from using fine
grained proximity still need to be explored. The concept of using proximity in mobile apps
has found use in mapping and social network applications. Google Maps provides a list of
the closest POIs and Instagram lets you tag photos to places. Social networks have recently
started to display users in coarse proximity where a relationship exists. At present, fine-
grained proximity information and the insights it provides such as encounter patterns is not
being used to improve services.
Spatial indexes are used by spatial databases to optimize queries such as nearest neigh-
bor search. Many existing spatial databases used by an LBS cannot mine for user encounter
patterns in real-time. Commonly used methods for indexing are R-Trees and QuadTrees.
An issue arises when using these methods for moving objects since the index is required to
be updated right before a query is initiated. Indexes for moving objects have been proposed
such as the TPR tree [219] and the Bx tree [220, 221]. With these methods it needs to be
verified if an object is actually within a query region as variables such as speed of a user
or in some cases trajectory are assumed. Another drawback with using these methods for
our problem is as time increases, the number of possible locations a moving object can be
located based on the velocity vector increases. This results in having to process more com-
binations to check who is actually within proximity to whom as time increases if the index
is not updated frequently. These indexes are used to execute queries such as k-NN.
Applying a k-NN query to check for individuals in proximity is not an efficient method
to mine for encounters. We do not need to determine the nearest neighbors but rather the
individuals located within a close radius. For example, it is possible for a k-NN query to
return an object that is not in proximity if no immediate surrounding objects are found.
We define the constraint nearest neighbor (c-NN) query to return points that are within a
defined close proximity as our first step. Given the c-NN constraints, it is possible to exploit
proximity to build an efficient method that is used to return the results by taking into account
the redundancy of not having to search for points not in the immediate vicinity.
Proximity is a constraint required for individuals to be having an encounter. We exploit
this property for maintaining an index that stores points that are close to each other in a
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given area. Our novel approach is based on using a dynamic grid that maintains and stores
the cells that individuals have not moved for a specified time period. At each interval, an
efficient scan is executed to determine what user locations intersect with grid cells. For
example, people that are in the same grid cell may be potential candidates for encounters.
We developed a simulator that creates an environment of people traveling in an inner city
area and meeting and having possible encounters with other people. The simulator uses real
geospatial data provided by Open Street Map (OSM).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that focuses specifically on encoun-
ters. We demonstrate our novel algorithm to mine for these associations in real-time. Our
algorithm runs in the milliseconds for two million people in the Melbourne inner city. It
is significantly more suitable for real-time mining than conventional techniques, which run
orders of magnitude slower.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• Define the mining for encounters problem
• Provide a novel algorithm to mine for encounters
• Evaluate our algorithm and compare it with other possible techniques
5.2 Background
A significant amount of research has been directed at the storage and retrieval of spatial
data. In this section we provide an overview of certain techniques and how to apply them to
our problem. We found that these techniques are not suitable for our setting.
5.2.1 Static Spatial Indexes
Modern databases use spatial indexes to improve the query execution speeds. The use of an
index improves performance by graphing points or regions in a manner by exploiting various
spatial properties for improving query execution time. Two techniques in widespread use
include the QuadTree [222] and R-Tree [223]. The index to be used is dependent on the
problem.
For our problem, static indexes need to be built right before a query is initiated to cap-
ture individuals that are having a potential encounter. Repeated nearest neighbor queries is
5. Mining Encounters of Smartphone Users in Real-Time 123
required to be run for each user to find those in proximity. Fast methods to perform NN
queries using static indexes have been proposed [224, 225]. While static indexes is gener-
ally quick to build, if it has to be updated continuously then they do not scale well as the
index needs to be rebuilt every time a user moves, in addition a NN query has to be repeated
for all objects in the database.
Range queries can also be performed efficiently using spatial indexes to retrieve neigh-
bors that are within a specified proximity. Instead of performing a direct NN query that
would retrieve the closest neighbors irrespective of the distance, a range query can be per-
formed. When using a range query, a rectangle with the center point being the query point
is generated. This rectangle can then be used to find any neighboring points that intersect
with it.
Another approach is to use hashing. For example, the service geohash.org provides a
short string given a specific geographic coordinate. The key idea is to use Z-Order curves
[226] to reduce the data into a single dimension. The advantage of Geohash is that it pro-
vides a convenient representation that allows to sacrifice precision for the length of the hash
string. Reducing precision is used as a means to bucket a collection of locations. Points that
generate the same hash would naturally be in close proximity in most cases, by observing
the prefix, a quick nearest neighbor search can be performed. With this method, hashes need
to be refreshed at query time leading to scalability issues as well. None of the methods we
have seen so far also consider the concept of proximity in the index or query execution
design.
5.2.2 Moving Object Indexing
Indexing moving objects is an active area of research. The need for efficient techniques is
in high demand with the proliferation of wireless devices. Velocity based approaches use
speed and trajectory information to reduce the updates required to the underlying structures.
This leads to the index not having to be rebuilt each time a query is required.
The TPR tree is an extension of an R-Tree designed to handle queries in the time di-
mension. It takes into account current and future positions of moving object data [219].
The TPR tree uses a minimum bounding rectangle (MBR) in addition to a velocity vector
to model the object moving in time. The time a query is initiated is captured. The area is
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then calculated to determine if there is an overlap with the query region. We can use this
instead for a solution to our problem, however a large area will be interpreted at query time
due to possible locations a moving object can be located at as time increases. In particular,
for a large set of neighbor investigations even a minor change in the size of the area under
investigation will lead to large execution times.
To overcome the high cost in node splitting exhibited in TPR Trees, the use of dynamic
B trees [220, 221] has been explored. The Bx tree maintains a directory in each node
containing the id, velocity, mapping and last update time of an object. The mapping of two
dimensional points into a single dimension is achieved using Z-order curves [227]. Linear
interpolation is used to project the position of an object at a future time.
The Bx tree requires an object moves in fixed velocity. When capturing location tracks
in real-time, we do not know the direction a user travels in. We found this approach did not
work well for mining encounters. Using this method would require many frequent updates
that would lead to little benefit against using a static spatial index.
Certain Quadtrees [228, 229] can be used to index moving objects as demonstrated in
[230]. By using loose quadcells, an object can move and not need to be reinserted provided
the new location is still within the quadcell. There is an expansion factor which defines how
much a quadcell can enlarge. Thus, these methods work well if it is known ahead of time
what area an object can cover and the object does not move relatively far from the initial
position. The concept of loose quadtrees can be applied to the mining encounter problem,
however since a user can cover positions in a really large area, many frequent updates would
be required. There is no defined bounds where a person may move in a city area. These
approaches also do not consider any tolerance constraints nor the fact that we are interested
in ANN query types rather than k-NN.
5.2.3 k-NN Queries
Mining for encounters is related to the nearest neighbor problem. The nearest neighbor
problem being for a set of points S and a query point q, what is the closest point from S to q
[231]. When mining for encounter patterns, the location of each person can act as the query
point q, the nearest neighbors of each person can then be tested if they are in proximity to
the person to determine if they are having a potential encounter with each other.
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One immediate issue with applying k-NN queries to mining for encounters is neighbors
that are not in proximity would also be returned. It has to be checked that the users returned
are actually in proximity. A monitoring continuous k-NN approach [232] uses a grid. This
approach does not work well in our application domain as building and maintaining an entire
grid over a large area is costly. Setting the grid cell size too small leads to long execution
time for a large city. Setting them too big causes too many hits. The authors also proposed
an incremental approach to updating index which was only demonstrated to work well for
low velocities.
One method proposed in [233] uses an R-Tree to compute k-nearest neighbors for a trip
efficiently. The method assumes that the line segment a user is traveling needs to be known
ahead of time and neighbors are not moving. This technique cannot be applied to our mining
for encounters as we do not know where the user is traveling.
An expansion of [233] was proposed in [234] to take into account moving objects for
kNNs by using a TPR-Tree as the underlying structure. Further methods making use of
a TPR tree were proposed in [235]. We found that TPR trees do not work well for our
application domain as stated in the previous subsection. This same observation was also
noted independently in [232].
5.2.4 ANN Queries
When mining for encounters, we actually want to find possible occurrences for every person.
The problem can be represented as the all nearest neighbor (ANN) problem that states for
all N points, find the k nearest neighbors in a certain proximity for each of the N points.
Efficient solutions for the ANN problem have been proposed with the basic premise being
to exploit redundancy [236, 237].
In [236], a PR QuadTree with a fixed cell size is used to store points, Each cell is labeled
using the total of points stored. This leads to a reduction of the search space to be based on
size of the quad cells. The scan time is bounded by the depth of the tree. An improved variant
[237] proposed the use of box cells that are dynamic cells around groups of points reducing
the query time to be bounded based on the number of points. This approach assumes that
all information is stored in main memory.
A more recent approach exploits the distance between blocks storing the points [238].
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The use of a high level structure such as a QuadTree is used to generate the containers. Each
structure containing points is assigned a label indicating the number of points it contains.
The MinDist and MaxDist between the blocks in the structure is then calculated. When
finding the neighbors required, it can be quickly seen which blocks to select to get the
desired number of points. The ANN approaches assume that the points are not moving,
when points move then the structures in most cases needs to be recalculated.
There has not been much attention focused on continuous ANN. One approach recently
proposed in [239] presented an algorithm that uses cell tower radius as a proxy to reduce the
search space. This is not appropriate for our problem since it would yield too many results
that would manually need to be checked if they are within close proximity since a cell tower
radius can cover a large area.
Our algorithm makes use of redundancy in both the time and space domains to reduce
computation. As a result there is far less points that need to be stored in the index and the
number of combinations that need to be processed.
5.3 Problem Definition
A potential encounter can occur when people are in close proximity. It is assumed people
are within proximity when the distance between them is within ε distance. We define the
constraint nearest neighbor (c-NN) query to return objects in proximity at a given a location.
People that are being monitored for encounters can be represented as a set. Let q be
the number of people in the search space and P be a finite set of people. We have P =
{p1, p2, p3, ..., pq}. People may either move or remain static as time increases, an encounter
may occur at a location when people move within proximity to each other.
A Euclidean space R2 is used to define location points where people are positioned at a
particular point in time. Let L be the set of locations where a person can be located as well
as an encounter may occur. We have L = {l1, l2, ...} where li ∈ R2. The moment in time
that a person is at a location or having an encounter is captured by a timestamp. Let T be a
set of timestamps used to indicate when encounters occur and where a person is located at
a particular point in time defined as T = {t1, t2, ..., tj} for 1 ≤ j <∞.
To determine if people are having an encounter, the locations of the people in question
needs to be retrieved in order to see if they are in proximity to one another. A person pa ∈ P
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is at a location lm ∈ L is returned by the function Loct(pa) at a point in time t ∈ T is
returned as follows
Loct(pa) = lm where t ∈ T , pa ∈ P , lm ∈ L
Assume that a constant ε is used as a measure of proximity between locations. Consider
the two locations lm ∈ L and ln ∈ L, they are in ε proximity if the following condition is
satisfied
Dist(lm, ln) ≤ ε
When monitoring locations of interest, surrounding locations need to be determined. Con-
sider the location lm, let R(lm) be the set of locations that are within ε distance defined
as
R(lm) = {lo ∈ L | Dist(lm, lo) ≤ ε}
The set of people at location li ∈ L and in the region surrounding li at a certain time t ∈ T
is returned as follows
LocPt(li) = {p ∈ P | Loct(p) ∈ R(li)}
For people to have an encounter, it is required to determine if they are in proximity to each
other. This is achieved by taking the person in question and determining if their location is
within close proximity to others in the set. Let c-NNt(pa) be the set of people in proximity
to pa defined as
c-NNt(pa) = {p ∈ P | Dist(Loct(pa), Loct(p)) ≤ ε}
Encounters occur at a given time when people are in proximity. The combination of people
meeting can be derived using a power set (P). Let Et be the set of all people in proximity
that have encounters, defined as
Et = {P(c-NNt(p)) | p ∈ P}
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In cases where encounters need to be found at a given location, this can be defined as follows
Et(li) = {P(c-NNt(p)) | p ∈ P, p ∈ LocPt(li)}
5.4 Mining for Encounters
In order to mine for encounters efficiently, we propose the use of proximity and time con-
straints to significantly reduce the search space. The aim is to use a c-NN query to quickly
find all the individuals that are within proximity. We propose the use of a spatial index that
exploits these properties. Building a spatial index for the purposes of answering (c-NN)
queries allows for the fast determination of Et(p) where p ∈ P .
We refer to our spatial index as TimeGrid. Our index marks cells as active when they
contain more than one person or in the case of a cell containing one person, another person
can be found in an adjacent cell. We only consider encounters that occur in the one region
and do not move from that region. The index also imposes a time constraint requiring that
the people are in the same cell for a specified period of time. The TimeGrid index can satisfy
c-NN queries without having to perform an exhaustive search.
Our spatial index is based on using the properties of a grid to index people close to
one another. Given a grid cell, people indexed in the same cell must be in proximity to one
another while people in adjacent cells may also be in proximity. Thus, the query is already
being answered in each timestamp by means of updating our index. Updates are also done
in an efficient manner as presented in the next section.
5.4.1 Indexing and Mining using a Grid
A potential encounter can occur when people are in close proximity. It is assumed people
are within proximity when the distance between them is within ε distance. We define the
constraint nearest neighbor (c-NN) query to return objects in proximity at a given location.
In order to search for people that are within proximity to one another quickly, a grid
structure can be constructed and used as a spatial index. In a grid, the distance between two
objects can be approximated as the distance between the two grid cells, where the objects
are located. Constructing a grid removes the need to calculate the exact distances between
all possible pairs of points. In other words, people in proximity can be found by considering
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all the people that are in the same cells or surrounding cells if the grid is constructed and
interpreted carefully.
We propose TimeGrid, a spatial index that takes into account time as well as space.
Since in many cases it may be only of interest to capture encounters that last a certain
amount of time, the minimum time an encounter has to last before it is reported is defined
as τ . The underlying data structure is required to maintain a list of people that fall within
the grid cell for τ seconds. Given the cells are set to have a side of size ε/
√
2, a person that
is in the same grid cell for τ seconds with another person indicates a potential encounter.
Each person pa ∈ P is positioned at a location li ∈ L, all locations are within R2.
The space itself can be partitioned into a grid which can then in turn be used to index each
person in the set P . We define a grid overlaid with each cell to be of size δ = ε/
√
2 in each
dimension. Thus, locations within a grid cell would be within a maximum of ε distance from
one another. The grid over the entire space is defined as G with each cell having a side of δ.
Each person in P is indexed to determine which grid cell they reside in and represented in a
set. It is possible to map the set of people to a grid cell (P → G). The function CellIDt(pa)









, (x, y) = Loct(pa)
The set PG represents all the cell locations people are located in at a given time. It is
assumed that all people in set P can then be mapped to a grid cell in the set PG at time
t ∈ T as follows:
PGt = {CellIDt(p) | p ∈ P}
Assume the set F contains locations l ∈ L that are of interest to be monitored. We define
the set FR as the locations of interest and their surrounding regions as follows
FR = {r | l ∈ F, r ∈ R(l)}
PGt can be redefined using the additional condition Loct(p) ∈ FR where p ∈ P to filter
out locations that do not need to be monitored as follows
PGt = {CellIDt(p) | Loct(p) ∈ FR, p ∈ P}





Figure 5.1: Structure of how Points are Stored in Grid Cell
T TL TR B BL BR L R
NW SW,SE SE - - - - NE,SE -
SW - - - NE,NW NE - NE,SE -
NE SW,SE - SW - - - - NW,SW
SE - - - NE,NW - NW - NW,SW
Table 5.1: Checking Adjacent Cell Quadrants of Cells 1-Adjacent Away From Source
The property of a grid cell implies all people in the same grid cell are within proximity to
each other. However there are cases where people can be in proximity that are not in the
same grid cell.
Consider the location points in Figure 5.2, it can be seen that there are people that are
in proximity while residing in different cells. To efficiently check adjacent cells, we di-
vide each cell into four quadrants. The quadrant cells act as virtual boundaries that can
be grouped together efficiently to check for people in adjacent cells that are within ε dis-
tance. While our main approach only requires to check active cells and those surrounding,
subdividing a cell into quadrants can be used to save checking for extra combinations of
encounters. This is more efficient, in particular in areas of greater density.
To efficiently check inside cells, we can create an index inside each cell for some really
dense city streets. For the sake of simplicity, we divide each cell into four quadrants in
this chapter as an example. Since our main approach only requires to check active cells.
Subdividing a cell into quadrants allows for efficient checking of surrounding active cells
that are part of the space.
Each quadrant within the cell has a side of ε/2
√
2. In a manner the same as a QuadTree,
quadrant assignment is labeled based on the cardinal directions (NE,NW,SE,SW). For ex-
ample, in the case where a person is in the top left corner of the cell, this would be labeled
as NE.
We use virtual boundaries made up of quadrant cells to ensure all people within ε
distance are considered. Consider a person pa ∈ P in the NE corner of one cell, a
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person pb in the SW corner of the adjacent top right cell would satisfy the property
Dist(Loc(pa),Loc(pb)) ≤ ε.
The function CloseQuadsPt(c) where c ∈ PGt returns the set of people in surrounding
cells by checking quadrants that are within ε distance of one another. Hence, the people in
proximity to the person pa ∈ P can be determined by finding all the people within the same
cell as pa ∈ P and within surrounding quadrants within ε distance.
Initially each person is assigned to a grid cell. At each interval of τ a scan is performed
to determine if a person is still in the same grid cell or has changed cell locations. With τ
being set, only the cells where one or more individuals have stayed longer than a certain
amount of time needs to be checked. Such cells are marked as active cells. These cells can
be determined by taking the intersection the cells identified at different times, this results in
the TimeGrid TG as follows:
TG = PGtnow ∩ PGtnow−τ
Proximity results are in the TimeGrid output TG. A cell in the proximity result must satisfy
one of the two following conditions. First, the cell contains at least one person. Second,
a surrounding cell contains at least one or more people. The spatial index is refreshed at
increments of τ seconds.
Algorithm 1: Building a Spatial Index using TimeGrid
Input : A set of people P , A timestamp t
Output: A set of grid cells TG
TG← ∅
for each p ∈ P do
cnow ← CellIDt(p)
q← QCt(cnow, p)
if p.cprev ≡ cnow then
if |cnow ∪ CloseQuadsPt(cnow, q)| ≥ 2 then
TG← TG ∪ cnow
p.cprev ← cnow
return TG







Figure 5.2: Spatial Index using TimeGrid
5.4.2 Detecting Encounters
The TimeGrid spatial index allows for the detection of encounter patterns in an efficient
manner. Initiating a query to mine for potential encounters Et can be satisfied by looking
up the TimeGrid index. People reside inside cells based on their location. A cell is defined
as active if there are more than two people present in the cell or a person can be found in an
adjacent cell within ε distance.
To mine for potential encounters, active cells are required to be checked. People within
the active cells are within proximity to one another. It is also possible that a person in an
active cell is in proximity to people in another active adjacent cell. We can determine who
is inside the cell. The function CellPt(c) where c ∈ TG returns the list of people inside a
cell is as follows:
CellPt(c) = {p | CellIDt(p) ≡ c, p ∈ P}
Suppose a person pa ∈ P is indexed in a cell c ∈ TG and no other person can be found
in the adjacent cells, then only the people inside c would be in proximity to pa. Thus, the
following relationship can be satisfied as follows:
c-NNt(pa) = {p ∈ CellPt(c) — c = CellIDt(pa)}
Consider CellPt(c) to be the set of people inside an active cell and CloseQuadsPt(c)
where c = CellIDt(pa) and pb ∈ CloseQuadsPt(c) to be the set of people in surrounding
quadrants that are within ε distance. With these defined, c-NNt(pa) where pa ∈ P in a cell
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c ∈ TG can be defined using TimeGrid as follows:
c-NNt(pa) =






The distance between people found in quadrants needs to be verified to ensure they are
within ε distance as points can be on the outer edge of a quadrant that slightly exceed ε. The
set of encounters Et can be derived using TimeGrid is as follows:
Et = {P(c-NNt(p)) | p ∈ P}
The powerset (P) of all the people in proximity is derived resulting in every possible com-
bination of encounters.
Algorithm 2 describes procedurally how to mine for encounters using the TimeGrid
index. When a sample needs to be captured, the index is checked for active cells. If the cell
is active then adjacent cells will also be checked. The powerset of people all the people in
proximity is derived. The algorithm is run multiple times at a sample rate dependent on the
level of granularity required.
Algorithm 2: Mining for Encounters
Input : A set of people P ,
A TimeGrid spatial index TG,
A timestamp t
Output: A set of encounters E
for each p ∈ P do
c← CellIDt(p)
if c ∈ TG then
q← QCt(c, p)
E ←P(CellPt(c) ∪ CloseQuadsPt(c, q))
return E
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5.4.3 Complexity Analysis
Our approach consists of building the TimeGrid index and the querying for encounters by
locating those in proximity using the index. Let n represent the number of people in the
search space.
Building the TimeGrid spatial index is bounded by the amount of people in the search
space. In Algorithm 1, there is a single loop for iterating over each person to assign a grid
cell. Considering there is only assignment and comparison operations, this leads to a time
complexity of O(n), thus allowing for the index to be updated continuously in an efficient
manner.
In practise it is very unlikely for our algorithm to yield the worst case. One theoretically






). Values typically selected for ε are small so in practise we would not have more
than a few people in the same cell.
At query time, encounters are only checked if the person is located in an active cell.
Let m to be the amount of active cells and a to be the average number of people inside an
active cell. Each person is scanned checking who is in proximity by determining who is in
the active cell and the surrounding cells. We assume that people are distributed uniformly





). Considering only a
few people can fit within ε distance, the value of a will be small. We found in our evaluation
even for values of n being over a million, only 3% of cells were active. Thus, for small
values of ε the average case is closer to Θ(m).
5.5 Encounter Event Simulation
The event simulator is designed to cause encounters to occur for a specified number of
people within a city area in a manner it would occur in a real world scenario. Individuals
tend to move along a predetermined path when traveling to a point which would likely be
not provided to a LBS provider. The simulator uses data from OpenStreetMap which has
been demonstrated to be accurate [240] to create paths for people to travel towards.
The simulation continuously iterates over each person and either assigns a destination
for them to move towards or leaves them in their current position depending on a probability
value. Another person may be selected to go to same destination to cause an encounter to
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Figure 5.3: Simulation of Encounters in Melbourne, Australia
occur also based on a probability. Each person is assigned a process that handles the moving
of objects and finding the shortest path to assigned points. Using OSM data, the location
is snapped to the closest node on the road network to ensure the people can travel to the
destinations.
The number of people in the simulation determines how many people are traveling and
can lead to an increase in encounters in a given area. To ensure encounters occur more often,
when organizing a scheduled encounter, only people in the surrounding area are selected.
This increases the chances that people would meet people in their local area more often. The
duration of an encounter can be set to be between a minimum and a maximum time. The
ε value is the minimum threshold considered when people are in proximity. This is usually
set to the error rate of the measuring instrument being simulated. For example for GPS it
would be 5m. The speed that users travel can also be set, a suitable value is typically the
average speed users travel by foot.
Parameters accepted by the simulator are summarized in Table 5.3. The simulator was
used to create data that was used in our experimental evaluation described in the next sec-
tion.
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Figure 5.4: TimeGrid Representation in 3D
Parameter Description
p Number of people in the search space
s The speed a person is traveling
ε Proximity distance threshold
τ Update frequency of scan for TimeGrid
Table 5.2: Encounter Event Simulator Parameters
5.6 Experimental Evaluation
This section presents our evaluation comparing TimeGrid with different adapted approaches
that make use of spatial indexes for the purpose of detecting encounters. We also test
TimeGrid across a variety of typical use cases. Positioning and movement data of people
was generated by the simulator described in the previous section and passed to the mining
algorithms in real-time.
People were distributed using both a zipfian distribution and uniform random distribu-
tion. The zipfian distribution closely mimics how people would be placed in a city, more
people would be distributed in areas of higher road network concentration while in uniform
random, people would be scattered everywhere within the bounding box with no bias from
the road network. People either stay in the one position or move to a destination depending
on what the simulator allocates to the person.
The number of people in the city was gradually increased to test the effect of pro-
cessing large numbers of people that would be typical in a city area. Variations of people
were increased in the following order 1, 000, 10, 000, 50, 000, 100, 000, 250, 000, 500, 000,
750, 000, 1, 000, 000 and 2, 000, 000. Considering modern cities have millions of people,
being able to mine in cases in the millions in real-time was the primary focus of our evalu-
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ation.
The city we selected to simulate encounters was Melbourne, Australia. We believe it is
suitable because the density is high in the inner city areas and is low in surrounding areas.
We tested our simulation using an area of 15km2, 50km2 and 100km2 with the center point
being set as the CBD to measure the effect of increasing the density of people.
We considered encounters at specific locations and encounters at all possible locations.
In the later case, every single person is checked to test if an encounter is occurring. For fixed
locations, 10, 000 and 50, 000 encounter location points were monitored in the city area. In
the infinite case, the location of each person is required to be scanned to test all possible
encounter locations.
The speed in which a person is moving can also make a difference in how the approaches
perform. By default people are not moving unless they are assigned a destination in which
they will then travel at a certain speed. We considered speeds of 5km/hwhich is the average
walking speed, 10km/h which is close to a jogging speed, 30km/h being the average
driving speed in the city center and 60km/h which is the driving speed on many main
roads in the city.
TimeGrid specific parameters ε and τ were also tested. εwas set to 5mwhich reasonably
represents people close by and can be speaking to each other. Furthermore the lower bound
error of GPS technology is also 5m. ε was also considered to be set to 10m and 15m which
represents people that are within range to be speaking to one another but not necessarily
having a direct encounter. The τ values for refreshing the TimeGrid index were tested for
values including 1, 5, 10 and 30 seconds.
The only inputs available to the mining algorithms were the location of a person at a
given time. This is typical of what would be available by a service collecting location data
in real-time.
5.6.1 Implementation Details
The experiments were developed using Java 7 and deployed on Windows 7 running on an
Intel i7 950 with 30GB of RAM. Static indexes were built using a QuadTree provided by
varunpant1 and the R-Tree provided by JSI2. These libraries provide NN functionality. In
1QuadTree: https://github.com/varunpant/Quadtree
2JSI R-Tree Library: http://jsi.sourceforge.net
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order to perform a fair comparison, instead of performing a direct NN query, we performed
a range query of ε distance which would perform faster since it will only retrieve neighbors
that are close.
The static indexes were rebuilt right before a sample was captured. The query region
was set to ε distance from the encounter locations. For the QuadTree and R-Tree, a rectangle
was generated ε distance from the center point of the encounter location in each direction.
This rectangle acted as the query region when calling the intersection with query region
method to return the people located at points that are in range. The TPR Tree was provided
by libspatialindex3 which is a popular C++ library. In order to construct the TPR tree, we
created a minimum bounding rectangle at the location point of a person and set the velocity
rectangle to move in each direction at the speed the user is traveling at. When performing a
range query at a location point, the TPR tree returns if that person could have reached that
point.
TheBx library we used was provided by MST4 and was used in the evaluation of [220].
It requires a starting point and a velocity vector. Since it only accepts a fixed vector and not
a window, we generated trajectory vectors in multiple directions.
Geohash was used as an index by bucketing points using hashes with a precision of
8 characters. The hashes were generated using the methods provided by the geohash-java
library5. This leads to grid cells being a size of approximately 38.2mx19m. When a NN
query is executed, a hash is generated for each person. That value is then used to look up
a hashtable with each value being set to be an ArrayList object containing people. To run
a NN query, a hash is generated at the location and everyone in the buckets is tested to
determine if they are within proximity.
The event simulator makes use of many asynchronous callbacks and runs multiple
threads to create and track events. As a result the same encounter occurrences would not
always occur in the same order. This is attributable to the execution of threads being de-
termined by the CPU scheduler. To account for this in the results, we ran the experiments
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Figure 5.5: Avg Scan Duration by Number of People
A: 30km2, τ : 1s, ε: 5m, ν: 5km/h
Parameter Values Tested
# of People 1k, 10k, 50k, 100k, 250k, 500k, 750k, 1M, 2M
ε 5m, 10m, 15m
τ 1s, 5s, 10s, 30s
Speed ν 0km/h, 5km/h, 10km/h, 30km/h, 60km/h
Area A 30km2, 100km2, 200km2
Table 5.3: Parameters Tested in Evaluating Algorithms to Mine for Encounters
5.6.2 Results and Discussion
TimeGrid demonstrated that it significantly outperforms competing approaches in every
use case we tested. It can scan for encounters in under a second even in situations where
millions of people were considered and every possible encounter location was tested. We
first compare TimeGrid against certain nearest neighbor algorithms that use static indexes
[224, 225] as can be seen in Figure 5.5.
Mining for encounters can be done using indexing of moving objects. We found that
velocity based approaches did not work well for our problem at all. For example, when
indexing moving objects with TPR tree, we found that scan duration grows substantially as
the time period of the simulation increases. Figure 5.7 plots the time elapsed since the TPR
tree was built with the scan duration. It can be seen that the scan duration grows significantly
as time increases. The trend resulted from the fact that when a person moves, the amount of
places the person could possibly visit increases as time elapses. TPR trees tend to perform
better for queries where the the common velocity vector is fixed in a limited direction. For
example, which airplanes are going to land on the runway in the next ten minutes. We also























(a) A - People: 2M, τ : 1s, ε: 5m, ν:
5km/h












































(c) ε - People: 2M, τ : 1s, A: 30km2,
ν: 5km/h




















(d) τ - People: 2M, ε: 5m, A: 30km2,
ν: 5km/h
Figure 5.6: Varying Parameters of the TimeGrid Algorithm
attempted a Bx tree, however we found that this approach cannot be applied to our problem
due to the requirement of fixed velocity vectors.
A continuous approach to answering k-NN queries for moving objects proposed in [232]
was also tested. In attempting to apply this method, the evaluation time took much longer
than any other method we used mainly due to cases where the closest neighbor is far away.
When looking for k neighbors, grid cells would incrementally expand until it finds at least
one neighbor. It would take significant time to find even just one neighbor in cases where
the closest neighbor is far away. In our experiments, this situation occurred many times.
In one preliminary test, when considering just a thousand people with 50 fixed encounter
locations, this approach took an average of 14 seconds to find encounters. As more people
and encounter locations were considered, the approach could not scale.
Increasing the size of the search space has the effect of lowering how densely packed
people are within the tested area. It can be clearly seen in Figure 5.6a that increasing the
search space improves the scan performance as people will be more sparsely distributed.
Varying the speed did not appear to make a major difference in performance as seen in
Figure 5.6b. While traveling from one grid cell to another quicker may reduce how many
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Figure 5.7: TPR Tree Performance as Time Increases
active cells are indexed, there is a large number of people in the city that do not move and
stay in the same position for long periods of time.
In theory, increasing the size of ε causes the TimeGrid to take longer to scan for encoun-
ters, this is due to having to check for more combinations in the powerset. This is evident
in Figure 5.6c. Larger values of ε would result in people being too far away to have an
encounter.
Increasing the interval τ reduces the amount of times the index needs to be updated,
however possible encounters could be missed. Changing how often the index was updated
had no real noticeable trend for affecting the scan time. This is shown in Figure 5.6d.
Initially, people are placed at a random location and move at the assigned speed of
νkm/h. Our aim was to realistically simulate the movements in a city environment. We
also tested an extreme case of 2 million people not moving with the parameters set as ν =
0km/h, A = 30km2, τ = 1s and ε = 5m. TimeGrid ran in just over a second on average
even though movements over time were not being exploited. Thus, TimeGrid still performs
well whether people are moving or not.
Our evaluation demonstrated how TimeGrid is better suited for mining encounters.
While other techniques may miss quick encounters, our approach would capture them. We
also gave insights into why current velocity based techniques designed to handle moving
objects are not suitable for our application domain. Overall, the TimeGrid algorithm per-
formed orders of magnitude better than conventional techniques across all the use cases we
tested. Samples were captured fast enough to detect encounters in real-time, even if they
last for just a second. We demonstrated that our approach is capable of mining encounters
in real-time for a city of two million people.
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5.7 Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter shows that once people’s location is deducted, encounters between individuals
which is seemingly undetectable can be detected in real-time. This is achieved by efficiently
indexing people within proximity. Encounter information not only provides context of what
a user may be doing based on their location but also the interactions that are occurring with
individuals in their surroundings.
In this work, a new class of data mining problem has been defined, detecting encoun-
ters using spatial data. Data mining in very large data sets in real-time has received much
attention recently as conventional data warehouses are now capable of processing on the fly.
A novel technique was also presented that mines for encounters in an efficient manner.
This technique is based on the spatial properties that for an encounter to occur, users need
to be in proximity to each other for a certain amount of time. These properties were used to
build a new spatial index that can be easily looked up to determine encounters quickly.
An advanced simulator to create encounter occurrences using real city data was pre-
sented simulating the people moving in the city and organizing for encounters to occur. The
simulator makes it possible to test a range of different techniques to mine for encounters in
many different scenarios.
Our evaluation demonstrated how our algorithm is better suited for mining encounters.
While other techniques may miss quick encounters, our approach would capture them. We
also gave insights into why current velocity based techniques designed to handle moving
objects are not suitable for our application domain.
For future work we plan on expanding our approach to consider moving encounters
that occur across multiple locations after they begin due to individuals moving. Another
possible direction is to deploy our algorithm using a real social network data and running a
user study.
Chapter 6
Identifying Smartphone Users Using
Only Diagnostic Features
.
In the previous chapters we explored how query results could reveal a smartphone user’s
location. Mobile smart phones capture a great amount of information about a user across a
variety of different data domains. This information can be sensitive and allow for identifying
a user profile, thus causing potential threats to a user’s privacy. In addition to query data,
smartphone apps send diagnostic data to service providers for the purposes of debugging
and improving the quality of service.
Many mobile games and applications collect diagnostic data as a means of identifying
or resolving issues. Diagnostic data is commonly accepted as less sensitive information.
There are notable open source apps that share diagnostic data online in bug tracking sys-
tems. Types of data include the type of phone and how much storage space is available. By
looking at one diagnostic metric in isolation to others would not reveal much. For exam-
ple, hundreds of millions of people have a device with the manufacturer metric specified
as “Samsung”. We consider both static and dynamic diagnostic features. Static features
such as the manufacturer do not change on a particular device while dynamic fields such
as storage space change over time. Combining a few fields leads to the number of possible
smartphone users that could result from certain diagnostic data to drop off rapidly.
This chapter demonstrates how diagnostic information that is not considered sensitive,
could be used to identify a user after just three consecutive days of monitoring. We have used
This chapter is based on
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the Device Analyzer dataset to determine what features of a mobile device are important in
identifying a user. This dataset has gained popularity amongst mobile privacy researchers
as it has captured data for a large number of users. Users can set the types of data they wish
to share. While many metrics like location were switched off, almost every user provided
diagnostic data.
Our experimental results demonstrate that using only diagnostic features like hardware
statistics and system settings, a user’s device can be identified at an accuracy of 94% with
a Naive Bayes classifier. Diagnostic data is considered to not be sensitive and exchanged
freely. By demonstrating that it can uniquely reveal a user, providers need to take care in
how it is shared.
6.1 Introduction
Modern smart phones capture a great amount of personal information about a user across
a variety of different data domains. Extractable diagnostic features could be collected on a
regular basis by a large number of mobile apps by the fact that many smart phones have
Internet access.
Mobile app marketplaces such as Google Play and Apple App Store are convenient
for both the application developers and the mobile users providing centralized services for
downloading third party applications. This has led to an explosion of mobile application
development and their usage [241]. Many of these applications capture raw data from a
user’s device and upload it to a remote database in order to deliver certain services. While
these applications can provide significant benefit to the users, they can also impose potential
risk to disclose sensitive user information.
In smart phone applications, location data collected via GPS, Wi-Fi, RFID or Bluetooth
sensors is considered as the most sensitive information causing the most severe privacy
risks [242, 243, 244, 245]. Sensitive personal data can also be captured through camera,
microphone, accelerometer sensors installed in smart phones. There is also other seemingly
less-sensitive information such as signal strength information, hardware statistics or system
settings that could be easily accessed. Signal strength information is considered to be diag-
nostic because it is often used to determine strength of wireless connections and if devices
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are in range. These features can be extracted by a mobile application like Device Analyzer1.
In this chapter, we have analyzed the Device Analyzer dataset [246] to see what features
are important in order to identify a user’s device other than the obvious sensitive informa-
tion. To make the data more accessible for our analysis, we first transformed the raw dataset
to a aggregated dataset to provide context about each user at a daily level. A web application
has been developed as a part of this aggregation process to describe the daily level context
of a Device Analyzer user.
We have modeled a Naive Bayes classifier to learn a user’s device using less sensitive
features such as hardware statistics. Our experiment shows that using only information like
manufacturer name, internal and external memory usage and system settings, a user profile
can be predicted at an accuracy of 94%. Only three consecutive days of monitoring diag-
nostic features are necessary to identify a user profile, a time period that is short for normal
app usage. We also collected Bluetooth signal strength information of surrounding devices
and demonstrate how it could be used to infer contextual information.
A mobile app has access to direct features that can uniquely identify a device such
as a WI-FI MAC address, however diagnostic information used in our experiments is less
suspected in posing as a private threat and more widely distributed to remote servers. For ex-
ample, a mobile hardware manufacturer company may have access to the usage of hardware
statistics of its customers for analyzing the performance.
This finding is a threat to user privacy as an adversary could learn the identity of a user
profile given they have access to an additional dataset that contains the user’s name or if a
user moves to pay for a service and reveals their name to complete a transaction. Once the
identity of a user is known, this could lead to further intrusions. For example, a user may be
targeted with unsolicited marketing.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• We provide an approach to aggregate the dataset at a daily level.
• We developed a web application called DescribeMyData to describe the context of a
Device Analyzer user at daily level in human readable format.
• We demonstrate that diagnostic features of a mobile device such as hardware statistics
1Device Analyzer App: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=uk.ac.
cam.deviceanalyzer
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and system settings can be sufficient to predict the user.
• Using a Naive Bayes classifier, we obtain a accuracy of 94% to predict a user’s device
from less sensitive mobile information.
6.2 Background
Smart phones are becoming the number one convergence device that stores most of a user’s
personal data. Information privacy in pervasive computing is a established research disci-
pline with roots dating back to the early 1980s when PCs were gaining mainstream adoption.
There is now growing concern of the privacy implications associated with smart phones.
Traditionally smart phones have been used for location based services and social net-
working applications. As a result considerable research has been performed to protect user
privacy in location sharing applications [242, 243, 244, 245]. For example, Consolvo et
al. have discovered the three important factors, why, what and when for sharing location
information with service providers [242]. In [244], a privacy-aware location sharing appli-
cation, called Locaccino, has been developed. Anthony et al. have studied whether users’
preferences to share location information vary with respect to place or social context [243].
Research into the privacy implications of third-party app usage is a relatively new topic.
Automated systems have been proposed for both Android and iOS to detect privacy leaks at
an API method call level. While these systems are very useful in detecting where sensitive
information is leaked, they do not indicate if it is justified given the functionality of the app.
With the advancement of smart phone applications, people are becoming more con-
cerned about the privacy of other sensitive data in their phones, for example photos, con-
tacts, etc. According to the survey performed by Ben-Asher et al., the sensitivity of mobile
data depends on the data type and the context of use [247]. Chin et al. have performed a
survey on 60 smart phone users to determine their attitudes towards security and privacy.
They found that people are more concerned about privacy on the smart phones than their
laptops [173].
A real-time privacy monitoring application, called TaintDroid was recently developed
for smart phones. According to their result, TaintDroid could identify misusage of users
location and device identification information for 20 applications out of 30 popular Android
applications [241].
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The iOS platform relies on a strict auditing process to protect their users as opposed to a
permissions system. A system called PiOS [170] gained much attention demonstrating the
ability to deconstruct an iOS application and demonstrate where privacy leaks occur. PiOS
found that most of the applications that were analyzed on iOS do not leak much personal
information, however more than half leaked the device ID.
Another system called Stowaway was demonstrated in [9] which compares method calls
made by an app relative to the permissions the app developers request in the Android Man-
ifest. Interestingly it was found that one third of applications are not following the least
privilege path with their permission requests. For example, a developer may request fine
grained location access but only actually use coarse grained access. This is likely a result
of developers not understanding how to request permissions correctly due to unclear docu-
mentation.
Similar work has been performed in the online privacy area by using browser configu-
ration features to determine if a browser can be uniquely identified in [248]. It was demon-
strated that given common plugins like Java and Flash are installed, 94.2% of browsers in
the sample are unique.
In this work, we argue that less-sensitive mobile information such as hardware statistics
and system settings can cause potential threats to a user’s privacy.
6.3 Problem Definition
Consider the set of users U that use smartphones that capture diagnostic data. Each user u
in a set of users U communicates a set of smartphone diagnostic features F at a time t. The
time t is usually when diagnostic data is sent for analysis for the purposes to improve the
quality of an app. The aim is to build a profile about a user u using a known training dataset
containing diagnostic features to identify a user in another dataset where the identities of
the user are not known.
6.4 Methodology and Experiments
In this section, we describe our approach for identifying users based of diagnostic data and
evaluate it using data from the Device Analyzer dataset [246]. We also present preliminary
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findings of how the signal strength information provided by Bluetooth enabled device can
be used to infer contextual information of user behaviors.
6.4.1 Naive Bayes for Data Modeling and Classification
To uniquely identify a user, the model needed to classify the handset ID as it identifies the
user’s device. Naive Bayes which is based on Bayes’ theorem that captures the probability
of an event occurring based on possible conditions that effect the event. It was a good
candidate given for our problem given it has proven to be efficient when there are many
classes [249].
We take Naive Bayes and formulate it for our problem. Consider the set of user IDs
U = {UID1, UID2, ...} to be the classes that need to be classified and F = (f1, ..., fn) to
be a set of features where n is a the number of independent variables. Naive Bayes makes a
strong assumption of independence between features.
UMAP = argmax
u∈U
P (u | F ) MAP is the Maximum Posteriori
= argmax
u∈U





P (u | F )P (u) Remove Denominator
= argmax
u∈U
P (f1, ..., fn | u)P (u)
Conditional independence assumes the feature probabilities P (fi | uj) are independent







P (f | u)
6.4.2 Dataset
Given the nature and scale of the data, we followed a traditional data-ming approach per-
forming preprocessing on the data, feature selection and modeling. A web application
was developed to view Device Analyzer user data. We have used the Device Analyzer
dataset [246] to see what features are important in order to identify a user’s device other
than the obvious sensitive information. The complete Device Analyzer dataset contains
smart phone usage from over 17,000 devices. Given the nature and scale of the data, we
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Feature % Off % On % Null
System Settings Lock 52 24 24
System Settings Sound Effects 50 36 14
System Settings Device Stay On 85 9 7
Table 6.1: System Settings Features Distribution
followed a traditional data-mining approach performing preprocessing on the data, feature
selection and modeling. A web application was developed to view Device Analyzer user
data. Our experimentation focused on finding correlations between features and establish-
ing their predictive power.
6.4.3 Preprocessing
The dataset generated from the Device Analyzer app is stored in a low-level detailed format.
To make the data more manageable, we parsed the data extracting all key and value pairs and
aggregated it to a daily level per handset. User profiles that did not capture memory usage
were filtered out of our model. Preprocessing data in daily format is suitable because these
fields would not change frequently and the size reduction of the dataset makes it feasible to
train a classifier. Looking at data in daily format also allows trends to be easily identified.
The following process was performed:
1. Iterate over every data file for each Device Analyzer user;
2. Extract handset ID and date keys and create a data structure to store daily level data;
3. Use the handset ID and date as a hash to store each daily data structure in a hash table;
4. When a numerical feature is found, derive SUM, COUNT, AVG, MIN, MAX and
update the daily data structure;
5. When a categorical feature is found e.g. system settings lock mode, take the value at
end of the day and update the daily data structure;
6. Produce an output file for each device after all data is iterated;
7. Combine each output files into a single file which can be uploaded into a relational
database.
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Figure 6.1: Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) Plots of Continuous Features
6.4.4 Feature Selection
Our aim was to test the predictive power of diagnostic features, the following features were
used for our model:
• Device Manufacturer
• Device Model
• Device Locale (Language Setting)
• Internal Memory Size
• Free Internal Memory
• External Memory Size
• Free External Memory
• System Settings Lock
• System Settings Sound Effects Toggle
• System Settings Screen Stay On Du-
ration
• System Settings Device On While
Charging
The dataset indicates that a wide variety of Android devices are being used. After pre-
processing, our dataset contains 18 mobile manufacturers and 56 mobile device models.
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Figure 6.2: DescribeMyData: Web Application to Visualize Daily Level Data of Device
Analyzer Users
To estimate and visualize the distribution of the continuous features across user profiles,
Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) was preformed. In Figure 6.1a, it can be seen that total
internal device memory is more evenly distributed than internal free memory in Figure 6.1b.
Conversely, in Figure 6.1c and Figure 6.1d, both external memory available and external
memory free is well distributed. Most user profiles appear to have a similar setting for how
long the screen stays on when there is no user input as described in Figure 6.1e. There is
also a bias in the dataset to specific locales as shown in Figure 6.1f.
Percentage distributions of discrete features is presented in Table 6.1. Half the popula-
tion of users do not specify a phone lock setting on a given day while a third of users have a
lock. Sound effects are turned off be at least half the users in the population and most users
allow the device to turn off while charging.
6.4.5 Implementation
The parser was developed in C using libraries libcsv and uthash. After preprocessing the
data, the output file was imported into a MySQL2 relational database to allow for analysis
and feature extraction. Feature selection was performed in Weka 33 using the InfoGainAt-
tributeEval method. R4 was used for modeling making use of the e1071 library.
To easily visualize daily level data for each user, we also developed a web application
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Train/Test Split
(%/%)
Accuracy (%) Macro Avg Preci-
sion
Macro Avg Recall
70/30 93.75 0.921 0.949
Table 6.2: Experimental Results Using a Naive Bayes Classifier
6.4.6 Experimental Results
Using only the diagnostic features described in Feature Selection, the model produced using
Naive Bayes was accurate.
Our sample for analysis contained 223 days of data in which 66 user profiles could be
uniquely identified. In the preliminary analysis we trained and tested our model on devices
that contained at least two days of captured data, however we found that this was not suffi-
cient to uniquely determine a user. Thus, only devices in the dataset with at least three days
of captured data were considered for analysis. In practice three days is still a small amount
of time because a mobile user will use apps for significantly longer periods which are likely
to increase the accuracy of our approach further. Days in which the Device Analyzer app
did not capture the external memory free feature for a device were also filtered. Numerical
memory features were scaled based on the maximum for the respective feature.
The dataset was distributed ensuring that each device has 70% of the data points as
training data and evaluated on the remaining 30%. Table 6.2 describes the accuracy, preci-
sion and recall values of the classifier. It can be seen that a user’s device can be identified
at an accuracy of 93.75% with our model. The macro average of precision and recall values
across all the classes are 92.1% and 94.9%, respectively.
6.4.7 Invasive Bluetooth Beacons
Bluetooth devices emit a radio signal that can be perceived by other Bluetooth enabled de-
vices that are in range. Over a three week period, we ran a preliminary experiment using
only the Bluetooth device discovery features. The mobile was left on a desk inside a Uni-
versity lab and was not moved. Bluetooth discovery data can provide the time the sensing
device can sense another device and signal strength to approximate distance.
Considering that we found many Bluetooth users had their device name set to some-
thing that is personally identifying such as their full name, we anonymized the dataset by
removing this information. Figure 6.3 displays the results with the y-axis representing a
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unique device and the x-axis representing the sample time of when the device was captured.
Interestingly, we were able to determine the times staff were in their offices and even the
times in which some desktop PCs were active as the Bluetooth receiver activates when the
machine is not on standby.
The user is not aware when signal information emitted by their device is captured by
nearby devices. This type of information can be considered diagnostic but reveals general













154Figure 6.3: Sensing Bluetooth Devices in Range in an Office Space
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6.5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we presented a methodology to predicting a device ID based on diagnostic
features. We also presented a web application that can be used to easily navigate through
the Device Analyzer dataset and present the information in a more comprehensive visual
format.
Our results indicate that when using features that would not commonly be considered
sensitive are captured over a number of days, a simple Naive Bayes classifier can produce
an accurate model to identify a user.
For future work, a possible direction is to determine if certain features can be used to
predict other features in the dataset.
Chapter 7
Smartphone Privacy Protection with
PrivacyPalisade
Throughout this thesis we have revealed how even seemingly innocent data can be used to
infer sensitive information. Privacy has become a key concern for smartphone users as many
apps have the ability to access and share sensitive data. However, it is not easily understand-
able for users which apps access what type of data if an app is only using the minimal access
permissions that are required to achieve a certain functionality. Smartphone users that install
many apps on their device increases the risk that their data will be aggregated on a central
data warehouse server where sensitive inferences can be made. In this chapter, we propose
a solution to help protect smartphone users.
Although there are apps targeting such privacy concerns, they only show which type of
data is being accessed but not whether it is necessary for an app to achieve its functionality.
We propose a model that groups apps together in terms of advertised functionality and
assesses an app’s privacy intrusiveness based on the requested permissions relative to other
apps that provide similar functionality. If an app requests a permission that is not common
in its cohort, the user is notified and shown visually the implications of that permission. The
user can then decide on what action to take. To improve user comprehension of permissions,
we implemented PrivacyPalisade and demonstrate Android OS level modifications that use
visual cues to indicate privacy intrusiveness of an app. Our approach is scalable and incurs
little performance overhead to the system.
The privacy implications of using smartphones is becoming well known to the general
This chapter is based on
PrivacyPalisade: Evaluating App Permissions and Building Privacy into Smartphones - ICICS 2015
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public. This understanding will lead to demand for privacy aware smartphones. We demon-
strated throughout our work how even data that appears to be non-sensitive can be analyzed
to reveal sensitive insights. Thus, the protection of privacy for smartphone users is a hard
problem to solve. The system we propose aims to detect apps that are requesting permis-
sions simply to mine for data and alert the user. This will allow the user to download apps
that are more privacy conscience.
7.1 Introduction
The ubiquity of mobile smartphones combined with advancements in mobile network in-
frastructure has created a strong market for third party apps. While the apps and service
providers are of great convenience to its users, there are concerns of the privacy implica-
tions [1]. Mobile apps greatly enhance the experience of using smartphones. These apps
are typically developed by both large software firms and independent programmers [250].
Modern platforms allow for third-party developers to create apps and distribute them in
app stores or marketplaces. Popular app stores for Android include Google Play, Amazon
Appstore and GoAPK while iOS users primarily download apps from the Apple AppStore.
Google Play and Apple AppStore now list over one million apps.
Third-party developers can access a large amount of user data using standard API calls
provided by the mobile platform and send it directly to remote servers. Apps often make use
of user data to provide functionality. For example, VoIP apps such as Viber require access to
a user’s contacts list to provide a list of people the user can call. For this case, iOS displays
a popup asking the user if the app is allowed to access contacts. In contrast, Google Play
only alerts the user at installation time. The contacts permission is justified for the VoIP app
in order to provide auto-dialing. However, many other apps, such as weather apps, do not
require the permission in general.
The architecture for privacy protection varies between mobile platforms. Android de-
pends on a software based permissions system. When an Android user downloads an app,
a dialog at installation explains what data an app can access. In contrast, Apple employs
staff members that manually review apps with internal checks. Both approaches are not
without issues. It has been shown that user comprehension of permissions is low among
Android users. While iOS users need to place trust in the AppStore review process which
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is not entirely transparent. A more comprehensible privacy solution is needed that does not
unnecessarily hinder app functionality while at the same time protects user privacy.
App similarity has been provided as a measurement by marketplaces. It is commonly
based on download statistics across apps. For example, if users downloaded one app, how
many of those same users downloaded another app. We propose a protection method that
uses app similarity to detect anomalies. From building a table of permissions requested of
an app and comparing it with the permissions of those of similar apps, anomalies can be
detected. We use Isolation Forest [21], a data-mining technique for detecting outliers to find
the anomalies based on the requested permissions.
We focus on Android, which is a popular open source Linux based mobile OS designed
for smartphones and tablets. Android is used to prototype our approach as its open nature
allows changes to be made to the privacy models. As of 2014 Android has an estimated
global marketshare of 81.5% in a report conducted by IDC1, thus privacy research of the
platform is of great importance.
To evaluate our approach, we developed a web scraper and collected information of
nearly 17,000 of the most popular free and paid apps from the Google Play store. For each
app, data collected by the web scraper includes the permissions required by the app and a
list of similar apps as suggested by Google Play. We demonstrate our approach for flagging
outliers in app permissions will eventually lead users to pick apps that take more conserva-
tive paths to user data access.
Based on our model, we implemented a service called PrivacyPalisade that checks apps
installed on the smartphone. If an app is found to contain permissions that are outliers, the
user is notified about the nature of the data the app requested at launch time. We made OS
level modifications to achieve this. Our evaluation shows that PrivacyPalisade does not add
much overhead to the system and uses little resources. It works across free and paid apps as
it does not need access to the bytecode files.
Detecting potentially harmful Android malware using requested app permissions as
training vectors for use in data-mining approaches has been attempted before in [251, 252,
253]. PrivacyPalisade is more privacy focused and differs by determining if permissions are
justified relative to app functionality. The permissions of similar apps are used as means of
comparison to achieve this.
1IDC Report: http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS25450615
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(a) Isolating Data Point xi (b) Isolating Data Point Xo
Figure 7.1: Detecting Outliers with Isolation Forest [21]
In summary our key contributions are to:
• Propose an approach to highlight outlier permissions relative to an app’s category and
functionality;
• Implement PrivacyPalisade, a ready-to-deploy application that highlights privacy im-
plications to Android users;
• Demonstrate OS level modifications that receive PrivacyPalisade messages to help
alert users of privacy implications;
• Provide case studies of apps that we believe do not follow the path of least privilege.
7.2 Background
7.2.1 Isolation Forest Overview
Isolation Forest is a unique anomaly detection technique as it builds a profile that explicitly
isolates anomalies as opposed to building a profile of normal points and finding those that
do not conform [21]. Given our problem, in many cases there are only a small number of
similar apps to compare to a target app. Thus, Isolation Forest is a suitable choice because
it has demonstrated high performance with minimal training.
The motivation behind the Isolation Forest approach is that anomalies can be isolated
easier than other data points in a set. Consider the example illustrated in Figure 7.1 demon-
strating this principle. Isolating xo which is an outlier only requires a few random partitions
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while isolating xi requires many more. This idea idea has been shown to hold true in many
different datasets [21].
An Isolation Tree is a proper binary tree defined to contain nodes that are either external
and have no children or internal with one test and two child nodes. The test is made up of
an attribute value and a split value that divides the data. The split value is selected randomly
and is between the minimum and maximum range of the attribute selected. A dataset is
recursively divided by selecting a random attribute until the tree reaches its set height, there
is only one remaining attribute or all remaining data points yet to be selected have the same
value. The tree represents the amount of divisions to isolate points that can be then used to
rank the degree of anomaly.
The anomaly score is defined to reflect how much of an anomaly a data point is. Given
a point x, the function h(x) measures the number of edges that need to be traversed in an
Isolation Tree. The issue with deriving an anomaly score from h(x) is that the height of the
tree can grow depending on the number of entires in the dataset. This makes it difficult to
compare directly different values of h(x).
Since the Isolation Tree has the same structure as a Binary Search Tree, h(x) can be
estimated by considering the case of an unsuccessful search in the Binary Search Tree. The
estimation of the average h(x) given n is defined by the function c(n), this can be used to
normalize h(x). The function c(n) is provided in [254] as follows:
c(n) = 2H(n− 1)− (2(n− 1)/n), where H(i) ≈ ln(i) + 0.5772156649
Given a set of Isolation Trees, the average of a set of isolation trees is defined by the
function E(h(x)). The anomaly score s for a data point x can then be defined as follows:
s(x, n) = 2
−E(h(x))
c(n)
Scores of s being close to 1 indicate a definite anomaly while scores of s being closer to 0.5
indicate the points are quite safe and likely not an outlier. These scores are by PrivacyPal-
isade to determine the likelihood an app is requesting outlier permissions.
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7.2.2 Android Overview
In this section we provide an overview of the Android operating system, permissions used
to enforce security and how users download third-party apps via marketplaces to make our
work more tangible.
Android is an open source mobile operating system owned by Google. It was originally
designed for smartphones and tablets but is now found on a wide range of devices including
watches, smart televisions and digital cameras. The OS has been embraced by many device
manufacturers including Samsung, LG and HTC.
The Android operating system is built on the Linux kernel. Android applications are
typically built in Java on top of the Android API which is a set of libraries. Java SDK class
libraries can also be used and third party libraries can be imported. It is possible to also use
method calls not documented in the official API by inspecting the Android OS source code.
It has been found that apps do in fact use undocumented calls [255]. While applications are
compiled using the Java SDK provided by Oracle, Android itself runs a custom Java VM
called Dalvik. Apps contained in an Android application package (APK) which is similar
to the JAR file format.
Each app defines its components in a Manifest file which provides information to the
system. An Android application usually contains a combination of app components includ-
ing Activities, Services, Content Providers and Broadcast Receivers. Activities are defined
as a screen that comes with a user interface while services usually run in the background.
Content providers are used to manage data while broadcast receivers send announcements
to apps in the system. For example the system can send a broadcast to apps that the screen
has been locked or that a new email has been received.
To facilitate communication within applications and between applications, Inter-process
communications (IPC) is commonly used. IPC mechanisms introduced by the OS includes
Intents, Bundles and Binders. Intents are messages which can be broadcasted to all appli-
cations or a specific set. They are commonly used to start activities and services. Bundles
are used to pass Objects such as Strings and Bitmaps. An Intent can be associated with a
bundle. Binders allow an application to specifically make a method call on another running
process.
Each app is run as a separate operating system process and in an isolated JVM, in
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addition apps are run with their own Linux User and Group ID. Developers can create third-
party applications using Android build tools, at present Android Studio is the official tool
promoted by Google.
7.2.3 Android Permissions System
Android primarily relies on system features engineered into the operating system to protect
users from malicious apps. Developers statically declare what permissions they require in a
Manifest file. The system blocks API calls that do not have permission by terminating the
app. A permission restricts access to potentially sensitive data or code on a device that could
cause harm such as making automated calls to premium numbers without consent.
There are four protection levels assigned to permissions which indicate potential risk,
“normal”, “dangerous”, “signature” and “signatureOnSystem”. Normal permissions are
considered low risk, dangerous permissions will prompt the user explicitly and signature
requires the application be signed with the same certificate. Permissions with a risk value
set to “signatureOnSystem” require the application be signed with the same certificate as the
system image. In practice most permissions use “signature”. Third-party apps downloaded
from Google Play are required to be signed.
In Android 7.1.1 Nougat (API Level 25) there are 277 Android system permissions.
Each feature is protected by at most one permission. Each Android application contains
a manifest formatted in XML, which is called AndroidManifest.xml. Android developers
place XML code in the manifest defining which permissions the app will be requesting
while in execution. Defined in Listing 1 is an example of how a developer would request
sensitive permissions.
Third-party applications can also protect components for use as modules in other apps
by using the Android permissions system. For example, Google Play is also a library that
provides web services. To use the Google Play library, a developer would be required to
declare the permission in Listing 2 and defined in Listing 1 is an example of how a developer
would request sensitive permissions.
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7.2.4 Android Marketplaces
Android users can browse and download many apps for their smartphones from a variety
of markets. The market ensures apps that are listed are compatible with a user’s device.
Apps are submitted by developers that wish their app to be downloaded. App marketplaces
are responsible for alerting users to the potential privacy implications at installation time.
Developers that wish to list their apps in the store upload an APK file and enter all meta-data
related to the app such as category and description.
Google play utilizes a simple layout and divides apps into categories such as Action
Games or Entertainment. Upon installing the application, a message alerting a user of per-
missions accessed appears. All apps are required to be digitally signed with a certificate
before they can be installed from a marketplace. This ensures it is not possible to change
the permissions in the AndroidManifest.xml file after the user has installed the app. If the
APK file is modified after signing, the signatures will not match and the app will terminate.
Apps are not manually reviewed for quality or security. In response to increasing mal-
ware in the Google Play store, Google created a tool called Lockheimer which has lead to a
decline in malware [256], however it has been found that it is possible to circumvent [257].
7.3 Android Privacy Protections
Recent research on privacy is focused on the sensitivity of data stored on mobile devices.












Listing 1: Standard Android Permissions
<uses-permission android:name=
‘‘com.google.android.providers.gsf.permission.READ_GSERVICES" />
Listing 2: Custom Android Permissions
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activity [258]. Early protection techniques used frequent intrusive popups requesting a user
for permission to access data. For example each time a location sample was required, the
user is asked to give permission. Our solution only alerts users when an app is detected as
an outlier. Therefore, it reduces the amount of popups from the traditional approaches.
Many users do not easily comprehend the implications of granting third party apps per-
mission to access data [174]. A user study was performed via an Internet survey with 308
participants. It was found only 15% of the participants paid attention to the permissions at
installation time. This highlights the need for improving user comprehension. PrivacyPal-
isade uses clear examples of the implications of permissions in outlier apps.
Self-organizing maps (SOMs) were used to visualize the Android permissions system
and provide insights of where it could be improved [259]. Some permissions are used fre-
quently while other permissions are only used by a small subset of applications. While there
are many permissions a user can allow or disallow for mobile apps, it was found that few
clusters cover most users’ privacy preferences [260]. This can help in determining how strict
to implement user privacy controls.
Risk signals have been proposed using a SVM model that compares apps across two
datasets and looks for rare permissions across categories [261]. Privacygrade.org [180] re-
searchers use crowd-sourced data which require extensive data collection. Rules for detect-
ing dangerous combinations of permissions was proposed in [262]. For example, a combina-
tion of Internet and microphone permissions enable the app to record mobile conversations.
Risk signals are also used by PrivacyPalisade to alert users of privacy implications.
A framework for detecting Android malware based on permissions was proposed in
[251], where k-Means clustering is combined with decision tree learning. Malware samples
were used to train the classifier. Similarly PUMA [252] compares extracted permissions
from an APK and compares them to known malware samples provided by the VirusTotal
online security tool. Crowdroid [253] also uses k-Means to detect malware, however instead
of using permissions data, crowd-sourced samples of user behavior related to system calls
is used. These approaches are aim to use requested permissions to flag potential Malware
applications and not legitimate applications that are privacy invasive.
AndroidLeaks [171] and Stowaway [9] decompile the Java source code and look for
methods that pass personal information and detect overprivilege in apps. It has been de-
termined that many apps do not follow the least path of privilege. While this is useful in
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detecting what data is captured from an app, it does not provide information on whether the
collection of data was justified to provide functionality.
TaintDroid attempts to provide insights into how apps use and share data by providing
continuous real time monitoring of data and when data leaves the phone [241]. While Taint-
Droid provides a good monitor of what data is leaving the phone, it does not provide any
protection to prevent it from occurring.
7.4 Problem Definition
Given an app a in a set of apps A, there also exists a set of similar apps denoted SA(a).
There exists a set of permissions P that apps request a subset of these permissions to access
protected smartphone functionality. Each app a ∈ A specifies a set of permissions returned
by the function Perms(a) where Perms(a) ⊆ P . The aim is to detect if an app a ∈ A
requests permissions Perms(a) ∈ P that are not outliers relative to similar apps SA(a) ∈
A.
7.5 App Classification
In order to detect if an app has permissions that are excessive relative to advertised functions,
a comparison can be made with apps that provide comparable features. Similar apps as
suggested by marketplaces provides a good cohort for comparisons. Anomaly detection
techniques like Isolation Forest can be trained on permissions of similar apps and evaluated
on the target app to determine if it is an outlier.
7.5.1 Dataset
Apps in the Google Play marketplace are listed under a range of categories. Each detailed
app listing states all permissions required, also presented are suggested apps that are similar.
We developed a web scraper to collect this information across 16,581 popular apps. While
Google Play contains millions of apps, scrolling through the catalog lists the most popular
apps. Thus, we considered the popular apps interesting for analysis because they are widely
used.
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Metric Description
App Name Developer Google Play name
App Package Name App Java package name
App Permissions Summarized permissions
Google Play Category Developer selected for app
Similar Apps Suggested similar apps
Table 7.1: Metrics Collected from the Google Play Store by Our Web Scraper
Permission Count Count (%)
Full network access 16,089 97.00
Read phone status and identity 7,688 46.37
Approximate location 3,839 23.15
Precise location 3,703 22.33
Run at startup 3,018 18.20
Read your contacts 1,495 9.02
Record audio 1,325 7.99
Directly call phone numbers 867 5.23
Send SMS messages 481 2.90
Read your text messages 458 2.36
Read calendar events 386 2.32
Table 7.2: Apps Requiring Access to Sensitive Permissions
Google Play Web Scraping
The most popular apps in the Google Play marketplace are listed in a range of categories.
A user can also filter to see either free or paid apps. We developed a web scraper to collect
this information.
The total amount of apps we acquired is 16,581. While the Google Play store contains
many more apps, scrolling through the catalog lists obtained information on the most pop-
ular apps downloaded by many users daily. Table 7.1 lists the metrics we obtained.
To collect this data, we implemented a Python web scraper using BeautifulSoup2 which
is a framework commonly used to parse HTML content and extract key information from
markup tags. The scraper visits each Google Play category and waits for the tile view of
apps to load. It will then proceed to programmatically scroll down the page until no more
additional apps are returned. By keeping track of the hyperlinks of the app tiles, the scraper
will then follow the hyperlink to each app’s detailed listing page.
When the scraper visits a detailed listing page and look for HTML tags that contain the
app title and app category data. The app package name can be seen in the URL of the page
2BeautifulSoup: https://www.crummy.com/software/BeautifulSoup/
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Figure 7.2: Bubble Chart of Weather App Permissions
itself. Similar apps are also captured at the bottom of the page. To obtain permissions infor-
mation, there is a ”View Permissions” hyperlink at the bottom of the page, following this
hyperlink displays a popup. The tags containing the permissions information are captured.
Upon the scraper completing the parsing of the detailed listing page, all captured data
is stored in a MySQL relational database.
Google Play Scraping Results
Certain permissions give access to more sensitive data than others. Listed in Table 7.2 are
permissions we consider invasive as well as the percentage of apps that are using the per-
mission in question in our dataset.
The “full network access” permission was requested by almost all apps, this combined
with any permission that allows the app to retrieve data, creates the possibility of an app to
collect data on a network server.
Half of the apps request to “read phone status and identity”, which givesthe app access
to the IMEI number. IMEI is a unique number that is used by many developers to track
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App Name Perm1 Perm2 Perm3 PermN
SimilarApp1 0 1 1 0
SimilarApp2 1 1 1 0
TargetApp 0 1 0 1
Table 7.3: Representation of Apps Permissions
ε Green(%) Blue(%) Red(%)
0.5 26.51 36.62 36.87
0.6 35.14 50.48 14.38
0.7 36.45 56.34 7.21
0.8 37.19 60.09 2.72
0.9 37.56 62.44 0.00
Table 7.4: Percentage of Apps Flagged Across Alert Levels for Different Values of ε
a user. Furthermore this permission also allows the app to know when the phone rings or
when a user makes a call. Almost a quarter of apps request access to location services which
can be used to infer where a user lives and works. Highly sensitive permission requests to
contacts, messages, calendar and microphone access were found to be minimal (less than
10%).
Filtering the data to look at specific categories gives an indication of what type of per-
missions are required for app functionality. Obvious permissions required by a standard
weather app would include location and network access to download data from weather
services. Recording audio and reading the phone status identity are not as justifiable.
While weather apps seemingly may be innocent, it is quite common for weather apps to
be opened every single day by a user. The bubble chart in Figure 7.2 illustrates a bubble for
each permission. The size of the bubble indicates how many apps in the Weather category
use that permission. Thus, small bubbles indicate less commonly used permissions, as can
be seen for “record audio”. Thus, if a company interested in collecting user data wants to
make an app for this purpose, embedded data collection functionality inside a weather app
would be a good target.
7.5.2 Data Mining Approach
Each app a ∈ A requests permissions Perms(a) ∈ P . Each permission p ∈ P is repre-
sented as a separate field using a binarized value of 1 to flag the permission is required while
0 indicates it is not required. A table is created for each target app. An example is shown in
Table 7.3.
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The permissions we used for training include:
• Read your contacts
• Read phone status and identity
• Approximate location
• Precise location
• Run at startup
• Record audio
• Call phone numbers
• Send SMS messages
• Read SMS messages
• Read calendar events
• Require full network access
In our method, the set of similar apps SA(a) ∈ A is simply the apps classified in the
same category as a. An Isolation Forest is constructed from the similar app vectors. The
target app is then evaluated resulting in a IsolationScore between 0 and 1. A score of 1
indicates definite anomalies, while 0.5 indicates the app is consistent with similar apps. The
following rules are applied to determine the level of severity of an app:
• Red Alert - If an IsolationScore is greater than ε and uses a sensitive permission;
• Blue Alert - If an IsolationScore of less than ε and uses any sensitive permissions;
• Green Alert - If an app does not require any sensitive permissions.
The value for ε used by PrivacyPalisade was empirically determined by testing different
values and taking the ratio of alerts that appeared the most reasonable, in the case of our
dataset it was ε = 0.7. Table 7.4 demonstrates the effect when varying ε.
7.5.3 Outlier Results
We ran our app classification technique on every app in our dataset. Table 7.5 lists common
categories and the percentage of alerts triggered by apps. Communications had the highest
percentage of red alerts, while books were amongst one of the safest categories.
7.6 PrivacyPalisade
In this section, we present the design of PrivacyPalisade, a system designed to help protect
users from potentially privacy invasive apps and improve user comprehension. To improve
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Category # Apps Green(%) Blue(%) Red(%)
Communication 381 14.70 73.32 12.07
Social 382 24.35 65.18 10.47
Music Games 320 59.06 30.94 10.00
Action Games 487 32.03 58.52 9.45
Adventure Games 447 39.60 54.36 6.04
Lifestyle 318 42.09 52.53 5.38
Books 356 55.62 39.89 4.49
Table 7.5: Number of Outliers Detected per Category by PrivacyPalisade
user comprehension, our system flags outlier apps installed and displays permissions im-
plications at launch time. This is challenging to implement because third-party apps do not
allow to intercept and block an app when it is launched. Thus, we made enhancements at
the OS level. The Android OS Launcher is modified to overlay privacy information and re-
compiled as a custom ROM that can be deployed on Android devices. The system consists
of a web service, an Android app and an Android background service.
The web service maintains a database of Android apps and their respective privacy in-
formation as generated in Section 7.5. By passing an Android app package name via a GET
request, a JSON response is returned with the privacy rating and outlier permissions. The
web service was implemented in PHP and deployed on Apache. The web service maintains
a database of all Android applications and their respective privacy information as generated
by our approach described in Section 7.5. Running our approach directly on Android would
be computationally expensive, thus we opted for remote processing.
PrivacyPalisade runs a background service on the Android device that communicates
with a server retrieving information about apps a user has installed. This information is
stored in an internal database local to the user’s device, entries are added and removed
when a user installs and removes an app.
Our background service communicates privacy information both to the PrivacyPalisade
Activity and the Android Launcher. Other apps and widgets can also use PrivacyPalisade
information. Users can browse the privacy information for installed apps using the user
interface displayed in Figure 7.3. Icons are colored based on invasiveness. Green denotes
safe, blue indicates neutral and red for potentially invasive. When an app is opened, a popup
dialog is loaded which presents a view explaining permissions used.
The Android Launcher displays the home screen, phone dialer, messaging and app icons
for users to launch third-party apps. While the PrivacyPalisade UI is useful to display if
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(a) List of Installed Apps (b) Visual Alerts
Figure 7.3: PrivacyPalisade UI to Alert Users of Apps Requesting Excessive Permissions
apps are safe, it is more convenient for the user to see this information directly in the
launcher. To build the customized launcher, we downloaded the OS source code for An-
droid 7.1.1 Nougat from https://source.android.com and compiled it on Ubuntu
Linux 15.04. The custom operating system was deployed on a LG/Google Nexus 5X.
The original launcher was modified to listen for broadcasts from the background service.
Based on the invasiveness level; the Bitmap of the app icon is overlaid with a color filter.
An example is displayed in Figure 7.4. An additional class is added to the source tree to
display custom dialog boxes when an app is executed from the Launcher application. If the
user selects “Open App”, the original Intent to start the Activity is called, otherwise if a
user selects “Close App”, the app will not open and the dialog will dismiss.
We show the information of permission outliers with intuitive icons. If a location per-
mission is detected as an outlier, the user is displayed an image of a map and a house marker
(Figure 7.3a) making it obvious that the app can possibly know a user’s home location. The
SMS messages bubble (Figure 7.5b) indicate the app wants to read SMS messages, using
bubbles is intuitive inspired by the way that users typically read messages on a modern
smartphone. The microphone screen displayed in Figure 7.5c makes it clear the phone can
start recording.
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Figure 7.4: Android OS Modification to Color Code Launcher Icons
7.7 App Case Studies
Our study shows that PrivacyPalisade detects between 5% to 10% of apps as outliers in
each Play Store category. The apps we selected to present as case studies are very popular
and require permissions that are not needed for their functionalities. It was found that many
apps request “precise location” when only “approximate location” is required. Further-
more, some apps request permissions in which there is no direct use case to provide app
functionality. We show some examples as follows.
7.7.1 iHeartRadio
iHeartRadio is a popular free music streaming service for Android and iOS. At present it
has received between 10 to 50 million downloads from Google Play.
PrivacyPalisade flagged it as an outlier because it required the “precise location” per-
mission which only 14% of similar apps required. This permission is used to determine
what local radio stations are available in the area. For iHeartRadio to perform a local ra-
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(a) Location Alerts (b) Read SMS (c) Record Audio
Figure 7.5: PrivacyPalisade Sensitive Permissions Alert Dialogs
dio station lookup, “precise location” is not needed. TuneIn radio which provides a similar
service only required “approximate location” to achieve the same function. All competi-
tors received a similar number of downloads to iHeartRadio, indicating that precise location
access is not a deterrent for users.
7.7.2 Dictionary.com
Dictionary.com provides a free online English dictionary app for its Android and iOS users.
The Android version has received between 10 to 50 million downloads. The app requests 11
permissions, one of which is sensitive and flagged by PrivacyPalisade (“precise location”).
The app requires location to support the local lookups feature which allows the user
to see nearby word searches. Similar competitive apps such as the Oxford Dictionary of
English and Merriam-Webster do not require any location information. Each of these dic-
tionary apps are very popular, thus indicating it is not apparent to users that an alternative
dictionary that is not location invasive is available. Precise location is not needed to pro-
vide a nearby search feature, approximate location is sufficient and would result in the app
following the least privileged path.
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7.7.3 Hana Bank
Hana Bank is one of the largest banks in South Korea. A mobile app is provided to their
customers available on both Android and iOS. Google Play states that it has received be-
tween 1 to 5 million installs. PrivacyPalisade detected 25 permissions requested, many of
which give access to sensitive data. For example, only 20% of similar apps required access
to the “read your contacts” and “read call log” permissions.
The app requires access to contacts to allow the user to see a list of people they can
transfer money. We observed banking apps require a combination of “directly call numbers”
and “write call log” for the app to provide a direct way of calling customer support numbers.
Removing the “read call log” permission would not hinder this functionality. Many similar
banking apps require the “receive text messages” permission which allows the app to verify
the phone number via reading a confirmation SMS. For this type of verification, “read your
text messages” is not needed. However, it is requested by the app.
7.8 Protection Against Sensitive Inferences
Throughout this thesis, we demonstrated how sensitive inferences can be made from seem-
ingly innocuous data. In this section, we describe how PrivacyPalisade can prevent such
inferences from being made.
PrivacyPalisade protects smartphone users by alerting them to privacy dangers of certain
apps at launch time, allowing the user to make more informed decisions. A user can also
decide based on the color coded information provided whether to continue using a particlar
app or find a more privacy aware alternative.
The Android permissions system ensures that access permissions must be granted ahead
of time before an app can make method calls via system APIs. These system method calls
may be used for the purposes of accessing certain functionalities like turning on Bluetooth
or retrieving sensitive data including users contacts. PrivacyPalisade running at the operat-
ing system level checks for permissions apps are requesting to determine the possible data
metrics an app can access at load time.
Location services provided by Android is used in apps that require positioning estimates
or location query results. We demonstrated that services that make use of continuous loca-
tion queries can infer a user’s traveled route in Chapter 3 and their personnel encounters
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in Chapter 5. Before an app that makes use of location services is executed, the dialog in
Figure 7.5a is presented to the user. The visual indicates to the user what information can
be inferred. Since the attacks rely on the apps being continuously used, a user can decide to
use the app less frequently to ensure any data sent to a service is sparse.
Users leaving Bluetooth on all the time opens up the possibility for the location of a
smartphone user to be determined indoors or have contextual information determined of
when certain Bluetooth enabled devices are being used. We demonstrated how this can be
performed in Chapter 4. Many apps switch on Bluetooth automatically in order to facilitate
communications with other devices, users may not be aware of this. Bluetooth access is
considered a sensitive permission and a user is alerted when it is accessed by an app. Since
the user is aware that it has been switched on, the user can then decide if they wish for
Bluetooth to remain on after they close a certain app.
As a result of learning that a user can be identified from diagnostic data as demonstrated
in Chapter 6, access to any settings related permissions is considered sensitive by Privacy-
Palisade and a user will be alerted. Diagnostic data is sometimes used by app developers to
improve services so the user can decide if they trust the developer with this information.
7.9 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we evaluated the most popular Android apps and presented an approach to
highlight outliers by using the permissions information of apps of similar functionality as
inputs for the Isolation Forest anomaly detection technique. Privacy focused UI enhance-
ments to Android were also demonstrated. By color coding the launcher icons, it can be
easily seen by the user which apps are privacy invasive. The dialogs displayed when an
outlier app is opened would help the user easily understand which apps are more privacy
invasive.
We are currently in the process of deploying PrivacyPalisade on Google Nexus devices
and conducting a user study. In future work we aim to implement a continuous monitoring
solution to create a profile of each data entry an app has requested and sent to a server.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Directions
In this thesis, we developed techniques to analyze smartphone data that at first glance ap-
pears innocuous, however upon further inspection can reveal sensitive information about an
individual. We also presented a prototype system that makes modifications at the OS level
on Android to help users better control what types of sensitive information can be accessed
by third party apps. In this chapter, we provide a summary of the research contributions,
the implications they have for smartphone privacy and future directions for research in this
area.
In Chapter 2, we covered research highlighting the types of sensitive data stored by
smartphones, associated smartphone privacy implications, generic dataset privacy protec-
tion models, privacy preserving data-mining techniques and legislative frameworks. Smart-
phones collect and store personal information about a user including contacts, messages,
emails, social networking information, appointments, web history and location tracks. There
is also data stored and sent to services that is not considered sensitive such as diagnostic
data or query results. This data is accessible via third party apps and sent to cloud storage
providers.
There has been little research conducted into the privacy implications of smartphone
data that is more readily exchanged prompting the need for this work. Throughout this
thesis, we explored data that is not considered to be sensitive and in some cases even public
and demonstrated how sensitive inferences about smartphone users can still be made.
Smartphone users are becoming more aware of the potential privacy implications asso-
ciated with interacting with the device. Recent studies suggest that a majority of users do
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value their digital privacy and are willing to pay a premium if privacy aware alternatives
are available. An issue users currently face is there are not many privacy aware alternatives
for smartphone platforms and third party apps and studies show users apprehensively trade
their privacy for convenience.
The research conducted in this thesis is timely with public concern increasing over the
privacy implications of smartphone usage. Anonymized data is often exchanged for research
purposes and smartphones are a great source of certain types of individual data. Further-
more, advances in data mining has led to additional data being collected for the purpose of
modeling. An understanding into the possible inferences that can be made is important to
ensure both that data can be exchanged with strong safety guarantees and privacy controls
to help users select the level of privacy they require can become more readily available.
Insights into what seemingly innocuous data can reveal will assist smartphone designers to
build in better privacy protections directly into their respective platforms.
Smartphones are maturing as a technology, with privacy as key topic it will be expected
that measures are taken. Recent examples of attacks have led to adaptations being made.
Our research can assist smartphone developers to further safeguard privacy by adopting the
protection techniques we proposed in this thesis.
8.1 Summary of the Research Contributions
Query results are exchanged often amongst data providers. In Chapter 3, we demonstrated
how the location of an individual and the route they traveled along could be inferred. We
developed an algorithm that given a set of timestamped POIs, will return the likely route a
user travels along. This was performed by first constructing a Voronoi diagram with each
point representing a POI. Paths were incrementally generated to reach each Voronoi cell.
A maximum speed bound is assumed based on the average speed of the road network in
the area being considered. Any paths that do not reach a Voronoi cell a user resides in is
discarded. A candidate path selection algorithm was then used to pick a path from the set.
We proposed two candidate path selection methods. The first method is weighted to select a
path based on the most central roads. The second is weighted based on the roads users travel
along more frequently. It may be possible to infer other types of data from query results.
For example, places that a user may frequent often.
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Using just diagnostic data we demonstrated how users can be uniquely identified. We
took a set of features including manufacturer, storage space, user settings and trained a naive
bays classifier. Once trained, we were table to uniquely identify users in the set using a clas-
sifier on diagnostic data where the user ID was not known. Only three days of consecutive
updates of diagnostic data were required to make accurate inferences. Diagnostic data is
commonly shared by many apps and services and sent frequently to cloud storage services.
It is possible to detect when users are using certain services with this information. Users
may not want to disclose their usage behavior of apps. This data can also be linked to usage
data of other apps which will in turn then be able to be used to identify them. How diag-
nostic data is sent needs to be reviewed. We suggest that dynamic features such as memory
size are not sent to reduce the probability of being able to uniquely identify a user.
In simply scanning for Bluetooth signals, we were able to locate users indoors. Blue-
tooth has long been a concern for privacy researchers and many attacks to privacy have been
successful like retrieving a user’s address book. We developed a localization scheme that
combined the benefits of both range-based and range-free methods to locate Bluetooth users
with accuracies of up to 1m. A user may be comfortable with disclosing their workplace but
not the exact part of the building they are located in. With our scheme, it is possible to find
these users. How Bluetooth signals are transmitted and how often the device is in discover-
able mode needs to be carefully considered. Even if a device is not in discoverable mode, it
can be detected if a device is in range if the MAC address is known. Limiting the distance
Bluetooth signals can travel is one possible solution. Therefore, only devices that are within
close range can communicate with the device.
Many apps and services are making use of continuous queries. We were able to infer
user encounter patterns given access to continuous location data. We were also able to make
these inferences in real-time for millions of people in a city area. Proximity information
between users is required to mine for these patterns. Calculating the distance between each
combination pair would yield too many computations. Nearest neighbor algorithms can also
be applied to this problem, however it is not efficient as only the people in proximity are
required and not necessarily the nearest neighbor that is far away and not in proximity.
We proposed the use of a c-NN query that only considers neighbors that are within a fixed
threshold. By building a spatial index, taking advantage of properties that are unique to
encounters, we discovered an efficient way to mine for these patterns. In discovering en-
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counter patterns, users that are concerned that their activities are being learned should mask
their location to make it harder to track.
We also proposed a protection system called PrivacyPalisade. The system attempts to
balance the functionality requirements of apps with the privacy requirements needed. By
using Isolation Forests, we were able to detect apps that requested permissions that were
outliers in the cohort. The system is integrated directly into the operating system and re-
trieves privacy scores of apps installed on the smartphone. Users are warned if an app is
detected as suspicious before the app is executed. In addition, the launcher icons were color
coded. Using this system, we found that many apps in Android marketplaces are not privacy
aware. PrivacyPalisade enables users to make more privacy conscience choices for apps.
8.2 Implications of Research and Suggested Safeguards
Throughout this thesis, we have highlighted how sensitive data can be inferred from data
considered to be non-sensitive. Data aggregation organizations and third party apps that
collect this data may assume the data is anonymous. We show that upon careful inspection
that this is not the case in many instances. Mobile data can be combined with external
data sources and aggregated to build a very accurate profile about an individual. In order
to develop effective techniques to protect user privacy, a clear understanding is needed into
what data can be sourced by an adversary as well as what data can be dangerous to a user if
leaked.
Our work suggests that extra care needs to be taken by data providers to ensure data is
anonymous and additional information cannot be inferred. In addition, smartphones need to
be equipped with more tools to help safeguard user privacy. As the public continue to learn
about privacy implications, there will be demand for more secure phones.
Legislative frameworks exist to protect user data ensuring that it is stored anonymously
but they do not extend to implicitly inferring sensitive information. We believe that by the
work in this thesis demonstrating cases where implying sensitive information is possible,
additional regulatory guidelines can be proposed by legislators to ensure additional mea-
sures are taken to protect user data.
Spatial nearest neighbor query results often yield locations that are close to the posi-
tion of the initiator. We demonstrated how a smartphone user’s route can be reconstructed
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to a high accuracy using only the query results without access to the original positioning
estimates. Query results retained by location services should be a fair distance away from
where the query was initiated to help ensure their user’s privacy.
Devices that make use of radio technologies such as Bluetooth and WI-FI make avail-
able signal strength information without any authentication having to be performed. We
demonstrated that it is possible to infer indoor location information and contextual informa-
tion about a user. Techniques to suppress, generalize or add noise to the signal information
should be considered. For most applications such as signal strength indication bars, only
granular signal strength information is required. These protections would make it much
more difficult to infer user location.
When smartphone users reveal their location, many are unaware of the possibility of
deriving further contextual information. We demonstrated that the encounters of individuals
can be detected. As a result, smartphone platforms should take care to not send location
information to providers when the user is within proximity to people in their social network.
This protection would make it far more difficult to detect encounter patterns.
Certain metrics considered to be non-sensitive such as diagnostic data are personally
identifying. In just examining the raw data, it may be hard to find user insights, with data
aggregation and data mining, more information can be revealed. For example, we revealed
how diagnostic data can be used to identify an individual and thus, should be considered
sensitive. In turn, leading diagnostic data to being considered sensitive in own work when
developing PrivacyPalisade.
This research helps provide a far better understanding of what data can be captured,
stored and insights inferred of person or a group by only using their smartphone data. In
also showing that modifications to the smartphone platforms operating system via Priva-
cyPalisade can further protect privacy, smartphone developers can adopt these methods to
better safeguard user privacy.
8.3 Future Directions
Smartphone privacy research has recently received a lot of attention. In this section, we
highlight a few possible future directions.
In this work we considered a few seemingly innocent data features and went through
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great efforts to infer sensitive information. While careful inspection is required, we showed
it is possible to infer this sensitive information such as traveled routes and the encounters
individuals have with people. For future work, additional metrics that are considered inno-
cent can be inspected and analyzed to determine if additional information can be derived.
One example of a possible direction is to determine if a combination of sensors such as
temperature and light can be used to derive context of the environment the user is likely
within e.g. indoors or outdoors. This knowledge will continue to help in refining privacy
protection mechanisms.
In terms of protection, our system stops users from using apps that are considered sus-
picious. Integrating directly into the operating system opens up the doors to more sophis-
ticated protection techniques. A future direction for this is to analyze traffic being sent to
services and detecting the probability of attacks occurring. If the system detects data sent
can lead to a sensitive inference being made, then it can be blocked. Furthermore, a pro-
file of what data is sent to what app can be built and displayed to the user so they have an
understanding into what third parties know about them. In many cases, finding a privacy
aware app may not be an option. Another possible direction is to investigate how to best
feed apps obfuscated data so the app can still continue to function while not compromising
user privacy.
Third party app developers can implement apps to access data. An investigation is
needed to determine developer comprehension of permissions used to request data. There
have been studies performed investigating user comprehension of smartphone permissions
but less focus on the developers. There are often less data invasive paths to perform required
functionality. For example, when performing a local radio search only approximate location
data is needed, not precise. Promoting developers to better carefully consider privacy ap-
plications can lead to more secure apps and thus, providing users with more privacy aware
alternatives to common apps they use.
User comprehension of permissions has been demonstrated to be low (see Section
2.7.4). Further techniques are needed to assist users construct privacy protection profiles.
Depending on the type of user and their privacy requirements, profiles need to be con-
structed. Some users may have stricter privacy requirements and are willing to sacrifice
more privacy than others. Further studies are needed to show how to best customize user
profiles and provide a guarantee to users that their privacy requirements set in the profile
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are being met by the platform.
While it is widely known that it is possible to easily collect smartphone information via
third party apps and that data mining is being performed, few studies consider in detail the
motivations. More work is needed to better understand the types of organizations that are
mining for user smartphone data, the methods that are commonly employed to acquire said
data and for what purposes. Enjoyed benefits from data mining vary depending on the sector
data analysts are working within. In better knowing the purposes, it will be easier to establish
privacy models that can achieve the goals of the organizations without compromising user
privacy.
Users install multiple apps on their smartphones and make use of many different ser-
vices. A single app or service may not necessarily maintain all of a user’s mobile data. For
example, a navigation app may maintain location information about a user while a media
streaming app may maintain music preferences. It is possible that data aggregation tech-
niques can be employed making use of multiple data sources to maintain a user profile. An
investigation is needed into the extent of how effective data aggregation across multiple data
sources is and how to protect against it. An even greater understanding can also be gained
from combining internal smartphone data with external sources such as a national census.
More work is needed to understand how data features can be combined and what could be
learned as a result.
Following on from our results, practical applications could follow including security
software can be better implemented to protect user privacy and better manage the exchange
of smartphone data. We hope to raise user awareness of the potential dangers of certain





Mobile smartphones store a significant amount of information about a user. This data can
be easily accessed using standard API calls commonly provided by popular platforms. In
this chapter, we present the technical details of how to capture data and send it to a remote
server. Our primary focus was on the Android platform which has the highest number of
users worldwide and is accessible for research purposes since it is open source.
The aim was to explore if stored mobile data can be easily captured via third party apps
commonly found in app repositories. When we prototyped our application, literature on the
issue was scarce. There are now numerous articles discussing this issue in detail and there
have also been media publications bringing attention to the general public. Modern plat-
forms aimed to provide a rich environment for developers to create apps on the smartphone,
however in doing so have opened up a new attack vector for those who wish to collect user
data.
MobileSensor captures data stored natively on the device and sends it to a remote
database. Publicly available APIs that retrieve data and pass it to the app were used. It
is important to note that no exploits were utilized in the data collection as the focus was
on what standard apps are capable of accessing. Data captured is stored in an internal re-
lational database and periodically synchronized with a remote database server. Modules
implemented in this work have been reused in varied research completed in the department
where data collection via smartphones is required. This appendix chapter can serve as a
guide to providing best practices when making use of smartphone data.
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A.1 Introduction
Android is a popular open source mobile platform. We focused on Android smartphones
because its open nature lends itself to being suitable for research purposes as it can be
customized to suit a wide range of needs. Android, Inc was founded in 2003 with the aim
of developing smarter mobile devices. The Android OS is not limited to mobile devices and
has been used on devices including tablets, e-readers, car computers and media centers.
The initial goal of the then startup was to compete with Nokia’s Symbian based op-
erating system and Windows Mobile. Google acquired Android, Inc in 2006 and invested
heavily in Android. When Android launched, its main competitor in terms of functionality
was the iPhone. Symbian lagged behind in software features offered. While Android and
iOS provide similar functionality, the software architecturally is vastly different. This lead
to mobile app development companies having to create two different versions of the same
product.
The first commercial phone was made available by HTC in 2008. Android applications
do not run in the Java Virtual Machine but rather a specialist virtual machine called Dalvik.
Standard Java code can be used in Android apps and are built on top of the Android API
1. XML is heavily used in Android development for application properties, user interface
designs and values for variables. Every Android application has an AndroidManifest.xml file
that stores common meta-data including Android API version required, user permissions
that are required to be granted and features the app uses.
Android applications can be developed on Windows, Mac OS X and Linux via Android
Studio. Each major release of Android has an associated API Level. Higher API levels sup-
port all the functionality of lower API levels as a general rule. For example, code developed
for API level 14 would work fine on API level 18. Many devices have much older versions
of Android running on them so developers typically target lower API levels to gain good de-
vice coverage for a deployed app. Android devices support upgrading the operating system
to the latest version the manufacture supports so it is difficult for users to install the latest
version as proprietary drivers are often required.
1Android API: http://developer.android.com/reference/packages.html
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A.1.1 Activities
Android initiates code in an Activity instance that provides callback methods that correspond
to a specific stage in the life cycle of an app. Each Activity needs to be declared in the
Android Manifest in addition to a default launch activity. Activities are linked to a user
interface displayed on the screen and are not guaranteed to run in the background.
Figure A.1: Activity Lifecycle as Illustrated in the Android API2
A.1.2 Services
Initialized code intended to run long running operations. Needs to be registered as a service
in the Android Manifest. Can be used to run operations in the background. Communication
between the Activities and Services is facilitated mainly using BroadcastReceiver classes.
2Android Activity API: https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/
Activity.html
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Figure A.2: Service Lifecycle as Illustrated in the Android API3
A.1.3 Mobile Data Transfer
Every mobile facilitates data transfer wirelessly. Data captured from mobile sensors can be
easily sent to another device for processing via the following communications mediums:
• 2G/3G/LTE Network connection
• WI-FI Network Connection
• Bluetooth Data Transfer
• SMS Messages
• Near Field Communication (NFC)
• Infrared
A.1.4 Permissions
The Android API provides many method calls for developers to build functionality upon.
Some of these method calls are sensitive and require permissions be declared in the An-
droidManifest. Permissions required by an Android app can be added as follows:
<uses-permission android:name="PERMISSION_NAME" />
3Android Service API: https://developer.android.com/guide/components/services.
html
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A.2 Data Captured
Mobile hardware is increasingly becoming more sophisticated. Mobile devices contain
many instruments that can be used as sensors. The following metrics were successfully
captured using standard API calls:
• GPS and tagged places
• Cell Tower and signal strength
• WI-FI devices in proximity
• Bluetooth devices in proximity







• Network traffic stats
• Call logs meta data
• Contacts data
• Hardware info
• Mobile features (Camera, WI-FI,
Bluetooth etc.)
• File names on SD Card
• Calendar entries
• Device language and languages of ac-
tive keyboards
• Device setting preference accessible
(109 variables)
• Last alarm clock set
• SMS messages
• CPU/RAM usage
A.3 Social Media Network Data
Apps are provided by social media networks allowing for users to interact with the service
conveniently on their smartphone. In many cases a user grants third party apps access to
their social network. This is commonly seen at login screens where the user can conve-
niently login using their social network profile instead of creating an additional profile for
the service provided by the third party app. This scenario is one example of how a third
party app can gain access to private data not stored on the device itself.
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A.4 Sensor Data
Android devices are equipped with a variety of internal sensors that can be used to detect
how the user is interacting with the device. Many of these sensors are abstracted by the
Sensor class and values are accessible via the SensorManager class.
The Sensor class provides constants for different types of sensors that can be passed into
the getDefaultSensor method call. Registering a SensorListener for the sensor will return
sensor events to the onAccuracyChanged and onSensorChanged methods. The SensorEvent
class passed to onSensorChanged provides the sensor values that can be then parsed to suit









public void onAccuracyChanged(Sensor sensor, int accuracy) {
// Accuracy is given in onSensorChaged
}
public void onSensorChanged(SensorEvent event) {
int accuracy = event.accuracy;
long timestamp = event.timestamp;
float values[] = event.values;
}
Listing 3: Retrieving Sensor Data in Android
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A.5 Location Data
Android devices all come equipped with a GPS and can provide location samples as accu-
rate as 5m. Location services can be accessed via the LocationManager class. The request-
LocationUpdates method call can be used to register a LocationListener class that returns




lm.requestLocationUpdates(LocationManager.GPS_PROVIDER, freq, 0, this);
...
@Override
public void onLocationChanged(Location location) {
double lat = location.getLatitude();
double lng = location.getLongitude();
double alt = location.getAltitude();
}
Listing 4: Retrieving Location Samples in Android
A.6 Camera
Android phones usually come with a front and back facing camera Photos can be taken
and then processed by Computer Vision Algorithms. Launching the camera involves start-
ing the camera activity via an Intent provided by the MediaStore class. Once a user takes
a photo, it will be returned as an Intent containing the image information passed via the
onActivityResult call back.
static final int REQUEST_IMAGE_CAPTURE = 1;
Intent takePictureIntent = new Intent(MediaStore.ACTION_IMAGE_CAPTURE);




protected void onActivityResult(int requestCode, int resultCode,
Intent data) {
if(requestCode == REQUEST_IMAGE_CAPTURE &&
resultCode == RESULT_OK) {
Bundle extras = data.getExtras();
Bitmap imageBitmap = (Bitmap) extras.get("data");
}
}
Listing 5: Taking a Photo with the Camera
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A.7 Contacts
Contacts can be retrieved using a content resolver query with the URI provided by the




null, null, null, null);
while(c.moveToNext()) {




Cursor phones = getContentResolver().query(Phone.CONTENT_URI,








} catch(Exception e) {
Log.d("Exception", e.toString());
}
Listing 6: Retrieving Contacts in Android
A.8 Call Logs
Call logs can be retrieved by issuing a query to the content resolver using a URI. Iterating
through the cursor allows for call log information to be retrieved for calls made.
try {
Uri cLog = Uri.parse("content://call_log/calls");









} catch(Exception e) {
Log.d("Exception", e.toString());
}
Listing 7: Retrieving Call Logs in Android
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A.9 Messages
Text messages sent and received can be retrieved via a content resolver query using the
URI ”content://sms/inbox”. Itearting through the Cursor allows for retrieval of each SMS
message.
Uri smsURI = Uri.parse("content://sms/inbox");
Cursor smsCursor = getContentResolver().query(smsURI, null, null, null,
null);
while(smsCursor.moveToNext()) {
String person = smsCursor.getString(4);
String date = smsCursor.getString(5);
String read = smsCursor.getString(8);
String type = smsCursor.getString(10);
String subject = smsCursor.getString(12);
String body = smsCursor.getString(13);
}
Listing 8: Retrieving Text Messages Android
A.10 Language
Languages that are used on the device can be detected by retrieving the available input
methods. The InputMethodManager class provides the method getEnabledInputMethodList
that returns a list of InputMethodInfo objects that provide information about the input type.




List<InputMethodInfo> lst = imeManager.getEnabledInputMethodList();
String defaultLanguage = Locale.getDefault().getLanguage();





for(int i=0; i<list.size(); i++) {
InputMethodSubtype currInputMethodSubtype = list.get(i);
String keyboardLocale = currInputMethodSubtype.getLocale();
boolean keyboardAuxiliary =
currInputMethodSubtype.isAuxiliary();
String keyboardInputMode = currInputMethodSubtype.getMode();
}
}
Listing 9: Retrieving Languages set in Android
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A.11 Apps Installed
Apps installed on the device can give an indication of user activity Android allows this infor-
mation to be easily accessible via the PackageManger class. The method call getInstalled-
Packages returns a list of PackageInfo objects.







for(PackageInfo packageInfo : packages) {
String packageName = packageInfo.packageName;
int versionCode = packageInfo.versionCode;
ApplicationInfo applicationInfo = packageInfo.applicationInfo;
PermissionInfo[] permissions = packageInfo.permissions;
String applicationName = applicationInfo.loadLabel(pm).toString();
}
Listing 10: Retrieving Apps Installed in Android
A.12 App Usage
Android is built on top of the Linux kernel and uses virtually the same process sched-
uler. Running processes can be retrieved using the ActivityManager class. The method call





for(int i=0; i<processes.size(); i++) {
RunningAppProcessInfo currentRunningTaskInfo =
(RunningAppProcessInfo) processes.get(i);
int pid = currentRunningTaskInfo.uid;
int[] pidArray = {pid};
String processName = currentRunningTaskInfo.processName;
android.os.Debug.MemoryInfo memoryInfo =
actvityManager.getProcessMemoryInfo(pidArray)[0];
int totalPrivateDirty = memoryInfo.getTotalPrivateDirty();
int totalPss = memoryInfo.getTotalPss();
int totalSharedDirty = memoryInfo.getTotalSharedDirty();
int importanceFlag = currentRunningTaskInfo.importance;
}
Listing 11: Retrieving App Usage in Android
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A.13 Bluetooth
All modern mobiles devices have Bluetooth Bluetooth is a well-established technology sup-
ported by many different devices.
The BluetoothAdapter class allows for detecting if Bluetooth is enabled, if not it can
be started by starting an activity provided by an Intent in the bluetoothAdapter. Calling the
method startDiscovery returns any detected Bluetooth devices asynchrnosuly via a Broad-











private final BroadcastReceiver mReceiver = new BroadcastReceiver() {
@Override
public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {







String deviceName = device.getName();
String deviceAddress = device.getAddress();
int bondStateFlag = device.getBondState();
String bondState = "";
if(bondStateFlag == BluetoothDevice.BOND_BONDED) {
bondState = "BOND_BONDED";
}
if(bondStateFlag == BluetoothDevice.BOND_BONDING) {
bondState = "BOND_BONDING";
}






Listing 12: Retrieving Bluetooth
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A.14 CPU/RAM Usage
The amount of memory android activities occupy can be retrieved via the ActivityManager
class while the file /proc/stat can be read to determine the CPU usage.
The ActivityManager class provide to retrieve memory information and store it in the
MemoryInfo class. While direct calls to retrieve CPU usage is not available, the file /proc/s-
tat commonly found on Unix based operating systems provides this information which can
be accessed and parsed.
//Read Memory usage




long ramUsageMB = mi.availMem / 1048576L;
//Read CPU Usage




} catch(Exception e) {
Log.d("Exception", e.toString());
}
String cpuInfo = sb.toString();
Listing 13: Retrieving CPU/RAM Usage in Android
A.15 WI-FI
WI-FI devices within range that are discoverable can be easily accessed The WifiManager
class provides a method call setWifiEnabled that allows for toggling if the WI-FI is on or off.
The getScanResults method call returns a list of ScanResult objects that provide information
about sensed WI-FI access points.
wifi = (WifiManager) getApplicationContext().
getSystemService(Context.WIFI_SERVICE);




for(int i=0; i<results.size(); i++) {
ScanResult result = results.get(i);
//result.SSID;
}
Listing 14: Retrieving WI-FI in Android
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A.16 Calendar
The calendar reveals personal information about a users daily activities. This can be re-
trieved through the use of a content resolver query. The URI to access calender content is
“content://com.android.calendar/calendars”. The resolver returns a HashSet containing all
found Calendar IDs. The associated calendar entry information can then be accessed via the
Cursor objects returned from the content resolver query.
Uri calendarURI = Uri.parse("content://com.android.calendar/calendars");
Cursor calendarCursor =
getContentResolver().query(calendarURI, null, null, null, null);
HashSet<String> calendarIds = new HashSet<String>();
while(calendarCursor.moveToNext()) {
String _id = calendarCursor.getString(0);
String displayName = calendarCursor.getString(1);
Boolean selected = !calendarCursor.getString(2).equals("0");
calendarIds.add(_id);
}







getContentResolver().query(builder.build(), null, null, null,
null);
while(eventCursor.moveToNext()) {
String eventEndTimezone = eventCursor.getString(0);
String hasAlarm = eventCursor.getString(3);
String calendarTimezone = eventCursor.getString(8);
String startDay = eventCursor.getString(9);
String description = eventCursor.getString(10);
String hasExtendedProperties = eventCursor.getString(15);
String allDay = eventCursor.getString(18);
String organizer = eventCursor.getString(19);
String eventTimezone = eventCursor.getString(25);
String createTime = eventCursor.getString(26);
String eventId = eventCursor.getString(32);
String title = eventCursor.getString(38);
String availability = eventCursor.getString(44);
String maxReminders = eventCursor.getString(49);
String accessLevel = eventCursor.getString(50);
String calendarColor = eventCursor.getString(53);
String duration = eventCursor.getString(54);
String guestsCanInviteOthers = eventCursor.getString(57);
String eventColor = eventCursor.getString(58);
String eventStatus = eventCursor.getString(60);
}
}
Listing 15: Retrieving Calendar in Android
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A.17 Settings
User settings can be retrieved via the Settings class. Many of the settings are toggles repre-
sented as ints although settings can also be represented as other data types such as String.
All settings that are available to be retrieved are represented as constants in the Settings
class.
Settings sets = Android.provider.Settings;
ContentResolver cr = getContentResolver();
adbEnabled = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.ADB_ENABLED);
airplaneModeOn = sets.System.getInt(cr, System.AIRPLANE_MODE_ON);
alarmAlert = sets.System.getInt(cr, System.ALARM_ALERT);
androidId = sets.System.getInt(cr, System.ANDROID_ID);
autoTime = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.AUTO_TIME);
autoTimeZone = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.AUTO_TIME_ZONE);
bluetoothDiscoverability =
setts.System.getInt(cr, System.BLUETOOTH_DISCOVERABILITY);
bluetoothOn = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.BLUETOOTH_ON);
dataRoaming = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.DATA_ROAMING);
debugApp = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.DEBUG_APP);
dimScreen = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.DIM_SCREEN);
fontScale = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.FONT_SCALE);
httpProxy = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.HTTP_PROXY);
installNonMarketApps =
setts.System.getInt(cr, System.INSTALL_NON_MARKET_APPS);
modeRinger = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.MODE_RINGER);
lockPatternEnabled =
setts.System.getInt(cr, System.LOCK_PATTERN_ENABLED);
networkPreference = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.NETWORK_PREFERENCE);
notificationSound = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.NOTIFICATION_SOUND);
radioBluetooth = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.RADIO_BLUETOOTH);
radioCell = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.RADIO_CELL);
radioNfc = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.RADIO_NFC);
radioWifi = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.RADIO_WIFI);
ringtone = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.RINGTONE);
screenBrightness = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.SCREEN_BRIGHTNESS);
screenOffTimeout = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.SCREEN_OFF_TIMEOUT);
soundEffectsEnabled =
setts.System.getInt(cr, System.SOUND_EFFECTS_ENABLED);
textAutoReplace = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.TEXT_AUTO_REPLACE);
textShowPassword = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.TEXT_SHOW_PASSWORD);
userRotation = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.USER_ROTATION);
vibrateOn = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.VIBRATE_ON);
volumeAlarm = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.VOLUME_ALARM);
volumeRing = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.VOLUME_RING);
volumeSystem = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.VOLUME_SYSTEM);
volumeVoice = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.VOLUME_VOICE);
wallpaperActivity = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.WALLPAPER_ACTIVITY);
waitForDebugger = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.WAIT_FOR_DEBUGGER);
wifiOn = setts.System.getInt(cr, System.WIFI_ON);
Listing 16: Retrieving Settings in Android
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A.18 Cell Tower
Cell tower information can be found using the TelephonyManager class. The Phon-
eStateListener class calls methods onCellInfoChanged, onCellLocationChanged and
onSignalStrengthsChanged when the smartphone switches cell towers.
The network operator information can then be used to reverse lookup a database of









PhoneStateListener phoneStateListener = new PhoneStateListener() {
@Override
public void onCellInfoChanged (List<CellInfo> cellInfo) {
}
public void onCellLocationChanged (CellLocation location) {
StringBuffer str = new StringBuffer();
String networkOperator = telephonyManager.getNetworkOperator();
String mcc = networkOperator.substring(0, 3);
String mnc = networkOperator.substring(3);











String cdmaDbm = String.valueOf(signalStrength.getCdmaDbm());
String cdmaEcio = String.valueOf(signalStrength.getCdmaEcio());
String evdoDbm = String.valueOf(signalStrength.getEvdoDbm());
String evdoEcio = String.valueOf(signalStrength.getEvdoEcio());






Listing 17: Retrieving Cell Tower Information in Android
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A.19 Filenames
All files stored in external storage such as an SD card can be accessed. The external storage
directory can be found using the Environment class. The list of all files in the directory can
be accessed using the listFiles method in the File class. If a file is found to be a directory,
then a recursive call can be made to determine files in the sub-directory. In general, these
files can then be accessed.
filesInDrive = new ArrayList<String>();
String filePath =
Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory().getAbsolutePath();
File file = new File(filePath);
getFiles(file);
public void getFiles(File dir) {
for(int i=0; i<dir.listFiles().length; i++) {









Listing 18: Retrieving Filenames in Android
A.20 Network Traffic Sensor
The amount of network traffic between cellular and WI-FI networks can be captured via
the TrafficStats class. Conveniently, the class differentiates between data transferred over
cellular networks versus other network connection types.
long mobileRxBytes = TrafficStats.getMobileRxBytes();
long mobileRxPackets = TrafficStats.getMobileRxPackets();
long mobileTxBytes = TrafficStats.getMobileTxBytes();
long mobileTxPackets = TrafficStats.getMobileTxPackets();
long totalRxBytes = TrafficStats.getTotalRxBytes();
long totalRxPackets = TrafficStats.getTotalRxPackets();
long totalTxBytes = TrafficStats.getTotalTxBytes();
long totalTxPackets = TrafficStats.getTotalTxPackets();
Listing 19: Retrieving Network Traffic Data in Android
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(a) Data Being Captured (b) Place Tagger
Figure A.3: MobileSensor User Interface
A.21 Uploading Data
SQL files are generated by Mobile Sensor containing INSERT statements for every entry
captured to populate structures detailed in Section A.22. A unique ID field is generated for
each entry via a hash function that concatenates the hash of each attribute contained in a row.
Each entity, contacts or messages for example are assigned to a separate SQL file. These
SQL files are are compressed using tar and GZIP (tar.gz) compression. The files are sent to
a remote server via a PHP form which will store them and call a job to pipe the statements
to a MYSQL client. The UID is set as a unique index so duplicates are not inserted. This
process can be run in the background on users’ Android devices without them being aware.
A.22 Relational Data Structure
The ER diagram in Figure A.4 illustrates the structure we used to store data captured from
the Mobile Sensor. There is a copy of this database structure on each mobile device using
SQLite and a remote copy that syncs with the local databases stored on each device. Each
type of information stored on a device such as contacts, messages and call logs are assigned










Figure A.4: ER Diagram of our Data Schema to Store Smartphone Data
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A.23 External Data
External data sources that may be useful to supplement with the captured raw internal data
include:
• Reverse address/phone listing data
• Australian census
• Business register
• Social media websites
• Cadastre information
• Real estate sale and rental history
• Government public available informa-
tion (e.g. property titles, births deaths
and marriages)
Tools and techniques to infer information will then be applied. Data mining techniques
such as decision trees and SOMs may be useful in establishing accurate profiles for smart-
phone users.
A.24 Conclusion
Sensitive user data stored on an Andorid device can be easily retrieved using standard API
calls. Additional data can also be accessed from API calls provided by externally installed
apps such as social media services. The captured data can then be stored in standard Java
structures. Mobile data captured can also be efficiently stored in local databases such as
SQLite and synchronized with a remote MySQL database.
In this appendix, we demonstrated our approach to capture Android smartphone data.
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[155] Fatih Emekçi, Ozgur D. Sahin, Divyakant Agrawal, and Amr El Abbadi. “Privacy
preserving decision tree learning over multiple parties”. In: Data & Knowledge En-
gineering 63.2 (2007), pp. 348–361.
[156] Leo Breiman. “Random Forests”. In: Machine Learning 45.1 (2001), pp. 5–32.
[157] Santu Rana, Sunil Kumar Gupta, and Svetha Venkatesh. “Differentially Private Ran-
dom Forest with High Utility”. In: Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International
Conference on Data Mining (ICDM 2015), Atlantic City, NJ, USA, November 14-
17, 2015. IEEE Computer Society, 2015, pp. 955–960.
[158] Shuguo Han and Wee Keong Ng. “Privacy-Preserving Self-Organizing Map”.
In: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of Data Warehousing and
Knowledge Discovery (DaWaK 2007), Regensburg, Germany, September 3-7, 2007.
Vol. 4654. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2007, pp. 428–437.
[159] Dong-Her Shih, Binshan Lin, Hsiu-Sen Chiang, and Ming-Hung Shih. “Security
aspects of mobile phone virus: a critical survey”. In: Industrial Management and
Data Systems 108.4 (2008), pp. 478–494.
[160] A Schmidt and Sahin Albayrak. Malicious software for smartphones. Tech. rep.
Technische Universität Berlin, DAI-Labor, Tech. Rep. TUB-DAI, 2008, pp. 08–01.
[161] Adrienne Porter Felt, Matthew Finifter, Erika Chin, Steve Hanna, and David Wag-
ner. “A survey of mobile malware in the wild”. In: Proceedings of the 1st ACM
Workshop Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices (SPSM 2011),
Co-located with CCS 2011, Chicago, IL, USA, October 17, 2011. ACM, 2011,
pp. 3–14.
[162] Mariantonietta La Polla, Fabio Martinelli, and Daniele Sgandurra. “A Survey on
Security for Mobile Devices”. In: IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 15.1
(2013), pp. 446–471.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 223
[163] Sancheng Peng, Shui Yu, and Aimin Yang. “Smartphone Malware and Its Propaga-
tion Modeling: A Survey”. In: IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials 16.2
(2014), pp. 925–941.
[164] Billy Lau, Yeongjin Jang, Chengyu Song, Tielei Wang, PH Chung, and P Royal.
“Mactans: Injecting malware into iOS devices via malicious chargers”. In: Pro-
ceedings of Black Hat USA (2013).
[165] Kaspersky Lab, ed. The very first mobile malware: how Kaspersky Lab discovered
Cabir. [Online; posted 16-June-2014]. 2014. URL: http://www.kaspersky.
co.in/about/news/virus/2014/The- very- first- mobile-
malware-how-Kaspersky-Lab-discovered-Cabir.
[166] Kaspersky Lab, ed. Antivirus Protection & Internet Security Software. [Online;
posted 09-August-2010]. 2010. URL: http://me.kaspersky.com/en/
about/news/virus/2010/First_SMS_Trojan_detected_for_
smartphones_running_Android.
[167] F-Secure Corporation, ed. WORM:IPHONEOS/IKEE. [Online; posted 25-
November-2009]. 2009. URL: https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/
worm_iphoneos_ikee.shtml.
[168] Juniper Networks, ed. 2011 Mobile Threats Report. [Online; posted February-
2011]. 2011. URL: http://www.juniper.net/us/en/local/pdf/
additional-resources/jnpr-2011-mobile-threats-report.
pdf.
[169] Mikko Hypponen and Jarno Niemela. BRADOR. Ed. by F-Secure Corporation. [On-
line; posted 06-August-2004]. 2004. URL: https://www.f-secure.com/v-
descs/brador.shtml.
[170] Manuel Egele, Christopher Kruegel, Engin Kirda, and Giovanni Vigna. “PiOS: De-
tecting Privacy Leaks in iOS Applications”. In: Proceedings of the Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2011), San Diego, California, USA,
6th February - 9th February 2011. The Internet Society, 2011.
[171] Clint Gibler, Jonathan Crussell, Jeremy Erickson, and Hao Chen. “AndroidLeaks:
Automatically Detecting Potential Privacy Leaks in Android Applications on
BIBLIOGRAPHY 224
a Large Scale”. In: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference of Trust
and Trustworthy Computing (TRUST 2012), Vienna, Austria, June 13-15, 2012.
Vol. 7344. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag GmbH, June 5,
2012, pp. 291–307.
[172] John Paul Dunning. “Taming the Blue Beast: A Survey of Bluetooth Based Threats”.
In: IEEE Security & Privacy 8.2 (2010), pp. 20–27.
[173] Erika Chin, Adrienne Porter Felt, Vyas Sekar, and David Wagner. “Measuring user
confidence in smartphone security and privacy”. In: Proceedings of the Symposium
On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS ’12), Washington, DC, USA - July 11 -
13, 2012. ACM, 2012, p. 1.
[174] Adrienne Porter Felt, Serge Egelman, and David Wagner. “I’Ve Got 99 Problems,
but Vibration Ain’T One: A Survey of Smartphone Users’ Concerns”. In: Proceed-
ings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile
Devices (SPSM 2012), Raleigh, NC, USA, October 19, 2012. SPSM ’12. Raleigh,
North Carolina, USA: ACM, 2012, pp. 33–44.
[175] Adrienne Porter Felt, Elizabeth Ha, Serge Egelman, Ariel Haney, Erika Chin, and
David Wagner. “Android permissions: user attention, comprehension, and behav-
ior”. In: Proceedings of the Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS
’12), Washington, DC, USA - July 11 - 13, 2012. ACM, 2012, p. 3.
[176] Alexios Mylonas, Anastasia Kastania, and Dimitris Gritzalis. “Delegate the smart-
phone user? Security awareness in smartphone platforms”. In: Computers & Secu-
rity 34 (2013), pp. 47–66.
[177] Serge Egelman, Adrienne Porter Felt, and David Wagner. “Choice Architecture and
Smartphone Privacy: There’s a Price for That”. In: The Economics of Information
Security and Privacy. Springer, 2013, pp. 211–236.
[178] The United Nations. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1948.
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